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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT), also referred to as the Internet of Objects, is envisioned as
a holistic and transformative approach for providing numerous services. The rapid
development of various communication protocols and miniaturization of transceivers
along with recent advances in sensing technologies offer the opportunity to transform
isolated devices into communicating smart things. Smart things, that can sense, store,
and even process electrical, thermal, optical, chemical, and other signals to extract
user-/environment-related information, have enabled services only limited by human
imagination.
Despite picturesque promises of IoT-enabled systems, the integration of smart
things into the standard Internet introduces several security challenges because the
majority of Internet technologies, communication protocols, and sensors were not
designed to support IoT. Several recent research studies have demonstrated that
launching security/privacy attacks against IoT-enabled systems, in particular wear-
able medical sensor (WMS)-based systems, may lead to catastrophic situations and
life-threatening conditions. Therefore, security threats and privacy concerns in the
IoT domain need to be proactively studied and aggressively addressed. In this thesis,
we tackle several domain-specific security/privacy challenges associated with IoT-
enabled systems.
We first target health monitoring systems that are one of the most widely-used
types of IoT-enabled systems. We discuss and evaluate several energy-efficient
schemes and algorithms, which significantly reduce total energy consumption of
different implantable and wearable medical devices (IWMDs). The proposed schemes
make continuous long-term health monitoring feasible while providing spare energy
needed for data encryption.
Furthermore, we present two energy-efficient protocols for implantable medical
devices (IMDs), which are essential for data encryption: (i) a secure wakeup protocol
iii
that is resilient against battery draining attacks, along with (ii) a low-power key
exchange protocol that shares the encryption key between the IMD and the external
device while ensuring confidentiality of the key.
Moreover, we introduce a new class of attacks against the privacy of a patient
who is carrying IWMDs. We describe how an attacker can infer private information
about the patient by exploiting physiological information leakage, i.e., signals that
continuously emanate from the human body due to the normal functioning of organs
or IWMDs attached to (or implanted in) the body.
Further, we propose a new generic class of security attacks, called dedicated in-
telligent security attacks against sensor-triggered emergency responses (DISASTER),
that is applicable to a variety of sensor-based systems. DISASTER exploits design
flaws and security weaknesses of safety mechanisms deployed in cyber-physical sys-
tems (CPSs) to trigger emergency responses even in the absence of a real emergency.
In addition to introducing DISASTER, we comprehensively describe its serious con-
sequences and demonstrate the possibility of launching such attacks against the two
most widely-used CPSs: residential and industrial automation/monitoring systems.
Finally, we present a continuous authentication system based on BioAura, i.e., in-
formation that is already gathered by WMSs for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes.
We extensively examine the proposed authentication system and demonstrate that it
offers promising advantages over one-time knowledge-based authentication systems,
e.g., password-/pattern-based systems, and may potentially be used to protect per-
sonal computing devices and servers, software applications, and restricted physical
spaces.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) does not have a unique definition. However, a broad in-
terpretation of IoT is that it provides any service over the traditional Internet by
enabling human-to-thing, thing-to-thing, or thing-to-things communications [3]. IoT
represents the interconnection of heterogeneous entities, where the term entity refers
to a human, sensor, or potentially anything that may request/provide a service [4].
The emergence of the IoT paradigm is one of the most spectacular phenomena
of the last decade. The development of various communication protocols, along with
the miniaturization of transceivers, provides the opportunity to transform an isolated
device into a communicating thing. Moreover, computing power, energy capacity, and
storage capabilities of small computing or sensing devices have significantly improved
while their sizes have decreased drastically. Boosted by the rapid development of
IoT-enabled systems in recent years, Internet-connected wearable medical sensors
(WMSs) are garnering an ever-increasing attention in both academic and industrial
research. Although WMSs were initially developed to enable low-cost solutions for
continuous health monitoring, the applications of WMS-based systems now range far
beyond health care. As discussed later in this chapter, several research efforts have
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proposed the use of such systems in diverse application domains, e.g., education,
human-computer interaction, and security.
As a side effect of rapid advances in the design and development of IoT-enabled
systems, the number of potential threats and possible attacks against security of such
systems, in particular WMS-based systems that rely on resource-constrained sensors,
and privacy of their users has grown drastically. Thus, security threats and common
privacy concerns need to be studied and addressed in depth. This would greatly
simplify the development of secure smart devices that enable a plethora of services
for human beings, ranging from building automation to health monitoring, in which
very different things, e.g., temperature sensor, light sensor, and medical sensors, might
interact with each other or with a human carrying a smart computing device, e.g., a
smartphone, tablet, or laptop. This dissertation aims to explore and address different
security/privacy issues associated with IoT-enabled systems with a special focus on
WMS-based systems.
In the rest of this chapter, we first describe the IoT paradigm, and then discuss
WMS-based systems.
1.1 The IoT paradigm
In this section, we first discuss different IoT reference models described in the litera-
ture. Then, we describe the scope of IoT applications. Thereafter, we explain what
security means in the scope of IoT. Finally, we discuss who the attackers that target
the IoT might be, and what motivations they might have.
1.1.1 IoT reference models
Three IoT reference models have been widely discussed in academic and industrial
publications. Fig. 1.1 shows these models and their different levels. The three-level
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(a) Three-level model [5] (b) Five-level model [4]
(c) CISCO’s seven-level model [6]
Figure 1.1: Three IoT reference models
model [5] is among the first reference models proposed for IoT. It depicts IoT as an
extended version of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In fact, it models IoT as a
combination of WSNs and cloud servers, which offer different services to the user.
The five-level model [4] is an alternative that has been proposed to facilitate interac-
tions among different sections of an enterprise by decomposing complex systems into
simplified applications consisting of an ecosystem of simpler and well-defined com-
ponents [4]. In 2014, CISCO suggested a comprehensive extension to the traditional
three-level and five-level models. CISCO’s seven-level model has the potential to be
3
standardized and thus create a widely-accepted reference model for IoT [6]. In this
model, data flow is usually bidirectional. However, the dominant direction of data
flow depends on the application. For example, in a control system, data and com-
mands travel from the top of the model (applications level) to the bottom (edge node
level), whereas, in a monitoring scenario, the flow is from bottom to top.
In order to summarize IoT security attacks and their countermeasures in a level-
by-level fashion, we use the CISCO reference model in Chapter 2. Next, we briefly
describe each level of this model.
Level 1-Edge devices: The first level of this reference model typically consists of
computing nodes, e.g., smart controllers, sensors, RFID readers, etc., and different
versions of RFID tags. Data confidentiality and integrity must be taken into account
from this level upwards.
Level 2-Communication : The communication level consists of all the components
that enable transmission of information or commands: (i) communication between
devices in the first level, (ii) communication between the components in the second
level, and (iii) transmission of information between the first and third levels (edge
computing level).
Level 3-Edge computing : Edge computing, also called fog computing, is the third
level of the model in which simple data processing is initiated. This is essential for
reducing the computation load in the higher level as well as providing a fast response.
Most real-time applications need to perform computations as close to the edge of the
network as possible. The amount of processing in this level depends on the computing
power of the service providers, servers, and computing nodes. Typically, simple signal
processing and learning algorithms are utilized here.
Level 4-Data accumulation : Most of the applications may not need instant data
processing. This level enables conversion of data in motion to data at rest, i.e., it
allows us to store the data for future analysis or to share with high-level computing
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servers. The main tasks of this level are converting the format from network packets to
database tables, reducing data through filtering and selective storing, and determining
whether the data are of interest to higher levels.
Level 5-Data abstraction : This level provides the opportunity to render and store
data such that further processing becomes simpler or more efficient. The common
tasks of entities at this level include normalization, de-normalization, indexing and
consolidating data into one place, and providing access to multiple data stores.
Level 6-Applications : The application level provides information interpretation,
where software cooperates with data accumulation and data abstraction levels. The
applications of IoT are numerous and may vary significantly across markets and in-
dustrial needs.
Level 7-Users and centers : The highest level of the IoT is where the users are.
Users make use of the applications and their analytical data.
1.1.2 Scope of applications
In this section, we first discuss the scope of IoT applications.
Smart homes and buildings, electronic health aids, and smarter vehicles are just
some of the IoT instances [7–9]. Each smart device may provide several services to en-
able a more intuitive environment. However, we are not even close to exhausting the
possible uses of IoT. IoT provides an opportunity to combine sensing, communication,
networking, authentication, identification, and computing, and enables numerous ser-
vices upon request such that access to the information of any smart thing is possible
at any time. Fig. 1.2 demonstrates various applications of the IoT, which we describe
next:
1. Smart vehicles : Smart vehicles have started to revolutionize traditional
transportation. Small IoT-based systems can enable remote locking/unlocking of
cars, download of roadmaps, and access to traffic information. Moreover, Internet-
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Figure 1.2: Different applications of IoT [1]
connected cars provide significant protection against theft.
2. Smart buildings : Smart homes and buildings enable effective energy man-
agement. For example, smart thermostats, which have embedded sensors and data
analysis algorithms, can control air conditioners based on user preferences and habits.
Moreover, smart controllers can adjust lighting based on user’s usage. Several house-
hold items, e.g., refrigerators, televisions, and security systems, could have their own
processing units, and provide over-the-Internet services. These smart devices greatly
enhance users’ convenience. Remotely-controllable devices receive commands from
users to perform actions that have an effect on the surrounding environment. Thus,
attacks on these devices may lead to physical consequences [10].
3. Health monitoring : Recent advances in biomedical sensing and signal pro-
cessing, low-power devices, and wireless communication have revolutionized health
care. IoT-based long-term personal health monitoring and drug delivery systems, in
which various physiological signals are captured, analyzed, and stored for future use,
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provide a fundamentally new approach to health care [11]. Smart medical devices
are already in use in fitness, diet, and health monitoring systems [12]. The future of
IoT-based health care systems lies in designing personal health monitors that enable
early detection of illnesses.
4. Energy management : Use of smart IoT-based systems, which integrate
embedded sensors and actuation components, enables a proactive approach to opti-
mizing energy consumption. In particular, power outlets, lamps, fridges, and smart
televisions, which can be controlled remotely, are expected to share information
with energy supply companies to optimize the energy consumption in smart homes.
Moreover, such things allow the users to remotely control or manage them, and
enable scheduling that can lead to a significant reduction in energy consumption.
5. Construction management : Monitoring and management of modern infras-
tructure, e.g., bridges, traffic lights, railway tracks, and buildings, are one of the
key IoT applications [13]. IoT can be used for monitoring any sudden changes in
structural conditions that can lead to safety and security risks. It can also enable
construction and maintenance companies to share information about their plans. For
example, a construction company can let GPS companies know its maintenance plans
for the roads and, based on that, the smart GPS devices can choose an alternative
route, which avoids the road under construction.
6. Environmental monitoring : The use of smart things with embedded sensors
enables environmental monitoring as well as detection of emergency situations, e.g.,
a flood, which require a fast response. In addition, the quality of air and water can
be examined by IoT-based devices. Moreover, humidity and temperature can be
easily monitored [14].
7. Production and assembly line management : IoT-based smart systems
allow rapid manufacturing of new products and an interactive response to demands
by enabling communication between sensors and controlling/monitoring systems [15].
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Moreover, intelligent management approaches that use real-time measurements can
also enable energy optimization and safety management.
8. Food supply chain : The food supply chain model is fundamentally distributed
and sophisticated. IoT can provide valuable information for managers of this chain.
Although IoT is already in use within the supply management systems, its current
benefits are limited. One of the most obvious and significant advantages of IoT in
supply management is that it ensures security and safety of the products by utilizing
IoT-based tracking [16]. These devices can raise a warning in case of a security
breach at any unauthorized level of the supply management system.
1.1.3 Definition of security in the scope of IoT
Next, we define two of the most commonly-used terms in the scope of IoT: a secure
thing and a security attack. When defining what a secure thing is, it is important
to understand the characteristics that define security. Traditionally, security require-
ments are broken down into three main categories: (i) confidentiality, (ii) integrity,
and (iii) availability, referred to as the CIA-triad. Confidentiality entails applying a
set of rules to limit unauthorized access to certain information. It is crucial for IoT
devices because they might handle critical personal information, e.g., medical records
and prescription. For instance, an unauthorized access to personal health devices may
reveal personal health information or even lead to life-threatening situations [17]. In-
tegrity is also necessary for providing a reliable service. The device must ensure that
the received commands and collected information are legitimate. An integrity com-
promise may lead to serious adverse consequences. For example, integrity attacks
against medical devices, e.g., an insulin pump [18] or a pacemaker [19], may have life-
threatening outcomes. IoT availability is essential for providing a fully-functioning
Internet-connected environment. It ensures that devices are available for collecting
data and prevents service interruptions.
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Table 1.1: Security requirements
Requirement Definition Abbreviations
Confidentiality Ensuring that only authorized users access the C
information
Integrity Ensuring completeness, accuracy, and absence I
of unauthorized data manipulation
Availability Ensuring that all system services are available, A
when requested by an authorized user
Accountability An ability of a system to hold users responsible AC
for their actions
Auditability An ability of a system to conduct persistent AU
monitoring of all actions
Trustworthiness An ability of a system to verify identity and TW
establish trust in a third party
Non-repudiation An ability of a system to confirm occurrence/ NR
non-occurrence of an action
Privacy Ensuring that the system obeys privacy policies P
and enabling users to control their data
The insufficiency of the CIA-triad in the context of security has been addressed
before [20–22]. Cherdantseva et al. [20] show that the CIA-triad does not address
new threats that emerge in a collaborative security environment. They provide a
comprehensive list of security requirements by analyzing and examining a variety
of information, assurance, and security literature. This list is called the IAS-octave
and is proposed as an extension to CIA-triad. Table 1.1 summarizes the security
requirements in the IAS-octave, and provides their definitions and abbreviations. We
define:
• Secure thing : A thing that meets all of the above-mentioned security require-
ments.
• Security attack : An attack that threatens at least one of the above-mentioned
security requirements.
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1.1.4 Potential attackers and their motivations
Next, we briefly discuss who the attackers that target the IoT might be, and what
motivations they may have.
IoT-based systems may manage a huge amount of information and be used for
services ranging from industrial management to health monitoring. This has made
the IoT paradigm an interesting target for a multitude of attackers and adversaries,
such as occasional hackers, cybercriminals, hacktivists, government, etc.
Potential attackers might be interested in stealing sensitive information, e.g.,
credit card numbers, location data, financial accounts’ passwords, and health-related
information, by hacking IoT devices. Moreover, they might try to compromise IoT
components, e.g., edge nodes, to launch attacks against a third-party entity. Consider
an intelligence agency that infects millions of IoT-based systems, e.g., remote moni-
toring systems, and smart devices, e.g., smart televisions. It can exploit the infected
systems and devices to spy on a person of interest or to conduct an attack on a large
scale. Also, hacktivists or those in opposition might be interested in attacking smart
devices to launch protests against an organization.
1.2 WMS-based systems
Aging population and rapidly-rising costs of health care have triggered a lot of interest
in WMSs. Traditionally, in-hospital monitoring devices, such as electrocardiogram
(ECG) and electroencephalogram (EEG) monitors, have been used to sense and store
raw medical data, with processing being performed later on another machine, e.g., an
external computer [11, 23]. Several trends in communication, signal processing, ma-
chine learning, and biomedical sensing have converged to advance continuous health
monitoring from a distant vision to the verge of reality. Foremost among these trends
is the development of Internet-connected WMSs, which can non-invasively sense, col-
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lect, and even process different types of body-related data, e.g., electrical, thermal,
and optical signals generated by the human body.
WMSs enable proactive prevention and remote detection of health issues, thus
with the potential to significantly reduce health care costs [24, 25]. Since the intro-
duction of the first wearable heart monitor in 1981 [26], numerous types of WMS-
based systems have been proposed, ranging from simple accelerometer-based activity
monitors [25, 27] to complex sweat sensors [28]. WMS-based systems have also been
developed for continuous long-term health monitoring [11,29].
In the last decade, with the pervasive use of Internet-connected WMSs, the scope
of applications of WMS-based systems has extended far beyond health care. For
example, such systems have targeted application domains as diverse as education,
information security, and human-computer interaction (HCI). Park et al. [30] intro-
duced a WMS-based teaching assistant system, called SmartKG. It collects, manages,
and fuses data gathered by several wearable badges to prepare valuable feedback to
the teacher. Barreto et al. [31] designed and implemented a human-computer inter-
face, which uses EEG and electromyogram (EMG) signals gathered from the subject’s
head to control computer cursor movements.
Despite the emergence of numerous WMS-based systems in recent years, potential
challenges associated with their design, development, and implementation are neither
well-studied nor well-recognized. The rest of this section:
• provides a brief history of wearable computing devices and WMSs and discusses
how their market is growing,
• explains in depth the scope of applications of WMS-based systems,
• describes the architecture of a typical WMS-based system and discusses con-
stituent components, and the limitations of these components,
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• suggests an inclusive list of desirable design goals and requirements that WMS-
based systems should satisfy.
1.2.1 History and market growth
Wearable devices have a history that goes back longer than most people expect. The
first truly wearable computer appeared in 1961, when Edward O. Thorpe and Claude
Shannon created Roulette Predictor [32], a wearable computer that could be con-
cealed in a shoe and accurately predict where the ball would land on a roulette circle.
Integration of wearable sensors in wearable computing devices was done in 1981,
when Polar Electro Company introduced the first wearable heart rate monitors for
professional athletes [26]. After that, several companies were founded to offer various
services based on WMSs. However, due to the immaturity of the sensing technology,
implementation complexities, e.g., heat management, limitations of wearable sensors,
e.g., small local storage, and security/privacy concerns, the majority of such compa-
nies experienced a difficult time commercializing their products, and as a result, went
through bankruptcy [33].
Rapid advances in communication protocols and the miniaturization of transceivers
in 1990s, along with the emergence of different WMSs in the early 2000s, transformed
the market of wearable technologies. In the last decade, the rapidly-falling prices
of WMSs and components used to implement WMS-based systems have changed
the application landscape [34–36]. In addition, the rising market of personal smart
devices, e.g., smartphones and tablets, that are powerful, ubiquitous, and less
resource-limited relative to wearable sensors, has enabled a plethora of services, rang-
ing from continuous health monitoring [11] to continuous user authentication [37].
The introduction of Apple’s App Store for the iPhone and iPod Touch in July 2008,
Google’s Android Market (now called Google Play Store), and RIM’s BlackBerry
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App World in 2009, enabled easy distribution of third-party applications, further
boosting the WMS industry [38,39].
Global Wearable Sensors Market [40] recently published a report that includes
information from 2011 to 2016. This report indicates that the introduction of smart
watches from companies like Samsung, Sony, and Nike has given a significant boost
to the wearable technology market. As of 2016, North America has the highest
penetration of wearable sensors since Americans tend to be early adopters of new
technologies. However, Asia is expected to show the highest growth rate in a few
years due to the presence of developing countries like India and China [41]. A recently-
published report provided by IHS Technology [42] forecasts that the number of WMSs
will rise by 7× from 67 million units in 2013 to 466 million units in 2019. Another
recent report by Business Insider [43] claims that 33 million wearable devices were
sold in 2015 only for health monitoring. It forecasts that this number will reach 148
million by 2019. In the years after that, such usage is expected to explode further.
1.2.2 Scopes of applications
In this section, we describe various applications of WMS-based systems (a summary
is shown in Fig. 1.3).
Health care
Rapid advances in WMS-based systems are transforming and revolutionizing health
care. Medical WMS-based systems are of two main types: (i) health monitoring
systems that monitor the patient to prevent the occurrence of a medical condition or
detect a disease at an early stage, and (ii) medical automation systems, which offer
continuous treatment or rehabilitation services. Next, we describe each type.
1. Health monitoring systems : Prevention and early detection of medical con-
ditions are essential for promoting wellness. Unfortunately, conventional clinical di-
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Figure 1.3: The scope of applications of WMS-based systems
agnostic practices commonly fail to detect health conditions in the early stages since
diagnosis is typically performed after the emergence of major health symptoms, and
previous medical data on the patient are often very sketchy. Furthermore, clinical
practices are difficult to carry out in out-of-hospital environments.
In order to address the above-mentioned drawbacks of traditional clinical prac-
tices, several research studies have targeted WMS-based health monitoring systems.
Such systems can be divided into two categories based on their main task: (i) preven-
tive systems that aim to provide an approach to prevent diseases before the emergence
of their symptoms, and (ii) responsive systems that attempt to detect health condi-
tions at an early stage and provide health reports to the patient or the physician.
Next, we describe each category.
Preventive systems: Preventive health monitoring systems provide real-time feed-
back to the user in an attempt to correct behaviors that might lead to adverse health
conditions in the future. They promote healthy behaviors and lower the probabil-
ity of serious illnesses by automatically detecting/predicting unhealthy activities and
warning the user about them [44]. Posture correctors and fitness trackers are two of
the most widely-known types of preventive health monitoring systems.
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Posture corrector: A poor posture results in muscle tightening, shortening, or
weakening, causing several health conditions, e.g., back pain and spinal deformity [45].
Posture correctors [46–48] monitor the user’s movements and habits and offer real-
time feedback upon the detection of any posture abnormality, e.g., slouching when
sitting in front of a computer display. In fact, they help the user maintain a healthy
posture while performing daily activities.
Fitness tracker: Such trackers are in widespread use and their market is rapidly
growing. Although they may use different sensing technologies, they all have a com-
mon characteristic: they non-invasively measure some types of fitness-related pa-
rameters, e.g., calories burned, heart rate, number of steps taken [49], and even
sleep patterns [50]. State-of-the-art fitness trackers play a significant role in the IoT
paradigm by enabling object-to-object communication, transmission of user’s data
to the Cloud, and remote monitoring of user’s activities [51]. For example, a fit-
ness tracker, which can communicate with other objects, may be able to gather data
from gymnasium equipment to support aspects of fitness progress awareness, such as
shopping suggestions to support the user’s fitness regime [52].
Responsive systems: Responsive health monitoring systems aim to detect medical
conditions at an early stage by monitoring and analyzing various biomedical sig-
nals, e.g., heart rate, blood glucose, blood sugar, EEG, and ECG, over a long time
period. For example, the CodeBlue project [53] examined the feasibility of using in-
terconnected sensors for transmitting vital health signs to health care providers. Nia
et al. [11] proposed an extremely energy-efficient personal health monitoring system
based on eight biomedical sensors: (1) heart rate, (2) blood pressure, (3) oxygen satu-
ration, (4) body temperature, (5) blood glucose, (6) accelerometer, (7) ECG, and (8)
EEG. MobiHealth [54] offered an end-to-end mobile health platform for continuous
health care monitoring.
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2. Medical automation systems: Unlike health monitoring systems, medical
automation systems enhance the user’s quality of life after/during the emergence of
health issues. They mitigate health issues or minimize disease symptoms by actively
providing essential therapy. Based on their functionality, medical automation systems
can be divided into two main categories: drug infusion and rehabilitating systems.
Drug infusion systems: Drug infusion systems enable safe injection of pharma-
ceutical compounds, e.g., nutrients and medications, into the body to achieve desired
therapeutic effects. Automatic drug infusion systems control the drug release pro-
file, absorption, and distribution to enhance the treatment efficacy and safety as well
as patient convenience and compliance [55]. Insulin delivery systems are one of the
most commonly-used types of drug infusion systems. They continuously monitor
the patient’s blood glucose level using wearable glucose sensing patches and inject a
prescribed amount of insulin into the blood stream when necessary.
Rehabilitation systems: Such systems have attracted a lot of attention in the past
two decades. They are currently used by patients after a major operation, sensory
loss, stroke, severe accident, or brain injury [56]. They are also used to help patients
who suffer from serious neurological conditions, e.g., Parkinson’s disease or post-stroke
condition [57]. Gait and/or motor abilities analysis is often used in rehabilitation in
hospitals and health care centers [58].
An example of WMS-based rehabilitation system is Valedo [59], which is a medical
back-training device developed by Hocoma AG to enhance patient compliance. It
gathers trunk movements using two WMSs, transfers them to a game environment,
and guides the patient through exercises targeted at low back pain therapy. Another
example is Stroke Rehabilitation Exerciser [60] developed by Philips Research, which
coaches the patient through a sequence of exercises for motor retraining. Salarian
et al. [61] proposed a method for enhancing the gait of a patient with Parkinson’s
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disease. Hester et al. [62] proposed a WMS-based system to facilitate post-stroke
rehabilitation.
HCI
In our daily conversations, the existence of common contexts, i.e., implicit information
that characterizes the situation of a person or place that is relevant to the conversa-
tion, helps us convey ideas to each other and react appropriately. Unfortunately, the
ability to share context-dependent ideas does not transfer well to humans interacting
with machines. The design of WMS-based human-computer interfaces has notably
improved the richness of communications in HCI [63]. In particular, various WMS-
based gesture detection and emotion recognition systems have been proposed in the
literature to enhance HCI.
1. Gesture detection systems : Several applications, such as sign-language recog-
nition and remote control of electronic devices, need to respond to simple gestures
made by humans. In the last decade, many WMS-based gesture recognition mecha-
nisms have been developed to process sensory data collected by WMSs, e.g., magne-
tometer [64,65], accelerometer [25,27], and gyroscopes [66], to recognize user’s gesture
and enable gesture-aware HCI.
Although gestures from any part of the body can be used for interacting with
a computing device, previous experimental research efforts [67] have demonstrated
that finger-based gesture detection mechanisms are more successful in practice since
their information entropy is much larger than that of interactions based on other
human body parts. As a result, several research studies [66, 68–70] have focused on
developing algorithms to detect hand gestures in real-time. A promising example of
WMS-based gesture detection systems is Pingu [66], a smart wearable ring that is
capable of recognizing simple and tiny gestures from user’s ring finger.
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2. Emotion recognition systems: Wearable technology was first used to detect
emotions/feelings by Picard et al. [71]. Since then, several researchers have used
different sets of WMSs to detect different emotions/feelings, e.g., stress [72, 73], de-
pression [74], and happiness [75]). However, we humans still cannot agree on how
we define certain emotions, even though we are extremely good at expressing them.
This fact has made emotion recognition a technically challenging field. However, it
is becoming increasingly important in HCI studies as its advantages become more
apparent.
Information Security and Forensics
Next, we discuss two well-known types of WMS-based systems developed in the do-
main of information security and forensics for deception detection and authentication.
1. Deception detection systems: The examination of the truthfulness of state-
ments made by victims, suspects, and witnesses is of paramount importance in legal
settings. Real-time WMS-based deception detection systems attempt to facilitate se-
curity screening and criminal investigation, and also augment human judgment [76].
They process sensory data collected by various types of WMSs (commonly heart rate,
blood pressure, and accelerometers) to detect suspicious changes in the individual’s
mental state, e.g., a rapid increase in stress level, behavior, e.g., involuntary facial
movements, and physiological signals, e.g., an increase in the heart rate. For example,
PokerMetrics [77] is a lie detection system that processes heart rate, skin conductance,
temperature, and body movements to find out when the user is bluffing during a poker
tournament. FNIRS-based polygraph [78] is another fairly accurate lie detection sys-
tem that processes data collected by a wearable near-infrared spectroscope.
2. Authentication systems : Authentication refers to the process of verifying a
user’s identity based on certain credentials [79]. A rapidly-growing body of litera-
ture on the usage of behaviometrics, i.e., measurable behavior such as frequency of
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keystrokes, and biometrics, i.e., strongly-reliable biological traits such as EEG signals,
for authentication has emerged in the last two decades [80–82].
Design of WMS-based authentication is an emerging research domain that is at-
tracting increasing attention. Several research efforts have investigated the feasibility
of using the data collected by WMSs as behaviometrics or biometrics. In particular,
various research studies [83, 84] have demonstrated that the data collected by smart
watches, e.g., acceleration, orientation, and magnetic field, can be used to distin-
guish users from each other. Furthermore, the use of EEG [85] and ECG [86] signals,
as biomedical traits with high discriminatory power for authentication, has received
widespread attention. Although EEG/ECG-based authentication systems have shown
promising results, they have been unable to offer a convenient method for continu-
ous user authentication for two reasons. First, the size/position requirements of the
sensors that capture EEG/ECG signals significantly limit their applicability [86, 87].
Second, processing of EEG/ECG signals for authentication is resource-hungry [88].
A recently-proposed WMS-based authentication system, called CABA [37], has at-
tempted to effectively address these drawbacks by using an ensemble of biomedical
signals that can be continuously and non-invasively collected by WMSs.
Education
Next, we describe how technological advances in WMSs are transforming education
by opening up new opportunities for employing smart tutoring and teaching assistant
systems.
1. Smart tutoring : With the rapid development of online tutoring and exponen-
tial increase in the number of massive open online course websites, many research
projects have been conducted on computer-based tutoring systems, which aim to
select suitable instructional strategies based on the learner’s reactions, mental con-
ditions, emotional states, and feedback (see [89] for a survey). Moreover, there is a
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strong motivation in the military community for designing adaptive computer-based
tutoring systems to provide effective training in environments where human tutors
are unavailable [90, 91]. WMS-based tutoring systems can recognize the user’s emo-
tional condition, level of understanding, physical state, and stress level by collecting
and processing sensory data, e.g., user’s heart rate and blood pressure. They can also
predict learning outcomes, e.g., performance and skill acquisition, and continuously
adapt their teaching/training approaches to optimize learning efficiency [89].
2. Teaching assistant : WMS-based teaching assistant systems can continuously
collect and process various forms of biomedical signals from students, and analyze
their voices, movements, and behaviors in order to reach a conclusion about the lec-
turer’s quality of presentation and listeners’ level of satisfaction. They can facilitate
the teaching process by continuously assisting the lecturer in delivering and subse-
quently making the learning process shorter, more efficient, more pleasant, and even
entertaining. For example, Grosshauser et al. [92] have designed a WMS-based teach-
ing assistant system that monitors movements of dancers and provides feedback to
their teacher. Park et al. [30] have designed SmartKG that relies on several wearable
badges to provide valuable information about kindergarten students to their teacher.
1.2.3 Main components of WMS-based systems
In this section, we describe the components that constitute a typical WMS-based
system, and their limitations. As shown in Fig. 1.4, a typical WMS-based system
consists of three main components: WMSs, the base station, and Cloud servers.
Next, we describe each.
WMSs
With continuing performance and efficiency improvements in computing and real-
time signal processing, the number and variety of WMSs have increased significantly,
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Figure 1.4: The three main components of WMS-based systems: WMSs, the base
station, and Cloud servers [2].
ranging from simple pedometers to sophisticated heart-rate monitors. WMSs sense
electrical, thermal, chemical, and other signals from the user’s body. The majority
of these sensors, e.g., EEG and ECG, directly sense and collect biomedical signals.
However, a few sensors, e.g., accelerometers, gather raw data that can be used to
extract health-related information. Table 1.2 lists various commonly-used WMSs in
an alphabetical order, along with a short description for each sensor.
Despite the variety of WMSs available, they share two common limitations that
must be considered while designing a WMS-based system: small storage capacity and
limited energy.
1. Small storage : Storing a large amount of data in a WMS is not feasible for two
reasons. First, adding a large storage to a WMS dramatically increases its energy
consumption, and as a result, significantly decreases its battery lifetime [11]. Second,
the size constraints of WMSs impose specific storage constraints. The WMS size
needs to be kept small to ensure user convenience.
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Table 1.2: Common WMSs
Sensor Description
Accelerometer measures changes in the acceleration of the device
caused by user’s movements
Blood pressure sensor measures systolic and diastolic blood pressures
ECG sensor measures the electrical activity of the heart
EEG sensor measures the electrical activity of the brain
EMG sensor records electrical activity produced by muscles
Glucometer measures approximate blood glucose concentration
GSR sensor measures continuous variation in the electrical
characteristics of the skin
Gyroscope measures changes in device orientation caused by
user’s movements
Heart rate sensor counts the number of heart contractions per minute
Magnetometer specifies user’s direction by examining the changes
in the earth’s magnetic field around the user
Microphone records acoustic sounds generated by the body
(used for respiration analysis or emotion detection)
Near-infrared spectroscope provides neuroimaging technology to examine an
aspect of brain function
Oximeter measures the ratio of oxygen-saturated hemoglobin
to the total hemoglobin count in the blood
Pedometer counts each step a person takes by detecting the
motion of the person’s hands or hips
Respiration rate sensor counts how many times the chest rises in a minute
Strain sensor measures strain on different body parts
(used to detect when the user is slouching)
Thermometer measures an individual’s body temperature
2. Limited energy : The small on-sensor battery with limited energy capacity
is one of the most significant factors that limits the volume of data sampled and
transmitted by WMSs. It is still feasible to wirelessly transmit all raw data without
performing any on-sensor processing if devices are charged regularly, e.g., on an hourly
basis. However, forcing the user to frequently recharge the WMSs would impose
severe inconvenience. As described later in Section 2.2.1, on-sensor processing may
significantly preserve battery lifetime by extracting salient information from the data
and transmitting it.
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The above-mentioned limitations of WMS-based systems have three direct conse-
quences. First, the data generated by WMSs cannot be stored on them for a long
period of time and should be transmitted to other devices/servers. Second, only ex-
tremely resource-efficient algorithms can be implemented on WMSs. Third, WMSs
cannot usually support traditional cryptographic mechanisms, e.g., encryption, and
are vulnerable to several security attacks, e.g., eavesdropping.
Base station
Due to limited on-sensor resources (small storage and limited energy), the sensory
data are frequently sent to an external device with more computation power. This
device is referred to as the base station. It may range from smartphones to specialized
computing devices, known as central hubs [11]. They commonly have large data
storage, and powerful network connectivity through cellular, IEEE 802.11 wireless,
and Bluetooth interfaces, and powerful processors [93]. Smartphones have become the
dominant form of base stations since they are ubiquitous and powerful and provide
all the technologies needed for numerous applications [94]. Moreover, smartphones
support highly-secure encrypted transmission, which deters several potential attacks
against the system [37].
The base station has its own resource constraints, though much less severe, in
terms of storage and battery lifetime. Continuous processing along with wireless
transmission to the Cloud may drain the base station’s battery within a few hours,
and as a result, cause user inconvenience. Base stations typically perform lightweight
signal processing on the raw data and re-transmit a fraction or a compressed form of
data to Cloud servers for further analysis and long-term storage.
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Cloud servers
Since both WMSs and base stations are resource-constrained, sensory data are com-
monly sent to Cloud servers for resource-hungry processing and long-term storage.
Depending on the wireless technology used, the data can be sent either directly or
indirectly (through a base station, such as a smartphone) to the Cloud. In addition
to the huge storage capacity and high computational power that Cloud servers can
provide for WMS-based applications, they facilitate access to shared resources in a
pervasive manner, offering an ever-increasing number of online on-demand services.
Furthermore, Cloud-based systems support remote update of software, without re-
quiring that the patient install any software on the personal devices, thus making
system maintenance quick and cost-effective. This makes Cloud-based systems a
promising vehicle for bringing health care services to rural areas [95].
Despite the promise of Cloud servers in this context, utilizing them in WMS-
based systems has two drawbacks. First, Cloud-based systems are highly dependent
on the reliability of the Internet connection. Outage of Internet service may have
serious consequences. For example, unavailability of a seizure prediction system (that
tries to detect the occurrence of a seizure a few seconds before the patient’s body
starts shaking) may lead to a life-threatening situation. Second, the use of Cloud
servers increases the response time (the time required to collect sensory data, process
them, and provide a response or decision). As a result, there may be a significant
deterioration of the quality of service in real-time applications.
1.2.4 Design goals
Although the scope of applications of WMS-based systems is quite wide, they share
several common design goals. We reviewed many recent research studies on the de-
sign and development of different types of WMS-based systems and realized that,
unfortunately, there is no standard inclusive list of desirable goals in the literature.
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In this section, we suggest such a list. Fig. 1.5 summarizes seven general design goals
that should be considered in designing WMS-based systems. Next, we present the
rationale behind each goal.
1. Accurate decisions : WMS-based systems process the input data, e.g., an EEG
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Figure 1.5: Goal-heptagon: Desiderata for WMS-based systems [2].
signal, and return decisions as output, e.g., whether a seizure is occurring or not. The
quality of the service provided by a WMS-based system depends on the accuracy of
decisions made by the system. For instance, a WMS-based authentication system
must confidently determine if the user is authorized to use restricted resources, or a
posture corrector must accurately decide whether the user’s posture is healthy.
2. Fast response : A short response time is a desirable design goal for the majority
of systems. In order to ensure user convenience, it is obviously desirable for the system
to quickly respond to user requests. Moreover, a short response time is essential for
an authentication system, in which the system must quickly authenticate a legitimate
user and reject an impostor [37]. Furthermore, a long response time may endanger
user safety in some scenarios. For example, if an insulin pump fails to immediately
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detect an emergency, e.g., hyperglycemia or hypoglycemia, and provide a response
when it is necessary, the patient might suffer from life-threatening conditions [96].
3. Energy efficiency : The battery used in a WMS is typically the greatest con-
tributor to both size and weight. As a result, WMSs typically have very limited
on-sensor energy [97]. Rapid depletion of battery charge, necessitating frequent, e.g.,
on a hourly basis, battery replacement/recharge would deter wide adoption of the
device [98]. Thus, all components embedded in WMSs and the signal processing al-
gorithms implemented on them must be energy-efficient.
4. High security : The emergence of the IoT paradigm has magnified the negative
impact of security attacks on sensor-based systems. Furthermore, the demonstration
of several attacks in recent research efforts (see [1] for a survey) has led to serious secu-
rity concerns and highlighted the importance of considering security requirements. To
ensure system security, different security requirements must be proactively addressed.
As mentioned earlier, security requirements are often broken down into three main
categories: (i) confidentiality, (ii) integrity, and (iii) availability, referred to as the
CIA-triad [20].
5. High-quality measurements: Undoubtedly, the quality of the decisions offered
by a WMS-based system depends on the quality of sensory measurements provided
by WMSs. It has been shown that user’s activities may negatively impact the quality
of data obtained by the WMSs, e.g., running significantly deteriorates the quality of
the signal collected by EEG sensors [99]. Hence, WMSs should be designed to provide
accurate and noise-robust measurements during different daily activities, especially
intensely physical ones.
6. Compactness of sensors : To ensure user convenience, WMSs must be kept
lightweight and as small as possible. Moreover, in many scenarios, the presence of
specific WMSs, e.g., blood glucose monitor, may reveal the presence of an illness
along with the current level of the illness, leading to serious privacy concerns [100].
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Thus, WMSs should be designed to be compact so that the user can easily hide them.
7. Passiveness : Passiveness, i.e., minimal user involvement, is a key consideration
in designing a WMS-based system. It is very desirable that WMSs be calibrated
transparently to the user and sensory data be measured independently of user ac-
tivities [101]. Obviously, if a wearable device, e.g., a smart watch, asks the user to
calibrate internal sensors, e.g., accelerometers and magnetometers, manually, it may
be quite annoying to the user [102].
1.3 Contributions of the thesis
To mitigate the security/privacy issues in the IoT domain while considering domain-
specific limitations (e.g., limited energy and small storage capacity) of various com-
ponents utilized in IoT-based systems, this thesis provides low-energy solutions that
make data encryption practical for resource-constrained sensors (e.g., WMSs). Fur-
thermore, in order to shed light on new domain-specific security/privacy issues as-
sociated with IoT-based systems, two novel security attacks are introduced in this
thesis. Moreover, a novel IoT-enabled continuous authentication system is presented,
which aims to address the security issues and weaknesses of previously-proposed au-
thentication systems. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. The thesis first targets health monitoring systems, one of the most widely-
known types of IoT-based systems that are envisioned as key to enabling a
holistic approach to health care. It describes different solutions for reducing the
total energy consumption of different implantable and wearable medical devices
(IWMDs) utilized in continuous health monitoring systems. The proposed so-
lutions can significantly increase the battery lifetimes of different IWMDs while
offering spare energy for encrypting medical data before transmitting them.
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2. The thesis introduces OpSecure, an optical secure communication channel be-
tween an implantable medical device (IMD) and an external device, e.g., a
smartphone. OpSecure enables an intrinsically user-perceptible unidirectional
data transmission, suitable for physically-secure communication with minimal
size and energy overheads. Based on OpSecure, we design and implement two
protocols: (i) a low-power wakeup protocol that is resilient against remote bat-
tery draining attacks, and (ii) a secure key exchange protocol to share the en-
cryption key between the IMD and the external device. The proposed protocols
complement lightweight symmetric encryption mechanisms, so that common
security attacks against insecure communication channels can be prevented.
3. The thesis shows how security/privacy attacks against health monitoring sys-
tems extend far beyond wireless communication to/from IWMDs, and explains
why encryption cannot always provide a comprehensive solution for eliminating
security/privacy attacks on IWMDs. In particular, it describes the possibility of
privacy attacks that target physiological information leakage, i.e., signals that
continuously emanate from the human body due to the normal functioning of its
organs. Furthermore, it discusses several novel attacks on privacy by leveraging
information leaked from them during their normal operation.
4. The thesis then introduces a generic security attack that is applicable to a va-
riety of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), i.e., systems with integrated physical
and processing capabilities that can interact with humans and the environ-
ment. These attacks are called dedicated intelligent security attacks against
sensor-triggered emergency responses (DISASTER). DISASTER targets safety
mechanisms deployed in automation/monitoring CPSs and exploits design flaws
and security weaknesses of such mechanisms to trigger emergency responses even
in the absence of a real emergency. In addition to introducing DISASTER, it
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describes the serious consequences of such attacks, and demonstrates the feasi-
bility of launching DISASTER against the two most widely-used sensor-based
systems: residential and industrial automation/monitoring systems. Moreover,
it provides several countermeasures that can potentially prevent DISASTER
and discusses their advantages and drawbacks.
5. Finally, the thesis presents continuous authentication based on biological aura
(CABA), a novel user-transparent system for continuous authentication based
on information that is already gathered by WMSs for diagnostic and thera-
peutic purposes. The presented continuous authentication system can offer
a promising alternative to one-time knowledge-based authentication systems
(e.g., password-/pattern-based authentication systems) and potentially be used
to protect personal computing devices and servers, software applications, and
restricted physical spaces.
1.4 Thesis outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related work.
Chapter 3 quantifies the energy and storage requirements of continuous personal
health monitoring systems and presents several schemes to reduce the overheads of
wirelessly transmitting, storing, and encrypting/authenticating the data. Chapter
4 discusses OpSecure and two protocols that can be used in conjunction with sym-
metric encryption to protect the wireless channel between the IMD and an external
device from different security attacks. Chapter 5 describes the concept of physiolog-
ical information leakage and how such leakage can be exploited by attackers even if
the communication channels are encrypted. Chapter 6 introduces DISASTER and
describes its consequences. Moreover, it suggests several countermeasures to miti-
gate such attacks. Chapter 7 presents CABA, describes its various applications, and
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discusses how it can be extended to user identification and adaptive access control
authorization. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and presents ideas for future research.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss related work and provide background for several key con-
cepts used in this thesis. In Section 2.1, we summarize different attacks and threats
on the edge-side layer of IoT along with their countermeasures. In Section 2.2, we
describe several research directions related to the domain of WMSs.
2.1 Vulnerabilities of IoT and their countermea-
sures
In this section, we discuss different attacks and threats on the edge-side layer of IoT
and describe possible countermeasures against them.
2.1.1 Known vulnerabilities
Next, we provide an in-depth analysis of possible attacks and vulnerabilities at each
level of the edge-side layer (edge nodes, communication, and edge computing). Fig. 2.1
summarizes several attacks and their countermeasures that are discussed in this sec-
tion. We describe the left side of this figure (attacks) first. The security requirements
and their abbreviations that are used in Fig. 2.1 are given in Table 1.1.
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Figure 2.1: Summary of attacks and countermeasures [1]
Edge nodes
Next, we discuss various attacks against the first level of the reference model that
includes computing nodes and RFID tags.
1. Computing nodes: We begin with attacks against the edge computing nodes,
e.g., RFID readers, sensor nodes, and compact controlling nodes.
Hardware Trojan: Hardware Trojans have emerged as a major security concern
for integrated circuits [103–107]. Hardware Trojan is a malicious modification of
an integrated circuit, which enables the attacker to use the circuit or to exploit its
functionality to obtain access to data or software running on the integrated circuits
(ICs) [108]. In order to insert a hardware Trojan in the original circuitry, the at-
tacker maliciously alters the design before/during fabrication and specifies a trigger-
ing mechanism that activates the malicious behavior of the Trojan [103]. Trojans are
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generally divided into two categories based on their triggering mechanisms [107,108]:
(i) externally-activated Trojans, which can be triggered by an antenna or a sensor
that can interact with the outside world, and (ii) internally-activated Trojans that are
activated after a certain condition is met inside the integrated circuit, e.g., a Trojan
that wakes up after a specific timespan when it receives a triggering signal from a
countdown circuitry added by the attacker.
Non-network side-channel attacks: Each node may reveal critical information
under normal operation, even when not using any wireless communication to trans-
mit data. For example, the electromagnetic (EM) signature, i.e., the EM waves
emitted by the node, can provide valuable information about the status of the de-
vice. The declassification of TEMPEST documents [109] in 2007, and the recent
publications of some EM-based attacks [110–112] have started to develop the idea of
non-network side-channel threats. For example, in a recent work, researchers were
able to demonstrate how the acoustic/EM signals leaked from a medical device can
provide valuable information about the patient or the device [112]. As mentioned in
that work, detection of the existence of known signals or protocols may endanger the
safety of the user, e.g., if the user has a device that is very expensive. Moreover, this
type of attack may lead to a serious privacy issue in medical systems. For example,
consider a subject who wears a medical device indicating a certain medical condition
that carries a social stigma. Detecting the presence of this device can embarrass the
patient. In addition, specific side-channel information from the devices may provide
significant information about the individual’s health condition, e.g., glucose level,
blood pressure, etc.
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: There are three well-known types of DoS at-
tacks against edge computing nodes: battery draining, sleep deprivation, and outage
attacks.
1. Battery draining : Due to size constraints, nodes usually have to carry small
33
batteries with very limited energy capacity. This has made battery-draining attacks
a very powerful attack that may indirectly lead to serious consequences, such as a
node outage or a failure to report an emergency. For example, if an attacker can find
a way to deplete the battery of a smoke detector, he will be able to disable the fire
detection system [113]. Such attacks could destroy a network if recharging the nodes
is difficult [114]. An example of a battery-draining attack is when an attacker sends
tons of random packets to a node and forces the node to run its checking mechanisms,
e.g., authentication mechanism. Several battery-draining attacks have been discussed
in the literature [115–118].
2. Sleep deprivation: Sleep deprivation is a specific type of DoS attack in which
the victim is a battery-powered node with a limited energy capacity. In this type of
attack, the attacker attempts to send an undesired set of requests that seem to be
legitimate. Therefore, detection of this type of attack is much harder than that of a
simple battery-draining attack. The idea of sleep deprivation was first described by
Stajano [119]. The research effort by Martin et al. is one of the first publications
to closely examine the impact of sleep deprivation attacks on energy-constrained de-
vices [115].
3. Outage attacks : Edge node outage occurs when an edge device stops performing
its normal operation [120]. In some cases, a set of devices or an administrator device
may stop functioning. Outage may be a result of an unintended error in the manu-
facturing process, battery draining, sleep deprivation, code injection or unauthorized
physical access to the node. One of the most famous examples of outage attacks is
injecting Stuxnet [121] into Iran’s nuclear process control program. Stuxnet manipu-
lates the industrial process control sensor signals such that the infected system loses
its ability to detect abnormal behavior. Therefore, the system does not shut down
even in an emergency situation [121,122].
Physical attacks/tampering: Edge devices operate in hostile environments in
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which physical access to the devices may be possible, thus making them highly vul-
nerable to hardware/software attacks. The attacker, with a physical access to the
device, may extract valuable cryptographic information, tamper with the circuit,
modify programming, or change the operating system [123–127]. Physical attacks
against the edge nodes may cause permanent destruction. Therefore, their main pur-
pose is to extract information for future use, e.g., find the fixed shared key. Such
a well-known recent attack was on the Nest thermostat [127], in which the attacker
replaces the default firmware with a malicious one. This attack enables the attacker
to control the thermostat, even when he no longer has physical access to the device.
Node replication attacks: In such an attack, the attacker adds a new node, e.g.,
a malicious one, to an existing set of nodes by replicating one node’s identification
number. This attack can lead to a significant reduction in network performance.
Moreover, the attacker can easily corrupt or misdirect packets that arrive at the
replica [128]. This attack usually causes severe damage to the system by enabling
the attacker to obtain required access to extract cryptographic shared keys [129].
Moreover, node replicas may revoke authorized nodes by executing node-revocation
protocols [128,130].
Camouflage: In this type of attack, the attacker inserts a counterfeit edge node
or attacks an authorized node in order to hide at the edge level. Afterwards, the
modified/counterfeit node can operate as a normal node to obtain, process, send, or
redirect packets [129, 131]. Moreover, such a node can function in a passive mode in
which it only conducts traffic analysis.
Corrupted/malicious node: The main goal of corrupting nodes is to gain unautho-
rized access to the network they belong to. Malicious nodes injected into a network
can obtain access to other nodes, possibly controlling the network on behalf of the
attacker [129]. A malicious node can also be used by the attacker to inject false data
into the system or prevent delivery of true messages [131].
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2. RFID tags: Next, we discuss the attacks against RFID tags.
Tracking: Covert reading of RFID tags is a significant threat. Unfortunately, almost
all such tags provide a unique identifier. As a result, a nearby unauthorized reader
can easily and effectively read a tag that is attached to a product or an individual.
Such a reading provides very strong tracking information [132]. In the simplest form
of the attack, an attacker uses a large number of RFID readers to read these fixed
identifiers. The threat grows and becomes more important when a tag identifier is
combined with personal information, e.g., credit/loyalty card number and personal
profile [133].
Inventorying: There are certain types of tags that carry valuable information about
the products they are attached to. In particular, electronic product code (EPC) tags
have two custom fields: a manufacturer code and a product code. As a result, an
individual who has an EPC tag is subject to inventorying [134], i.e., a tag reader
can examine what products the individual has. This threat leads to serious privacy
concerns. For example, the attacker might recognize what types of medical device,
e.g., an insulin pump, a patient is wearing and, therefore, what illnesses, e.g., diabetes,
he suffers from.
Physical attacks/tampering: This type of attack can be launched when the at-
tacker has full physical access to a tag. In this attack, the tags can be physically
manipulated and modified in a laboratory setup [135]. There are several known
physical attacks against RFIDs. Among them are probe attacks, material removal,
circuit manipulation, and clock glitching [136]. These attacks are used for extracting
information from the tag, or modifying the tag for counterfeiting.
Tag cloning: Tag cloning (also referred to as spoofing) and impersonation of RFID
tags could be very profitable to hackers, and extremely dangerous for the company’s
reputation. Potential damage can be amplified through a high level of automation
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[137]. An attacker may use tag cloning to access restricted areas, bank accounts, or
sensitive information.
Counterfeiting: In counterfeiting, the attacker modifies the identity of an item,
typically by means of tag manipulation. Generally, the attacker needs less information
to launch counterfeiting attacks relative to spoofing attacks. In these attacks, a
tag is partially manipulated. Westhues describes how an RF tape-recorder can be
constructed to read commercial proximity cards and partially simulate their signals
to bypass building security systems [138].
DoS attacks: In DoS attacks, the RF channels are jammed such that the tags
cannot be read by the tag readers and, as a result, the intended services based on
the RFID tags become unavailable. For example, an attacker can lock down a whole
building by jamming all the RFID-based doors. Additional vulnerabilities of RFID
authentication protocols to DoS attack have been discussed in [139].
Eavesdropping: In this attack, the main goal of the attacker is to intercept, read,
and save messages for future analysis. The intercepted data can be used as an input
to other attacks, such as tag cloning. The concept of eavesdropping attacks against
RFIDs is not new and is frequently mentioned in the literature. Recent reports by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology [140] and the Department of
Homeland Security [141], in addition to several published surveys, e.g. [134,135,142],
all mention risks of eavesdropping in the RFID environment. In particular, several
practical attack scenarios and their experimental setups have been discussed in [142].
Side-channel attacks: Such attacks use state-of-the-art tools to intercept and pro-
cess communications in order to extract information from various patterns, even when
the messages are encrypted. For example, if an attacker reads the tags at the en-
trance of a building, he can guess the number of individuals in the building at any
moment by counting the number of communications. Over-the-air timing attacks
against RFID tags and their efficacy are open research problems [134]. Carluccio
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et al. have described the use of EM emanations to launch a power-analysis attack
against RFIDs [143].
Communication
Next, attacks against the communication level of the IoT reference model are dis-
cussed.
Eavesdropping: At the communication level, eavesdropping (also called sniffing)
refers to intentionally listening to private conversations over the communication links
[144]. It can provide invaluable information to the attacker when the data are unen-
crypted. In this situation, usernames and/or passwords are often easy to extract.
When packets also carry access control information, such as node configuration,
shared network password, and node identifiers, eavesdropping can provide critical
information. The attacker can use and process this captured information to design
other tailored attacks. For example, if an attacker can successfully extract the in-
formation that is required to add a new node to the set of authorized nodes, he will
easily be able to add a malicious node to the system.
Side-channel attacks: Although side-channel attacks are not easy-to-implement,
they are powerful attacks against encryption. They pose a serious threat to the
security and reliability of cryptographic implementations. As mentioned earlier, side-
channel attacks can also be launched at the edge node level. In contrast to the attack
at the edge node level, the side-channel attacks at the communication level are usu-
ally non-invasive. They only extract information that is often unintentionally leaked.
Typical examples of unintentional information leakage are time between two consec-
utive packets, frequency band of communications, and communication modulation.
An important characteristic of non-invasive attacks is that they are undetectable, and
as a result, there is no easy defense against them except to minimize leakage or else
add noise to the leaked information.
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DoS attacks: The most common and well-known DoS attack at the communication
level is a standard attack that jams the transmission of radio signals. Two types of
active jamming attacks have been defined in the literature [145, 146]: (i) continuous
jamming that involves complete jamming of all transmissions, and (ii) intermittent
(also called non-continuous) jamming in which jamming is periodic and, as a result,
the nodes can send/receive packets periodically. While the goal of constant jamming is
to block all transmissions, with intermittent jamming, the attacker intends to lower
the performance of time-sensitive systems. Consider a fire detection system that
can detect unusual changes in the level of gases in the environment and calls the
fire department in case of an emergency. An attacker can easily make the system
unreliable by intermittently jamming node-to-node and node-to-base transmissions.
In this scenario, the system will become out-of-service if the attacker uses constant
jamming. Several research efforts have examined the possibility and effectiveness of
launching DoS attacks against various transmission protocols, including Bluetooth
[147], ZigBee [148], and 6LowPan [149]. In addition to active jamming attacks, the
attacker can launch DoS against communication using malicious nodes or routers.
The attacker may insert a node/router that intentionally violates the communication
protocol in order to generate collisions or jam the communications [129]. A malicious
router/node may also refuse to route messages or attempt to misdirect them. This
could be done intermittently or constantly. Constant DoS attacks are usually easy to
detect, whereas detection of intermittent ones requires accurate and efficient monitors.
Injecting fraudulent packets: An attacker can inject fraudulent packets into com-
munication links using three different attack methods: (i) insertion, (ii) manipulation,
and (iii) replication (also called replay) [129]. In insertion scenarios, the attacker in-
serts new packets in network communication. In other words, an insertion attack has
the ability to generate and send malicious packets that seem legitimate. Manipula-
tion attacks involve capturing the packet, and then modifying, e.g., updating header
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information, checksum, and data, and sending the manipulated packet. In replication
attacks, the attacker captures the packets that have been previously exchanged be-
tween two things in order to replay the same packets. Generally, a stateless system,
which does not keep track of previous packets or previous state of the system, is quite
vulnerable to replay attacks.
Routing attacks: Attacks that affect how messages are routed are called routing
attacks. An attacker may use such attacks to spoof, redirect, misdirect, or drop the
packets at the communication level. The simplest type of routing attack is an altering
attack in which the attacker changes the routing information, e.g., by generating
routing loops or false error messages. In addition to altering attacks, several other
serious attacks have been proposed, e.g., Black Hole [150,151], Gray Hole [151], Worm
Hole [152], Hello Flood [153,154], and Sybil [155]. We briefly describe them next.
1. Black Hole: A Black Hole attack is launched by using a malicious node, which
attracts all the traffic in the network by advertising that it has the shortest path to
the destination in the network. As a result, all packets are sent to the malicious node,
and the attacker can process the packets or simply drop them.
2. Gray Hole: A Gray Hole attack is a variation of Black Hole attack in which the
nodes selectively drop some packets.
3. Worm Hole: A Worm Hole attack is a severe attack that can be launched even
when authenticity and confidentiality are guaranteed in all communications. In this
attack, an attacker first records packets at one location in the network and then
tunnels them to a different location.
4. Hello Flood : A Hello Flood attack is based on the fact that a node must broadcast
“HELLO PACKETS” to show its presence to neighbors. The receiving nodes may
assume that they are within the communication range of the sender. In this attack,
an attacker uses a malicious node with high transmission power to send “HELLO
PACKETS” to every other node in the network and claim to be their neighbor.
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5. Sybil : In a Sybil attack, the attacker adds/uses Sybil nodes, which are nodes with
fake identities. Sybil nodes can out-vote honest nodes in the system.
Unauthorized conversation: Every edge node needs to communicate with other
nodes in order to share data or access their data. However, each node should only
talk to a subset of nodes that need its data. This is an essential requirement for
every IoT system, in particular, ones consisting of both insecure and secure nodes.
For example, in a smart home scenario, the thermostat requires the smoke detector’s
data in order to shut down the heating system in an emergency situation. However,
if the insecure smoke detector can share (get) information with (from) every other
node, an attacker might be able to control the whole home automation system by
hacking the smoker detector.
Edge computing level
Edge (fog) computing is an emerging technology. Thus, its vulnerabilities have not
yet been adequately explored. The few research efforts that address attacks on edge
computing mainly focus on possible threats to sensor networks [156–158]. Next, we
discuss and suggest some attack scenarios against an edge computing based scheme.
Although some of these attacks were designed to target conventional systems and
networks, they are also applicable to the edge computing based systems.
Malicious injection: Insufficient validation of the input may enable malicious input
injection. An attacker could inject a malicious input that causes the service providers
to perform operations on behalf of the attacker. For example, an attacker may add
an unauthorized component to one of the levels below (communication or edge node
levels) that is capable of injecting malicious inputs into the servers. Afterwards, the
attacker might be able to steal data, compromise database integrity, or bypass authen-
tication. Standard database error messages returned by a database may also assist
the attacker. In situations where the attacker has no knowledge of the database’s
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tables, forcing an exception may reveal more details about each table and the names
of its fields [159].
Integrity attacks against machine learning: Two types of attacks can be
launched against machine learning methods that are used in IoT systems: causative
and exploratory [160]. In causative attacks, the attacker changes the training process
by manipulating the training dataset, whereas in exploratory attacks, he exploits
vulnerabilities without altering the training process. Recent research has introduced
a new type of causative attack, called the poisoning attack [161–163]. In a poisoning
attack, the attacker adds precisely-selected invalid data points to the training dataset.
In an edge computing based system, an attacker might be able to launch this attack
against the learning algorithm by directly accessing the server or computing nodes, or
he might be able to add malicious data to the dataset by adding a sufficient number
of malicious nodes to lower levels of the IoT model. The main motivation is to cause
the classification algorithm to deviate from learning a valid model by manipulating
the dataset.
Side-channel attacks: Earlier, we mentioned several types of side-channel attacks
against the components at the edge node and communication levels. In addition, an
attacker might use the information leaked from additional components, e.g., service
providers and servers, to launch side-channel attacks. For example, a service, which
generates verbose fault warnings, provides a useful tool for designers and develop-
ers. However, the same warnings can provide extravagant information in operational
environments.
Non-standard frameworks and inadequate testing: Non-standard coding flaws
can give rise to serious privacy and security concerns. Moreover, since the nodes
typically need to connect to intermediate servers, the consequences of a compromise
might be amplified. The development of an edge computing based system is a sophis-
ticated process because it requires combining heterogeneous resources and devices
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that are often made by different manufacturers [164]. In addition, there is neither a
generally-accepted framework for the implementation of edge computing based sys-
tems nor a standard set of policies. As a result, several privacy and security flaws of
these systems may remain undetected.
Insufficient/inessential logging: Logging is a nice approach for detecting an
intrusion or a hacking attempt. Developers should log events such as success-
ful/unsuccessful authentication attempts, successful/unsuccessful authorization
attempts, and application errors. The edge computing based systems may be dam-
aged as a result of insufficient logging [165]. It is also recommended that the log files
be encrypted.
2.1.2 Existing countermeasures
Here, the right side of Fig. 2.1 that consists of several countermeasures is discussed.
Next, we describe each defense in a level-by-level fashion.
Solutions for security issues in edge nodes
First, we describe countermeasures for addressing attacks against the edge nodes.
1. Computing nodes: We start with solutions for attacks against computing nodes.
Side-channel analysis: Side-channel signal analysis provides an effective approach
for the detection of both hardware Trojans and malicious firmware/software installed
on a device.
1. Trojan detection: Side-channel signals, including timing [108, 166, 167], power
[168–170], and spatial temperature [168, 171] can be used for Trojan detection. The
presence of a Trojan in a circuit commonly affects power and/or delay characteristics
of wires and gates in the circuit, and alters heat distribution on the silicon IC. In order
to detect a hardware Trojan, side-channel signal-based Trojan detection mechanisms
compare physical characteristics and/or the heat distribution map of a suspicious
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IC to the ones of a Trojan-free reference IC. Power-based analyses offer an activity
monitoring method that can be utilized to detect suspicious activities within the IC,
enabling detection of Trojans. Timing-based methods enable the detection of Trojans
by testing the IC using efficient delay tests, which are sensitive to small changes in the
circuit delay along the affected paths and can differentiate Trojans from process vari-
ations. Spatial temperature-based mechanisms rely on infrared imaging techniques,
which provide thermal maps of ICs. Silicon is transparent in the infrared spectral
region and this transparency enables us to obtain maps of thermal infrared emissions
using infrared imaging techniques [171].
2. Malicious firmware/software detection: The effectiveness of side-channel sig-
nal analysis in detecting malicious firmware/software installed on a device has been
shown by several previous research efforts [172–176]. As mentioned earlier in Section
IV, side-channel signals can reveal valuable information about the device’s operation.
Similar to the Trojan detection mechanism, malware detection methods can process
side-channel signals to detect abnormal behaviors of the device, e.g., a significant
increase in its power consumption, which are the results of a malware installed on the
device.
Trojan activation: Trojan activation strategies aim to partially/fully activate the
Trojan circuitry to facilitate Trojan detection. Several Trojan activation approaches
have been proposed in the last decade [108, 177, 178]. The common goal of such
strategies is to magnify and detect the disparity between the behavior, outputs, or
side-channel leakages of a Trojan-free circuit and the ones of a Trojan-inserted circuit.
For example, Chakraborty et al. proposed MERO [179], an efficient methodology to
derive a compact set of test patterns (minimizing test time and cost), while maximiz-
ing the Trojan detection coverage. MERO can increase the detection sensitivity of
many side-channel Trojan detection. The basic concept is to detect low probability
conditions at the internal nodes, select candidate Trojans triggerable by a subset of
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these rare conditions, and then derive an optimal set of vectors that can trigger each
of the selected low probability nodes.
Policy-based mechanisms and intrusion detection systems (IDSs): Policy-
based approaches are promising mechanisms for solving security and privacy problems
at this IoT level. Violation of essential policies can be detected continuously by intro-
ducing an IDS [129]. An IDS ensures that general rules are not broken. It provides a
reliable approach to defend against battery-draining and sleep deprivation attacks by
detecting unusual requests to the node. Several recent and ongoing research efforts
provide efficient IDS designs for monitoring the edge nodes and detecting potential
threats [180–184].
Circuit modification: Changing the circuit is one of the most effective defenses
against physical, side-channel, and Trojan attacks. In the following, for each of these
attacks, we briefly discuss how specific circuit changes and modifications may ad-
dress/prevent the attack.
1. Tamper proofing and self-destruction: Nodes may be integrated with physical
hardware that enhances protection against physical attacks. For example, to protect
against tampering of sensors, several mechanical/electrical tamper-proofing methods
for designing the physical packages of the nodes have been proposed and have tra-
ditionally been used in home automation sensors, e.g., smoke detectors. Moreover,
using self-destruction mechanisms provides an alternative approach to defend against
physical attacks [185].
2. Minimizing information leakage: There are also some well-known approaches
for addressing side-channel attacks including, but not limited to, adding randomized
delay [143] or intentionally-generated noise [186], balancing Hamming weights [187],
using constant execution path code [187], improving the cache architecture [188], and
shielding [112].
3. Integrating physically unclonable function (PUF) into the circuity: A PUF is
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a noisy function embedded into an integrated circuit [189]. When queried with a
challenge x, a PUF generates a response y that depends on both x and the unique in-
trinsic physical properties of the device [190,191]. PUFs are assumed to be physically
unclonable, unpredictable, and tamper-evident. PUFs enable unique device identi-
fication and authentication [190, 192], and offer Trojan detection mechanisms [108].
Any unintended modification of the circuit physical layout changes the circuit para-
sitic parameters that can be detected by Trojan detection methods.
Securing firmware update: Each firmware update can be launched remotely or
directly. In the case of remote firmware update, the base or server broadcasts a com-
mand (CMD) to announce that there is a new version of firmware available. Then,
a node with the new firmware broadcasts an advertisement (ADV) to neighboring
nodes. The nodes that are willing to update their firmware and have also received
ADV compare the new version with their existing version, and send requests (REQ) if
they need an update. Eventually, the advertiser starts sending data to the requesters.
Providing a secure method for remotely updating the firmware requires authentica-
tion of CMD, ADV, REQ, and data packets. Moreover, risks posed by DoS attacks
during each step of the protocol should be considered [193]. In addition to remote
firmware updates, some nodes support direct updates of the firmware, e.g., using a
USB cable. In this case, the integrity of the firmware should be checked, and the
user, who tries to update the firmware, should be authenticated, because a lack of
sufficient integrity check mechanisms may enable an attacker to replace legitimate
device firmware with a malicious one [127].
2. RFID tags: Next, we describe solutions and suggestions for addressing attacks
against RFID tags.
Kill/sleep command: A kill scenario is built into the manufacturing process of
RFID tags. An RFID tag has a unique PIN, e.g., a 32-bit password. Upon receiving
the correct PIN from the RFID reader, the tag can be killed, i.e., the tag will not be
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able to transmit any further information after receiving this command [135]. There
is an alternative approach called a sleep command that puts the tags to sleep, i.e.,
makes them inactive for a period of time [134]. Although these ideas seem simple
at first glance, designing and implementing secure and effective PIN management
schemes need sophisticated techniques.
Isolation: A very effective way of protecting the privacy of tags is to isolate them
from all EM waves. One way is to build and use isolation rooms. However, building
such rooms is usually very expensive. An alternative approach is to use an isolation
container that is usually made of a metal mesh [134]. This container, which can block
EM waves of certain frequencies, is called a Faraday cage [194]. Another approach
to is to jam all nearby radio channels using an active RF jammer which continuously
interrupts specific RF channels.
Blocking: Juels et al. proposed a protection scheme called blocking [132]. It adds a
modifiable bit to the tag that is called a privacy bit. A ‘0’ privacy bit indicates that
public scanning is allowed for the tag, whereas a ‘1’ bit marks the tag as private. This
scheme requires a certain type of tag (called blocker tag), which is a special RFID tag
that prevents unintended scanning. However, the idea of using blocker tags has two
main limitations: (i) it requires the use of a modified version of RFID tags, and (ii)
unreliable transmission of the tags may easily lead to privacy failure even when the
blocking scheme is implemented. Another blocking approach, called soft blocking,
has been proposed in [195]. It relies on auditing of reader configurations to enforce
a set of policies that is defined in software. This set guarantees that readers can
only read public tags. Then, a monitoring device can passively examine if a reader is
violating tag policies.
Anonymous tag: A novel idea based on look-up table mapping has been proposed
by Kinoshita [196]. The key contribution of his work is a scheme to store a mapping
between an anonymous ID and a real ID of each tag in such a way that a attacker
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cannot find the mapping algorithm to recover the real ID from the anonymous one.
The mapping may represent a key encryption algorithm or a random value mapped
to the real ID. Note that although the anonymous ID emitted by an RFID tag has
no intrinsic valuable information, it can still enable tracking as long as the ID is fixed
over time [135]. In order to address the tracking problem, the anonymous ID should
be re-issued frequently.
Distance estimation: Use of signal-to-noise ratio as a metric to determine the dis-
tance between a reader and a tag is proposed in [134]. For the first time, Fishkin et
al. claim that it is possible to derive a metric to estimate the distance of a reader
that tries to read the tag information. This enables the tag to only provide distance-
based information. For example, the tag might release general information, e.g., the
product type, when scanned at 10 meters distance, but release its unique identifier
at less than 1 meter distance.
Personal firewall: A personal RFID firewall [197] examines all readers’ requests
to tags. The firewall can be assumed to be implemented in a device that supports
high computation needs and provides enough storage capacity, e.g., a cellphone. The
firewall enables the setting of sophisticated policies. For example, “my tag should not
release my personal information when I am not within 50 meters of my work place”.
Crypthographic schemes: Three types of cryptographic schemes are widely dis-
cussed in the previous literature to address the security attacks against RFID tags:
1. Encryption: Full encryption usually requires significant hardware. Therefore,
its implementation in RFID tags has not been feasible due to the need for the tags
to be low-cost (a few cents). Feldhofer [198] proposed an authentication mechanism
based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). However, for a standard imple-
mentation of AES, 20-30K gates are typically needed [199], whereas RFID tags can
only store hundreds of bits and support 5-10K logic gates. The limitations arising
from gate count and cost suggest that the tag can only devote 250-3500 gates to the
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security mechanism. The traditional implementation of AES was not appropriate
until Jung et al. proposed a novel implementation of AES that requires only 3595
logical gates [200]. However, no fully-developed version of AES has been implemented
in any RFID tag.
2. Hash-based schemes: Such schemes are widely used for addressing security
issues in the RFID technology. Recent research on hash functions can be found
in [201–205]. A simple security mechanism based on hash functions is proposed
in [133]. In this work, two states are defined for each tag: (i) locked state in which a
tag responds to all queries with its hashed key, and (ii) unlocked state in which the
tag carries out its normal operation. To unlock a tag, the reader sends a request,
including the hashed key, to a back-end database and waits to get the key. After
getting the key, the reader sends the key to the locked tag. Then, the tag changes its
state to unlocked. Although this significantly improves RFID security, the problem of
tracking still remains. To address this issue, Weis et al. [133] propose a more sophisti-
cated scheme, in which the hashed key is changed in a manner that is unpredictable.
3. Lightweight cryptographic protocols: In order to address the security and pri-
vacy issues of RFID tags by taking into account their cost requirements, several
lightweight cryptographic protocols have been suggested. For example, Peris et al.
propose a minimalist lightweight mutual authentication protocol for low-cost RFID
tags [199]. They claim that their method provides an adequate security level for cer-
tain applications, and can be implemented with only slightly more than 300 gates,
which is quite acceptable even for the most limited RFID tags. Moreover, a simple
scheme for mutual authentication between tags and readers is proposed by Molnar
et al. [206]. Their protocol uses a shared secret and a pseudorandom function to
protect the messages exchanged between the tag and the reader. Another example is
extremely-lightweight challenge-response authentication protocols described in [207].
These protocols can be used in authenticating tags, but can be broken by a powerful
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adversary [135].
Circuit modification: In addition to the previously-mentioned applications of PUF
(device identification/authentication and hardware Trojan detection), several research
efforts have proposed different anti-counterfeiting mechanisms to prevent RFID tag
cloning by integrating PUFs into RFID tags [208–211]. For example, consider an au-
thentication mechanism that aims to identify the user based on his RFID tag. It can
generate a set of challenge-response pairs for each tag during the enrollment phase
and store it in a database. At a later point in time, during verification, it can compare
the response provided by the user’s PUF-based RFID tag for a chosen challenge from
the database with the corresponding response in the database [210,211].
Solutions for security issues in communication
Next, we discuss solutions for addressing the security issues that exist at the commu-
nication level of the reference model.
Reliable routing: An essential characteristic of IoT networks that complicates im-
plementation of secure routing protocols is that intermediate nodes or servers might
require direct access to message content before forwarding it. As mentioned earlier,
several valid attacks against routing have been proposed in the literature. Karlof
et al. have addressed most major attack scenarios [212]. They provide the first de-
tailed security analysis of major routing protocols and practical attacks against them,
along with countermeasures. Various other research efforts have also tried to address
security and privacy concerns in routing [213–216].
IDS: IDS is essentially needed at the communication level as a second line of de-
fense to monitor network operations and communication links, and raise an alert
in case of any anomaly, e.g., when a pre-defined policy is ignored. Traditional IDS
approaches [183,217,218] are usually customized for WSNs or for the traditional In-
ternet. However, few recent IDS proposals address the security and privacy concerns
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of IoT directly. SVELTE [219] is one of the first IDSs designed to meet the require-
ments of the IPv6-connected nodes of IoT. It is capable of detecting routing attacks,
such as spoofed or altered information, and Black Hole attack. Another intrusion
detection method for the IoT has been proposed in [220].
Cryptographic schemes: Using cryptographic schemes, e.g., strong encryption, to
secure communication protocols is one of the most effective defenses against a variety
of attacks, including eavesdropping and simple routing attacks, at the communica-
tion level. Several encryption methods have been proposed to address security issues
in communication [221, 222]. The encryption-decryption techniques, developed for
traditional wired networks, are not directly applicable to most IoT components, in
particular, to small battery-powered edge nodes. Edge nodes are usually tiny sensors
that have limited battery capacity, processing power, and memory. Using encryption
increases memory usage, energy consumption, delay, and packet loss [223]. Variants
of AES have yielded promising results for providing secure communication in IoT.
Moreover, different lightweight encryption methods have been proposed, e.g., CLE-
FIA [224] and PRESENT [225]. Unfortunately, at this time, there are no promising
public key encryption methods that provide enough security while meeting lightweight
requirements [223].
De-patterning and decentralization: De-patterning and decentralization are two
of the major methods proposed to provide anonymity and defense against side-channel
attacks. There is always a trade-off between anonymity and the need to share informa-
tion. De-patterning data transmissions can protect the system against side-channel
attacks, e.g., traffic analysis, by inserting fake packets that can significantly alter the
traffic pattern, when required. An alternative method for ensuring anonymity is dis-
tribution of sensitive data through a spanning tree such that no node has a complete
view of the original data. This method is called decentralization [226].
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Role-based authorization: In order to prevent a respone to requests by intruders
or malicious nodes in the system, a role-based authorization system verifies if a com-
ponent, e.g., edge node, service provider, or router, can access, share, or modify the
information. Moreover, for every communication, the authorization system should
check whether the two parties involved in the action have been validated and have
required authority [227].
Information flooding: Ozturk et al. propose flooding based anti-traffic analysis
mechanisms to prevent an external attacker from tracking the location of a data
source, since that information may release the location of things [228]. They have
proposed three different approaches to flooding: (i) baseline, (ii) probabilistic, and
(iii) phantom. In baseline flooding, every node in the network forwards a packet once
and only once. In probabilistic flooding, only a subset of nodes within the entire
network contributes to data forwarding and the others discard the messages they
receive. In phantom flooding, when the source sends a message, the message unicasts
in a random fashion (referred to as a random walk phase). Then, the message is
flooded using the baseline flooding technique (referred to as the flooding phase).
Solutions for security issues at the edge computing level
Next, we describe countermeasures and solutions for addressing the security attacks
and issues at the edge computing level.
Pre-testing: Testing of updates and design implementations is important before
they can be used in a critical system [229]. The behavior of the whole system and
its components, e.g., routers, edge nodes, servers, etc., should be closely examined by
feeding different inputs to the system and monitoring the outputs. In particular, pre-
testing attempts to identify the set of possible attack scenarios and simulate these
scenarios to see how the system responds [230]. It also specifies what information
should be logged and what information is too sensitive to be stored. In addition, the
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input files should be closely examined to prevent the danger of malicious injection.
For example, the attacker should not be able to execute any command by injecting
it into the input files.
Outlier detection: The common goal of almost all defenses against integrity attacks
on machine learning methods is to reduce the influence of adding invalid data points
to the result. These invalid data points are deemed outliers in the training set.
Rubinstein et al. have designed a defense framework against poisoning attacks based
on robust statistics to alleviate the effect of poisoning [231]. In addition, a bagging
defense against such integrity attacks has been proposed by Biggio et al. [232]. They
examine the effectiveness of using bagging, i.e., a machine learning method that
generates multiple versions of a predictor and utilizes them to get an aggregated
predictor by getting averages over the versions or using a plurality vote [233], in
reducing the influence of outlying observations on training data. Mozaffari-Kermani
et al. have presented several countermeasures against poisoning attacks in the area of
healthcare [234]. They have evaluated the effectiveness of their schemes and identified
the machine learning algorithms that are easiest to defend.
IDS: IDSs can detect the existence of a malicious node that tries to inject invalid
information into the system or violate the policies. Several recent research efforts have
proposed IDS based methods to address the injection issue [235–238]. For example,
Son et al. describe the design and implementation of DIGLOSSIA [235], a new tool
that precisely and efficiently detects code injection attacks on servers.
2.2 Emerging research directions in the domain of
WMS-based systems
As described in Chapter 1, with the pervasive use of Internet-connected WMSs, the
scope of applications of WMS-based systems has extended far beyond what has been
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traditionally imagined. In this section, we describe several research directions that
are closely related to the domain of WMSs and discuss how previous research stud-
ies have attempted to facilitate the design and development of WMS-based systems.
In particular, we briefly discuss the related research work present at the intersec-
tion of WMS and the following research areas: (i) design of low-power sensors, (ii)
minimally-invasive capture methods, (iii) security and privacy, (iv) calibration and
noise cancellation, and (v) big data.
2.2.1 Design of low-power sensors
The on-sensor energy has three major consumers: (i) sampling, (ii) transmission, and
(iii) on-sensor computation [11]. Thus, for each WMS, the energy consumption of
one or a combination of these consumers should be reduced to enhance its battery
lifetime. Next, we summarize what solutions previous studies have proposed to reduce
the energy consumption of each of these energy consumers.
Sampling
The sampling energy is mainly the energy consumed by the analog-to-digital converter
(ADC). The total energy consumption of an ADC can be divided into: (i) I/O energy,
(ii) reference energy, (iii) sample-and-hold energy, (iv) ADC core energy, and (v) input
energy [239]. However, separate calculations of these values is difficult. Hence, the
total on-chip ADC energy consumption per sample (EADC) is commonly reported in
the literature. In order to enhance ADC energy efficiency, several architectures have
been proposed in the last two decades, including but not limited to, asynchronous
[240], cyclic [241], and delta-sigma [242] (see [239] for a survey). As extensively
discussed in [11], with recent advances in the design and development of ADCs, the
sampling energy consumption of a WMS has become negligible in comparison to its
total energy consumption.
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Transmission protocols
A key consideration in the design of a WMS is the communication technology (ra-
dio and protocol) used to connect the WMSs with the base station. Several trans-
mission protocols have been implemented on low-power wireless chipsets to enable
energy-efficient data transmission. These protocols include, but are not limited to,
ANT/ANT+ [243], ZigBee [244], Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [245], and Nike+
[246]. Among them, three protocols have become dominant in the market: ANT, Zig-
Bee, and BLE. Dementyev et al. [247] analyzed the power consumption of these proto-
cols. They found that BLE typically achieves the lowest power consumption, followed
by ZigBee and ANT. BLE has become a promising solution for short-range transmis-
sions between WMSs and the base station since it benefits from the widespread use of
Bluetooth circuitry integrated in smartphones. In addition to energy-efficient trans-
mission, new protocols commonly offer lightweight strong encryption, e.g., a modified
form of AES [221], to provide confidentiality as well as per-packet authentication and
integrity. This prevents several security attacks, e.g., eavesdropping and integrity
attacks, against WMS-based systems.
On-sensor computation
The required signal processing varies significantly from one application to another.
In most applications, sensors perform lightweight signal processing on the data, e.g.,
compression, using on-sensor resources and then transmit the processed data to the
base station for further processing, e.g., indexing and machine learning. Due to
limited on-sensor resources, on-sensor computation, with attendant energy overhead,
can be avoided for applications in which the sampling rate of biomedical signals is low,
e.g., monitoring the patient’s body temperature [11]. However, in some applications,
on-sensor computation is beneficial and preferred over off-sensor computation due to
one of the following reasons [248,249]. First, on-sensor computation may significantly
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reduce the transmission energy (and as a result the total energy consumption of
the device) even though it imposes extra energy consumption for computation. For
example, if an EEG sensor can detect abnormal changes in the data, it only needs to
transmit a small fraction of the data that includes those changes. Second, for some
applications, in particular mission-critical applications, the communication delay or
the possibility of unavailability of the Cloud or Internet may not be tolerable.
Next, we briefly discuss three commonly-used types of on-sensor algorithms.
1. Aggregation : In practice, a WMS does not usually need to transmit data as fast
as it collects them. Hence, it can first aggregate multiple sensory measurements in one
packet and only then transmit the packet. In this scenario, the total number of bits
transmitted remains the same. However, the average number of transmitted packets
over a fixed time period is reduced due to the aggregation. This can significantly
reduce the transmission energy of WMSs [250]. The number of samples that can be
aggregated in a single packet varies from one device to another based on its resolution,
and is specified based on what is a tolerable response time [11].
2. Compression : Compression algorithms reduce the number of bits needed to
represent data. On-sensor compression is commonly utilized to decrease transmission
energy by reducing the total number of transmitted bits [251]. It can also save on-
sensor storage by dropping non-essential information from the raw data [252]. For
example, compressive sensing [253] offers a promising signal compression technique
for acquiring and reconstructing a continuous signal by exploiting the sparsity of the
signal to recover it from far fewer samples than required by the Shannon-Nyquist
sampling theorem. Compressive sensing is recommended as a promising on-sensor
compression technique in several recent research studies on WMSs [254, 255]. It
significantly reduces the number of bits required to represent a signal and, at the same
time, enables energy-efficient feature extraction and classification in the compressed
domain [254].
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3. Lightweight classification : Classification is defined as the problem of iden-
tifying to which category from a given set a new observation belongs. In a typical
classification problem, a feature extraction procedure first extracts a set of features
from the raw data. Then, a learning algorithm (also called classifier) trains a model
based on a training set of data containing observations whose category membership is
known. After training, the classifier infers the category of new observations using the
trained model and the features extracted from the new data samples. As a resource-
limited device, a WMS may consume a considerable percentage of its energy to extract
features and classify data samples. In order to reduce the energy required for infer-
ence, both feature extraction and classification must be energy-efficient. Compres-
sive sensing-based feature extraction and classification [254] can significantly reduce
the number of features that need to be processed, while maintaining high accuracy.
Simple classifiers, e.g., decision trees [256] and perceptrons [257], enable lightweight
classification when the use of traditional classification methods, e.g., support vector
machine [258], which need more computational power and storage, is not tolera-
ble. A few recent research studies have proposed application-specific classification
algorithms, e.g., seizure detection based on EEG signals [259], arrhythmia detection
based on ECG signals [260], and physical activity classification based on acceleration
data [27,261].
2.2.2 Minimally-invasive capture methods
As mentioned in Section 1.2.4, passiveness is one of the key design goals of a WMS-
based system. In order to ensure passiveness, WMSs should exploit minimally-
invasive capture methods. Prior to the emergence of WMSs, such methods were
developed to enhance user convenience for in-hospital settings. For example, EEG
capture was invented by Berger in 1924 [262]. The emergence of WMSs has magni-
fied the need for such methods. As a result, several novel sensing approaches, e.g.,
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for glucose sensing [263, 264] and sweat analysis [28, 265], have been developed for
wearable watches and patches. They can non-invasively analyze on-skin chemical
substances and minimize/eliminate the need for incisions or surgery. For example,
Gao et al. [28] have proposed a wearable sweat-analyzing patch that selectively mea-
sures sweat metabolites, e.g., glucose and lactate, and electrolytes, e.g., sodium and
potassium ions, from on-skin liquids. Designing novel minimally-invasive methods for
gathering biomedical data using wearable technology is an ongoing research direction
that has attracted significant attention in recent years.
2.2.3 Security and privacy
The pervasive use of WMSs along with the emergence of the IoT paradigm during the
last decade have led to several threats and attacks against the security of WMS-based
systems and the privacy of individuals [1]. Next, we describe such threats/attacks
along with their most well-known countermeasures.
Security threats and attacks
Unfortunately, the security threats against WMS-based systems are not well-
recognized. This has made WMSs targets for a multitude of adversaries, such as
cybercriminals, occasional hackers, hacktivists, government, and anyone interested
in accessing the sensitive information gathered, stored, or handled by WMS-based
systems, e.g., health conditions or details of a prescribed therapy.
As described in Section 1.2.3, a WMS-based system commonly consists of three
main components: WMSs, base station, and Cloud servers. Possible security attacks
against each of these components should be recognized and studied in depth in order
to address attacks/threats against the whole system. Many well-known types of se-
curity attacks against the components/objects commonly used in IoT-based systems
are summarized in [1]. Since the majority of WMSs are connected to the Internet
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(either directly or through a smartphone), almost all such attacks are also applica-
ble to WMS-based systems. Subashini et al. [266] describe various security attacks
against the Cloud. These attacks/challenges include, but are not limited to, web
application vulnerabilities such as Structured Query Language (SQL) injection, au-
thorization/access control, integrity attacks, and eavesdropping. Moreover, many
survey articles [267–269] summarize security attacks against wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) that are also applicable to WMS-based systems.
Among previously-proposed attacks against WMS-based systems, the most well-
known ones are: (i) eavesdropping on the communication channel to record unen-
crypted packets (an attack against confidentiality), and (ii) injection of illegitimate
packets into the communication channel by reverse engineering the communication
protocol (an attack against integrity). Encryption is the most effective approach for
preventing these attacks. However, traditional encryption mechanisms are not suit-
able for WMSs due to on-sensor resource constraints. In order to reduce the resource
overheads of encryption, several lightweight encryption mechanisms [270, 271] have
been proposed in recent studies. Unfortunately, finding a practical low-power key ex-
change mechanism to securely share the encryption key is still a challenge, but with
some solutions on the horizon [272].
Privacy concerns
With the exponential increase in the number of WMS-based systems, ensuring user
privacy is becoming a significant challenge. Smart wearable devices, e.g., smart
watches, are equipped with many compact built-in WMSs, e.g., accelerometers and
heart rate sensors, and powerful communication capabilities in order to offer a large
number of services. They collect, process, and store several types of private user-
related data.
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Several recent research efforts have demonstrated how WMS-based systems may
intentionally/unintentionally reveal the personal or corporate secrets of the user
[273–275]. For example, Wang et al. [273] demonstrate the feasibility of extracting
the user’s password by processing data gathered by the smart watch. The use of en-
cryption may reduce leakage of private information by protecting the communication
channel.
2.2.4 Calibration and noise cancellation
The negative impact of various disturbances on the data collected by WMSs has
been extensively discussed in recent research. In particular, it has been shown that
environmental noise [276, 277], user movement [278, 279], and changes in sensor lo-
cations [12, 280, 281] can impact sensory measurements significantly. For example,
Salehizadeh et al. [278] discuss how sudden user movements can negatively impact
pulse oximetry measurements, thus leading to inaccurate readings and even loss of
signal. Alinia et al. [12] demonstrate that a change in the location of an accelerometer
can impact the quality of sensory readings.
The above examples demonstrate that the various sources of noise should be taken
into account while designing WMSs, and each sensor should be calibrated to ensure
reliability and validity of measurements [12]. Several noise cancellation and filtering
techniques, e.g., for ECG [282] and EEG [283], have been proposed to mitigate the
impact of noise. Furthermore, various user-independent and user-oriented calibra-
tion algorithms have been developed to calibrate different sensors, e.g., accelerome-
ter [102, 284], magnetometer [285], and gyroscope [286]. Prior to a measurement, a
user-independent (user-oriented) calibration algorithm calibrates the sensor without
(with) the user’s involvement based on the data gathered by the sensor itself and other
sensors embedded in the system. However, there is still a significant gap between the
quality of measurements provided by wearable sensors and that of in-hospital moni-
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toring devices. Unlike the in-hospital environment in which the user remains almost
stationary, the user’s position frequently changes during various daily activities. This
makes the design of high-precision WMSs, which can provide high-quality measure-
ments comparable to in-hospital equipment, a very complex task.
2.2.5 Big data
WMSs have the potential to generate big datasets over a short period of time. For
example, a typical wearable EEG sensor generates over 120 MB of data per day [11].
With improvements in battery, sensor, and storage technologies, even more data might
be generated by WMSs. Processing such large datasets is a complex task due to the
following reasons.
1. Data heterogeneity: Different WMSs collect different types of signals [287].
Moreover, due to on-sensor resource constraints, the data may not necessar-
ily be acquired continuously or even at a fixed sampling rate, adding to the
heterogeneity of data [288].
2. Noisy measurements: As mentioned earlier, there are numerous sources of noise
and disturbances that can corrupt the raw data or deteriorate their quality. In
addition, the dataset might have several hours of data missing, when the user
is not wearing one or multiple WMSs [289].
3. Inconsistency in data representation: Two devices containing the same sensors
may offer very different types of raw data, e.g., older activity monitors generate
a proprietary measure called an activity count, i.e., how often the acceleration
magnitude exceeds some preset threshold, whereas newer ones commonly pro-
vide raw acceleration data [288]. Often, researchers and the industry use their
own (often proprietary) data types and standards to report raw data.
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Previous WMS-related research on big data has mainly focused on extracting
valuable information from big datasets generated by WMSs. Three of the most well-
known research areas that aim to address the above challenges in processing large
datasets are: (i) big data analytics, (ii) standardization, and (iii) data cleaning.
Big data analytics
This entails developing new methods and technologies to analyze big datasets, en-
abling a variety of services. The aim is to provide fast and efficient algorithms to
extract valuable information and trends embedded in the large datasets generated by
WMSs. Sensory data encode aspects of human movement, but simultaneously, and
at a higher level of abstraction, sleep patterns, physical strength, and mobility, and
even complex aspects of physical/mental health [290]. The complex relationships and
correlations present in big datasets might facilitate noise detection, and as a result,
enable the negative impact of the noise artifacts to be mitigated [288].
Standardization
Standardizing how wearable sensor datasets are stored and transferred can enable si-
multaneous processing of datasets from multiple locations around the globe. A naive
solution may be as follows: all devices should record and transmit raw signal data in a
standard format and sample rate without any on-board preprocessing [288]. However,
this is currently not a universally-practicable solution, mainly because battery restric-
tions for some applications, e.g., arrhythmia detection, necessitate preprocessing of
data on the device [11, 291]. Furthermore, different applications inherently require
different sample rates due to the nature of signals being monitored [11]. Thus, if
standards mandate sample rates and filter settings, the rules should be application-
specific.
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Cleaning
One of the first steps in data processing is data cleaning. This is the process of
identifying and fixing data errors [292]. Errors can be discovered in datasets by: (i)
detecting violations of predefined integrity rules, (ii) finding inconsistent patterns in
data, (iii) locating data duplicates, and (iv) searching for outlier values (see [293]
for a survey). A few innovative systems, e.g., NADEEF [294] and Bigdansing [295],
provide end-to-end solutions to data cleaning. However, there is still a lack of end-
to-end off-the-shelf efficient systems for data cleaning [292].
2.2.6 Cloud computing
As discussed in Section 1.2.3, a large number of WMS-based systems rely on Cloud
servers. Despite the promise of the Cloud in this context (access to shared resources
in a pervasive manner, large storage capacity, and high computational power), there
are several challenges that need to be addressed for on-Cloud WMS-based services
(see [296–299] for survey articles). We briefly summarize them next.
Availability/reliability
Many researchers have investigated the negative consequences of Cloud failure [300,
301]. Frequent failures of Cloud servers have serious consequences, e.g., increased en-
ergy consumption [302], propagated service disruptions [303], and, more importantly,
adverse impact on the reputation of the provider [304]. In order to offer a smooth and
continuous service, Cloud providers use redundancy techniques [305] (that back up
data and store them in multiple data centers geographically spread across the world).
As a result, the average system demand is several times smaller than server capacity,
imposing significant costs on the provider. To alleviate this burden, an availability-
tuning mechanism [306] has been suggested. It allows the customers to express their
true availability needs and be charged accordingly.
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Access control
The Cloud environment introduces new challenges on access control due to large scale,
multi-tenancy (a software architecture in which a single instance of an application
runs on a server and serves multiple groups of users), and host variability within
the Cloud [307]. In particular, multi-tenancy imposes new requirements on access
control as intra-Cloud communication (provider-user and user-user) becomes popular
[308]. Recent research efforts have been targeted at new access control techniques
[308–310], specifically designed for the Cloud. Masood et al. summarize and compare
the majority of newly-proposed Cloud-specific access control methods in [311].
Standardization and portability
Standardization of an efficient user interface is essential for ensuring user convenience.
Web interfaces enable the user to access and analyze data on personal devices, e.g.,
a smartphone. Unfortunately, such web interfaces commonly impose a significant
overhead because they are not specifically designed for smartphones or mobile devices
[312]. In addition to standardizing the user interface, standardization of data formats
is also essential to enable user-friendly services. If a Cloud provider stores data in its
own proprietary format, users cannot easily move their data to other vendors [313].
Bandwidth limitation
This is one of the fundamental challenges that needs to be handled in on-Cloud WMS-
based systems when the number of users increases drastically, in particular for appli-
cations that need frequent data upload/download. Managing bandwidth allocation
in a gigantic infrastructure, such as the Cloud that consists of several heterogeneous
entities and millions of users, is very difficult. Some recent research efforts [314, 315]
propose efficient bandwidth allocation methods for Cloud infrastructures. For exam-
ple, Wei et al. propose an allocation based on game theory [315].
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Chapter 3
Energy-Efficient Long-term
Continuous Personal Health
Monitoring
Continuous health monitoring using wireless body-area networks of implantable and
wearable medical devices (IWMDs) is envisioned as a transformative approach to
health care. Rapid advances in biomedical sensors, low-power electronics, and wire-
less communications have brought this vision to the verge of reality. However, key
challenges still remain to be addressed. The constrained sizes of IWMDs imply that
they are designed with very limited processing, storage, and battery capacities. There-
fore, there is a very strong need for efficiency in data collection, analysis, storage, and
communication.
In this chapter, we first quantify the energy and storage requirements of a contin-
uous personal health monitoring system that uses eight biomedical sensors: (1) heart
rate, (2) blood pressure, (3) oxygen saturation, (4) body temperature, (5) blood glu-
cose, (6) accelerometer, (7) electrocardiogram (ECG), and (8) electroencephalogram
(EEG). Our analysis suggests that there exists a significant gap between the energy
65
and storage requirements for long-term continuous monitoring and the capabilities of
current devices.
To enable energy-efficient continuous health monitoring, we propose schemes for
sample aggregation, anomaly-driven transmission, and compressive sensing to reduce
the overheads of wirelessly transmitting, storing, and encrypting/authenticating the
data. We evaluate these techniques and demonstrate that they result in two to three
orders-of-magnitude improvements in energy and storage requirements, and can help
realize the potential of long-term continuous health monitoring [11].
3.1 Introduction
Rapid technological advances in biomedical sensing and signal processing, low-power
electronics, and wireless networking are transforming and revolutionizing health care.
Prevention and early detection of disease are increasingly viewed as critical to pro-
moting wellness rather than just treating illness. In particular, continuous long-term
health monitoring, where various physiological signals are captured, analyzed, and
stored for future use, is envisioned as key to enabling a proactive and holistic ap-
proach to health care.
Several trends in computing and communications technology have converged to
advance continuous health monitoring from a distant vision to the verge of practical
feasibility. Foremost among these is the evolution of IWMDs. Traditionally, medical
monitoring systems, such as ECG and EEG monitors, have been used to simply gather
raw data, with signal processing and data analysis being performed offline. However,
with the continuing performance and energy efficiency improvements in computing,
real-time signal processing has become possible. In the last decade, the number and
variety of IWMDs have increased significantly, ranging from simple wearable activity
and heart-rate monitors to sophisticated implantable sensors. Moreover, advances in
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low-power wireless communications enable radios to be integrated into even the most
energy- and size-constrained devices. This has led to the possibility of composing
IWMDs into wireless body-area networks (WBANs) [316,317].
WBANs are opening up new opportunities for continuous health monitoring and
proactive health care [318]. A typical WBAN for health monitoring consists of (i)
implantable and wearable sensors, which are attached to the body or even implanted
under the skin to measure vital signs and body signals, e.g., body temperature, heart-
beat, blood pressure, etc. and (ii) external devices (which could be smartphones) that
act as base stations to collect, store, display, and analyze the data.
Many recent and ongoing research efforts have addressed the design and deploy-
ment of WBANs. The CodeBlue project [53] focused on designing wireless sensor
networks for medical applications. It included an ad-hoc network to transmit vital
health signs to health care providers. Otto et al. [319] designed a system architecture
to address various challenges posed by the need for reliable communication within the
WBAN, and between the WBAN and a medical server. The MobiHealth project [320]
offered an end-to-end mobile health platform for health care monitoring. Different
sensors, attached to a MobiHealth patient, enabled constant monitoring and transmis-
sion of vital signals. They considered security, reliability of communication resources,
and quality of service (QoS) guarantees.
Notwithstanding advances in IWMDs and WBANs, some key technical challenges
need to be addressed in order to enable long-term continuous health monitoring.
Due to size constraints and the inconvenience or infeasibility of battery replacement,
IWMDs need to be highly energy-efficient. IWMDs as well as the external devices
that aggregate the monitored data have limited storage capacity. Finally, health care
applications also impose strict requirements for privacy, security, and reliability [317].
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This chapter aims to address the challenging question of whether it is feasible to
energy- and storage-efficiently provide long-term continuous health monitoring based
on state-of-the-art technology. In this chapter:
• We first discuss the traditionally used sense-and-transmit monitoring scheme to
establish a baseline for our analyses. We evaluate a system that consists of eight
biomedical sensors: (1) heart rate, (2) blood pressure, (3) oxygen saturation,
(4) body temperature, (5) blood glucose, (6) accelerometer, (7) ECG, and (8)
EEG.
• We present analytical models that can be used to estimate the energy and stor-
age requirements for these biomedical sensors. Our analysis suggests a signifi-
cant gap between the energy and storage requirements for long-term continuous
monitoring and the capabilities of current devices.
• To address the aforementioned gaps in health monitoring, we propose and eval-
uate three schemes to reduce the overheads of sensing, storing, and wirelessly
transmitting the data:
1. First, we explore a simple scheme based on aggregation of samples to
amortize the communication protocol overheads and reduce the number of
transmissions.
2. Second, we explore anomaly-driven transmission in which the sensors per-
form on-sensor signal processing to identify time intervals of interest, and
only transmit/store data from these intervals.
3. Finally, we explore the concept of compressive sensing (CS) [321], together
with a newly developed approach for computation on compressively-sensed
data [254,322], to drastically reduce energy and storage.
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• We demonstrate that the proposed schemes can potentially result in two to
three orders-of-magnitude reduction in energy and storage requirements, and
therefore may be instrumental in enabling continuous long-term health moni-
toring.
• We compare all proposed schemes and discuss how a continuous long-term
health monitoring system should be configured based on patients’ needs and
physicians’ recommendations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes different
components, which form a WBAN and the communication protocols that can be
used to connect them together. Section 3.3 describes the baseline continuous health
monitoring scheme. Section 3.4 presents our analytical models and an analysis of the
energy and storage requirements for the baseline WBAN using these models. Section
3.5 describes the proposed schemes that include sample aggregation, anomaly-driven
sampling, and CS-based computation, and evaluates their energy impact. Section
3.6 evaluates the impact of the proposed schemes on storage requirements. Section
3.7 compares different schemes and summarizes the medical considerations in con-
figuration and optimization of different sensors. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes the
chapter.
3.2 Different components of a general-purpose
health monitoring system
In this section, we first describe two fundamental components that form a medical
WBAN, namely biomedical sensors and the base station. Second, we discuss the
communication protocols, which can used to connect them together.
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3.2.1 Health monitoring with networked wireless biomedical
sensors
Biomedical sensors have been used for health monitoring for a long time [323]. They
sense electrical, thermal, optical, chemical, and other signals to extract information
that are indicative of a patient’s health condition. Examples of such sensors include
oxygen saturation, glucose, blood pressure, heart rate, ECG, EEG, and several forms
of imaging.
ECG
Accelerometer
Blood pressure Smartphone
EEG
Storage servers
Hospital
Oxygen saturation
WBAN
Figure 3.1: A personal health care system.
In addition to the biomedical sensors, an important component of a WBAN, as
shown in Fig. 3.1, is the base station or hub, a more capable device that aggregates
data from the biomedical sensors, visualizes health data for the patient, performs
simple analytics, and communicates the health data to remote health providers or
health databases. The base station, which could be a customized device or a com-
modity mobile device such as a smartphone, contains a more capable processor, data
storage, and one or more wide-area network interfaces.
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3.2.2 Communication protocol
A key consideration in the design of a WBAN is the communication technology (radio
and protocol) used to connect the medical sensors with the base station. Energy
efficiency, security, and interoperability are some of the key factors that must be
considered in this context.
Dementyev et al. analyzed the power consumption characteristics of three popular
emerging standards – ANT, ZigBee, and BLE – in a duty-cycled sensor node scenario
[247]. They found that BLE achieves the lowest power consumption, followed by
ZigBee and ANT. Most of the power consumption differences can be attributed to
the time taken for a sensor to reconnect to the base station after waking up and
the efficiency of the sleep mode used between transmissions of successive packets.
In addition to low power consumption, BLE provides several other advantages for
continuous health monitoring:
1. Smartphones have become dominant over other forms of base stations for po-
tential use in the health monitoring system. BLE benefits from the widespread
use of Bluetooth technology since BLE can be easily integrated into classical
Bluetooth circuitry, and almost all new smartphones support BLE.
2. BLE is optimized for use in devices that need to communicate small packets
wirelessly.
3. BLE is optimized to provide a low-rate (< 270 kb/s) wireless data transfer. As
shown later, the maximum transmission rate of all sensors is much less than
270 kb/s.
4. BLE provides a long transmission range (more than 100 m) that enhances user
convenience.
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5. Due to the privacy and safety concerns in medical systems, security is a key
consideration in WBAN design. BLE supports strong encryption (Advanced
Encryption Standard) to provide confidentiality as well as per-packet authenti-
cation and integrity.
Thus, in our work, we use BLE for short-range transmissions between medical
sensors and the base station.
3.3 Baseline continuous health monitoring system
In this section, we first describe our baseline WBAN targeted at long-term continuous
health monitoring that consists of eight sensors. Then, we discuss its energy and
storage requirements.
3.3.1 Baseline WBAN
As mentioned earlier, we use eight biomedical sensors in the WBAN. In the baseline
WBAN, each sensor node gathers raw data at a specific sampling frequency related
to its application. Then, the node generates a BLE packet using a single sample
and sends the raw data to the base station for further analysis. In this scheme,
each sensor transmits the sample as soon as it is gathered, and the base station is
responsible for processing. In order to implement the WBAN, first, it is required to
specify the sampling rate for each sensor. This rate must be chosen in such a way
that the requirements of different applications are met. The rates vary significantly
from one sensor to another. Moreover, the same sensor may need to have different
sampling rates in different applications [324]. We have investigated the range of
possible sampling rates for each sensor by reviewing the medical literature published
between 1997 and 2014. Next, we provide these ranges for various sensors.
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• Heart rate: The heart rate is commonly sampled at 6-8 Hz frequency. For
example, this sampling rate is currently used in fetal heart rate monitors [325].
While the typical human heart rate is 65-82 beats per minute (bpm), the rate
can sometimes exceed 180 bpm. These considerations suggest a sampling rate
of 2-8 Hz [326].
• Blood pressure: During a typical ambulatory blood pressure monitoring ses-
sion, the blood pressure is commonly measured every 15 to 30 minutes over a
24-hour period [327]. In some cases (e.g., occurrence of a hemorrhage), the blood
pressure should be sampled at a much higher frequency. For example, Adibuz-
zaman et al. have investigated the use of a blood pressure waveform sampled at
100 Hz to monitor physiological system variations during a hemorrhage [328].
• Oxygen saturation: The sampling rate of continuously-monitored oxygen
saturation is suggested to be in the 0.001 Hz to 2.00 Hz range [324, 329, 330].
For example, Evans et al. use measurements at 5-min intervals (sampling rate
of 0.003 Hz) to monitor critically ill, mechanically ventilated adult patients
during intrahospital transport [329].
• Temperature: The body temperature normally fluctuates over the day. Con-
tinuous monitoring of these small fluctuations is suggested by different re-
searchers for a variety of applications [324,331]. For example, Simon et al. sug-
gest measurements at 10-min intervals to determine the influence of circadian
rhythmicity and sleep on 24-hour leptin variations [331]. However, some appli-
cations require a higher sampling rate (e.g., 1 Hz) [324]. Thus, we assume the
sampling rate of the body temperature sensor to be in the 0.001 Hz to 1 Hz
range.
• Blood sugar: Blood sugar measurements every 5 to 15 minutes are used in
a variety of medical applications [324, 332]. However, some applications, such
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as continuous glucose monitoring to detect a sudden rise or drop in the glucose
level of diabetics, require a higher sampling rate (∼100 Hz) [324].
• Accelerometer: An accelerometer is widely used for physical activity detec-
tion. Its sampling rate typically lies in the 30 Hz to 400 Hz range. However,
a lower sampling rate (e.g., down to 2 Hz) might be enough for some applica-
tions [324,333–335].
• ECG: Determining the frequency content of an ECG signal by investigating its
frequency spectrum is usually difficult because it is hard to distinguish between
frequency components of signal and noise. Berson et al. record over-sampled
ECG signals and then apply different low-pass filters to them [336]. They
describe the effect of filtering on amplitude variations, concluding that at least
a sampling frequency of 50-100 Hz is necessary to prevent amplitude errors.
Moreover, Simon et al. demonstrated that a 1000 Hz sampling rate is enough
for the majority of ECG-based applications [337]. We consider ECG sampling
rates in the 100-1000 Hz range.
• EEG: Traditionally, the range of EEG frequencies that was accepted to be clin-
ically relevant was in/below the gamma band (40-100 Hz). However, filtering of
the EEG signal at around 70 Hz and using at least a 200 Hz sampling rate are
commonly suggested by medical literature [338]. Moreover, recent studies have
shown that EEG signals may also have physiological relevance in high-frequency
bands (e.g., 100-500 Hz) [338,339]. Based on the above discussion, we consider
EEG sampling rates in the 100-1000 Hz range.
Next, we consider the sampling resolution of each sensor, where resolution is
defined as the number of bits required for representing a sample. We reviewed several
recent publications in the biomedical literature to obtain these resolutions.
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• Heart rate: An accurate and compact low-power heart rate sensor for home-
based health care monitoring is described and implemented in [340]. It shows
that a resolution of 10 bits is appropriate for providing an accurate measurement
of the heart rate.
• Blood pressure: We consider 16 bits of resolution for blood pressure samples,
which is commonly used in commercial blood pressure monitoring devices [324].
• Oxygen saturation: We consider 8 bits of resolution for oxygen saturation
based on the data reported in [341,342].
• Temperature: The body temperature varies within the 35 to 42℃ range. An
8-bit resolution is sufficient for body temperature sampling.
• Blood sugar: Measurements of blood sugar are based on color reflectance.
The meter quantifies the color change and generates a numerical value that
represents the concentration of glucose. A 16-bit resolution has been shown to
be adequate for blood sugar monitoring devices [343].
• Accelerometer: We consider 12-bit resolution, which has been used in a va-
riety of wearable accelerometer applications and commercial devices [324, 333,
344].
• ECG: Ultra low-power ECG sensors, which are commonly used in long-term
monitoring, support 8 or 12 bits of resolution [345–347]. A resolution of 8
bits may result in a small but noticeable quantization error. Researchers have
shown that greater than 8 bits of resolution will meet ECG requirements [348].
Therefore, we assume a resolution of 12 bits.
• EEG: Several low-power wearable EEG sensors [349, 350] use 10- or 12-bit
analog-to-digital converter (ADC) units. The recording should represent sam-
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ples down to 0.5 µV and up to plus/minus several millivolts. We consider a
12-bit resolution.
Table 3.1 summarizes information on sensors, their resolution and sampling rate,
and the maximum wireless data transmission rate.
Table 3.1: Resolution, sampling rate, and maximum transmission rate
Sensor Resolution Sampling Maximum transmission
(bits/sample) rate (Hz) rate (bits/s)
Heart rate 10 2-8 80
Blood pressure 16 0.001-100 1600
Oxygen saturation 8 0.001-2 16
Temperature 8 0.001-1 8
Blood sugar 16 0.001-100 1600
Accelerometer 12 2-400 4800
ECG 12 100-1000 12000
EEG 12 100-1000 12000
3.3.2 Energy and storage requirements
Next, we discuss energy and storage requirements for a continuous health monitoring
system.
Energy consumption can be divided into three categories: sampling, data trans-
mission, and data analysis [351]. Wireless data transmission is usually the major
energy-consumer. The available energy in each sensor node is often quite limited.
The battery used in the node is typically the largest contributor in terms of both
size and weight. Battery lifetime is a very important consideration in biomedical
sensors. In particular, battery replacement of implanted sensors may require surgery
and, hence, impose cost and health penalties [318]. Thus, biomedical sensors often
need to maintain their functionality for months or even years without the need for a
battery change. For instance, an implanted pacemaker requires a battery lifetime of
at least five years. Furthermore, during communication, biomedical sensors generate
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heat that may be absorbed in nearby tissue, with possible harmful effects. Hence, the
energy consumption should also be minimized from this perspective [318].
Moreover, a WBAN imposes specific storage requirements. Although WBANs fa-
cilitate health monitoring and early detection of health problems, physicians usually
want access to raw data so that they can independently verify the accuracy of on-
sensor processing. Thus, it is important to enable medical personnel to access all or
at least important chunks of raw data. However, storing the raw data in the sensor
nodes is not feasible for two main reasons. First, IWMD sizes need to be kept small
to facilitate patient mobility. Second, adding a large storage to a sensor increases its
energy consumption drastically, and as a result, battery lifetime decreases dramati-
cally. Therefore, we may think of storing the data in the base station. However, the
base station (e.g., a smartphone) may have its own resource constraints, though much
less severe, in terms of storage and battery lifetime. In addition, in order to provide
data backup, we may want to periodically send stored data from the base station
to storage servers. Therefore, the costs of long-term storage using reliable storage
services (e.g., Amazon S3 [352]) should also be considered. Thus, it is important
to minimize storage requirements for long-term health monitoring while maintaining
adequate information for future reference.
3.4 Analytical models for the evaluation of WBAN’s
energy and storage requirements
In this section, we first describe the analytical models that we use to abstract the
essential characteristics of the continuous health monitoring system. Then, we use
the model to evaluate the baseline IWMDs.
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3.4.1 Analytical models
Analytical models can be used to predict system requirements. They are much more
efficient than performing simulation. Next, we describe the models used to quantify
the energy consumption and storage requirements of the continuous health monitoring
system. Table 3.2 provides the list of variables used in our models.
Table 3.2: Variables, unit, and description
Variable Unit Description
Etotal J/day Total energy consumption of a biomedical sensor
Es J/day Energy consumption of sampling
Et J/day Energy consumption of transmission
Ec J/day Energy consumption of computation
EADC J/sample Energy consumption of sampling per sample
ft Hz Transmission frequency
fs Hz Sampling frequency
N − Sampling resolution
S 1/day #samples per day
C 1/day #transmissions per day
Psend W Average power consumption in the sending mode
Pstandby W Average power consumption in the standby mode
Isend A Average drained current in the sending mode
Istandby A Average drained current in the standby mode
Tsend s Sending time
Tstandby s Standby time
Vsupply V Supply voltage
SR B/year Required amount of storage in a year
Energy consumption
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.3, energy consumption of a sensor has three ma-
jor components: sampling, transmission, and on-sensor computation. Therefore, we
assume that total energy consumption of the sensor (Etotal) can be written as:
Etotal = Es +Et +Ec (3.1)
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1. Sampling energy
Next, we discuss the sampling energy that is consumed by the ADC chip. The
total energy consumption of an ADC chip can be divided into: (i) I/O energy, (ii)
reference energy, (iii) sample-and-hold energy, (iv) ADC core energy, and (v) input
energy [239]. However, separate calculation of these values is difficult. Thus, we use
the actual values of the total on-chip ADC energy consumption per sample (EADC)
reported in [239]. It summarizes the experimental results from more than 1400
scientific papers published between 1974 and 2010. Fig. 3.2 shows the scatter plot of
the reported EADC in each of these papers vs. the effective number of bits (ENOB),
where ENOB is defined as:
ENOB = SNR − 1.76
6.02
, SNR = Psignal
Pnoise
(3.2)
Figure 3.2: Scatter plot of the reported EADC vs. ENOB bits for different ADC
architectures: asynchronous (○), cyclic (◻), delta-sigma (◁), flash (+), folding (△),
pipeline (×), successive approximation (◇), subranging (▷), n-Slope (∗), n-Step (⋆),
and other (▽)
ENOB is always less than the resolution for all ADC chips. In particular, for
medium-resolution ADCs (8 ≤ N ≤ 16) that are used in biomedical sensors, ENOB ≤
N−1 provides a better boundary for the ENOB. For example, Verma et al. presented a
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low-power 12-bit resolution ADC for WSNs [353]. The ENOB of this ADC is reported
to be 10.55 bits.
As shown in Fig. 3.2, the EADC of modern medium-resolution ADCs is within the
4ENOB−9 pJ to 4(ENOB+1)−9 pJ range. Therefore, the sampling energy consumption
per day (Es) can be upper-bounded as follows:
Es = EADC ∗ S (3.3)
EADC < 4(ENOB+1)−9pJ ≤ 4(N−9)pJ, (3.4)
S = fs(1
s
) ∗ 60( s
min
) ∗ 60(min
hr
) ∗ 24( hr
day
) (3.5)
Ô⇒ Es < fs(1
s
) ∗ 60( s
min
) ∗ 60(min
hr
) ∗ 24( hr
day
) ∗ 4(N−9)pJ (3.6)
Table 3.3 shows the upper-bound values of Es for all the sensors. As discussed
later, Es values for all sensors are negligible in comparison to their total energy
consumption. Hence, we can safely assume that Etotal ≈ Et +Ec.
Table 3.3: Upper-bound values of Es
Sensor Es (J/day)
Heart rate 2 e-6
Blood pressure 1 e-1
Oxygen saturation 4 e-8
Temperature 4 e-8
Blood sugar 1 e-1
Accelerometer 2 e-3
ECG 5 e-3
EEG 5 e-3
2. Transmission energy
In our experiments, we used the Texas Instruments CC2541 Development Kit as
the BLE transmission device. To provide a quantitative comparison, we experimen-
tally measured the energy consumption of the transmission chip in a cyclic scenario.
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In a cyclic transmission, the transmitter takes Tsend seconds to send the data to the
base station and then enters a standby phase for Tstandby seconds. Hence, the average
energy consumption of transmission can be calculated as follows:
Et = (Tsend ∗ Psend + Tstandby ∗ Pstandby) ∗C (3.7)
C = ft(1
s
) ∗ 60( s
min
) ∗ 60(min
hr
) ∗ 24( hr
day
) (3.8)
Tsend is a fixed value and measured as 2.6 milliseconds for a single packet transmis-
sion. Tstandby depends on the transmission frequency (ft):
Tstandby = 1
ft
− Tsend (3.9)
Psend and Pstandby can be obtained by measuring the current drained from the battery
with supply voltage Vsupply. We calculated the average power consumption for a single
packet transmission using a standard oscilloscope. Psend and Pstandby were found to
be 30.5 mW and 2.5 µW , respectively, where Vsupply is set to 2.5 V . In order to
measure the power consumption of a single packet transmission, we also considered
different packet sizes (varying from 1 B to 20 B). Our experimental results show that
variations in transmission energy of a single packet are negligible when the packet size
changes from 1 B to 20 B. However, since Psend ≫ Pstandby, a higher transmission
rate obviously leads to a higher energy consumption.
3. Computation energy
Computation energy varies significantly from one biomedical application to an-
other. In most applications, the computation energy can be divided into feature
extraction energy and classification energy. Since a feature extraction function can
be converted into matrix form, the feature extraction energy can be estimated as the
energy consumption of a matrix multiplication function. The classification energy
can be estimated based on the reported values of classification energy per vector for
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various methods. However, obtaining a general model for computation energy is dif-
ficult because of its dependence on the application. In this work, when we consider
on-sensor computation energy, we use the values reported in [254,322].
Storage requirement
Next, we provide an analytical model for estimating the amount of required storage
for one-year storage of raw medical data. When there is no on-sensor computation,
this only depends on the sampling frequency (fs) and sampling resolution (N):
SR = fs(1
s
) ∗N(bits) ∗ ( 1B
8bits
) ∗ 31536000( s
year
) (3.10)
However, simple on-sensor computation can significantly decrease the amount of re-
quired storage. For example, if the computation method can efficiently detect points
of interest from the raw data, we may only need to store those specific points for fur-
ther analysis. Moreover, on-sensor data compression, e.g., in CS-based applications,
can also decrease the number of transmitted bits from the sensor to the base station
by compressing the raw data before transmission.
3.4.2 Evaluation of the baseline WBAN
Next, we evaluate the energy consumption and storage requirement for the baseline
scheme, described in Section 3.3, using the models described above.
Evaluation of the energy consumption
Since each sensor has its own sampling rate and resolution, its energy consumption
differs from that of others. Table 3.4 shows the minimum and maximum amounts of
82
energy consumption for different devices in this baseline scenario. They correspond
to the minimum and maximum sampling rates, respectively. Table 3.5 shows the bat-
tery lifetime of each sensor. The minimum/maximum battery lifetimes are reported
assuming that each sensor node uses a regular coin cell battery (CR2032). A regular
coin cell battery is commonly used in biomedical sensors. Not surprisingly, ECG and
EEG sensors are seen to consume the most amount of energy. Thus, these sensors
are the main obstacles to providing long-term health monitoring.
Table 3.4: Minimum and maximum values of total energy consumption
Sensor Minimum (J/day) Maximum (J/day)
Heart rate 13.99 55.23
Blood pressure 0.26 686.88
Oxygen saturation 0.26 14.00
Temperature 0.26 7.13
Blood sugar 0.26 686.88
Accelerometer 14.00 2747.52
ECG 686.88 6868.80
EEG 686.88 6868.80
Table 3.5: Minimum and maximum battery lifetimes of different sensors
Sensor Minimum (days) Maximum (days)
Heart rate 48.8 192.90
Blood pressure 3.93 10125.69
Oxygen saturation 192.86 10125.69
Temperature 378.68 10125.69
Blood sugar 3.93 10125.69
Accelerometer 0.98 192.86
ECG 0.39 3.93
EEG 0.39 3.93
Evaluation of the storage requirement
Next, we evaluate the baseline system from the storage perspective. We readily
realize the baseline transmission scheme requires a significant amount of storage.
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Table 3.6 shows the minimum and maximum amounts of storage required for long-
term health monitoring in this system. The minimum (maximum) value corresponds
to the minimum (maximum) sampling frequency. Since EEG and ECG signals require
the largest amount of storage, we mainly target these signals for storage reduction.
Table 3.6: Minimum and maximum storage required for long-term storage
Sensor Minimum (MB/yr) Maximum (GB/yr)
Heart rate 75.18 0.29
Blood pressure 0.07 5.87
Oxygen saturation 0.03 0.06
Temperature 0.03 0.03
Blood sugar 0.07 5.87
Accelerometer 90.23 17.62
ECG 4511.26 44.06
EEG 4511.26 44.06
3.5 Improving the energy efficiency of continuous
health monitoring
In this section, we first propose three schemes for signal processing and transmission
that can be used in a WBAN. Then, we evaluate and compare these schemes from
the energy perspective. We divide the sensors into two different categories based on
their transmission rate: low-sample-rate sensors (heart rate, blood pressure, oxygen
saturation, temperature, blood sugar, accelerometer) and high-sample-rate sensors
(EEG and ECG). Then, we use the following three schemes to reduce the energy
consumption of each node.
• We accumulate multiple samples in one packet before transmitting the raw
data in order to decrease the number of transmitted packets. The base station
is responsible for processing and storage of the raw data. This approach is
applicable to both high-sample-rate and low-sample-rate sensors.
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• We process the data in high-sample-rate sensors (EEG and ECG) using tradi-
tional signal processing methods. Then, we transfer just a fraction of the raw
data from the sensor node for storage in the base station based on the result of
computation.
• We suggest using CS-based computation in high-sample-rate sensor nodes before
data transmission. Again, we just transfer a small fraction of the raw data from
the sensor node for storage in the base station based on the result of on-sensor
computation.
Although on-sensor computation leads to some extra computational energy con-
sumption, it reduces transmission energy consumption significantly due to the reduc-
tion in the amount of data transmitted. This is especially true when the transmission
rate of a sensor is very high and important events (e.g., seizure, heart attack) are
rare. However, in the case of low-sample-rate sensors, the decrease in transmission
energy does not offset the increase in computational energy. Therefore, we do not
employ any on-sensor computation for low-sample-rate sensors.
Each scheme is discussed in the following subsections and compared against the
baseline scheme. We estimated the minimum/maximum energy consumption of each
sensor in different scenarios, and based on that, we computed the minimum/maximum
battery lifetime.
3.5.1 Sample aggregation
In practice, we do not usually need to transmit the data as fast as we gather them.
Thus, we could first accumulate multiple samples (up to 20 B) in one packet and
only then transmit the packet. The total number of bits transmitted remains the
same. However, the average number of transmitted packets per second is reduced
due to the accumulation. The number of samples that can be accumulated in a single
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packet varies from one device to another based on its resolution. In addition, the data
processing algorithm in the base station might have been optimized with a specific
number of required samples in mind. Therefore, the number of samples per packet
may need to be varied between 1 and the maximum number. For the devices being
evaluated, Table 3.7 shows the maximum number of samples that can be gathered
into a single packet.
Table 3.7: Maximum number of samples in one packet
Sensor #Samples
Heart rate 16
Blood pressure 10
Oxygen saturation 20
Temperature 20
Blood sugar 10
Accelerometer 13
ECG 13
EEG 13
In order to calculate the total energy consumption of a sensor, we also need to
consider the storage energy required for storing multiple packets before transmission.
To store 20 B, which is the maximum number of bytes that can be sent in a single
transmission, we consider the energy consumption of a 160-cell buffer. This storage
energy remains fixed for the maximum and minimum transmission rates. However, the
maximum (minimum) energy consumption is calculated as the energy consumption
of transmission using the maximum (minimum) rate plus the energy consumed by
the 160-cell buffer. Using the SRAM cell energy reported for the 90 nm technology
node in [354], we calculate the minimum and maximum energy consumption of each
device, as shown in Table 3.8. The minimum and maximum battery lifetimes of each
sensor are shown in Table 3.9. Relative to the baseline, this method provides up
to 13.58× reduction in maximum energy consumption for low-sample-rate sensors.
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The maximum and minimum energy consumptions of high-sample-rate sensors are
reduced by 12.98× and 12.83×, respectively.
Table 3.8: Minimum and maximum values of total energy consumption while using
the sample aggregation scheme
Sensor Minimum (J/day) Maximum (J/day)
Heart rate 1.50 4.07
Blood pressure 0.65 69.38
Oxygen saturation 0.65 1.33
Temperature 0.64 0.98
Blood sugar 0.65 69.38
Accelerometer 1.70 212.13
ECG 53.52 529.36
EEG 53.52 529.36
Table 3.9: Minimum and maximum battery lifetimes of different sensors while using
sample aggregation scheme
Sensor Minimum (days) Maximum (days)
Heart rate 663.39 1800
Blood pressure 38.92 4153.85
Oxygen saturation 2030.08 4153.85
Temperature 2715.10 4218.75
Blood Sugar 38.92 4153.85
Accelerometer 12.73 1588.24
ECG 5.10 50.45
EEG 5.10 50.45
3.5.2 Anomaly-driven transmission
Next, we evaluate a process-and-transmit scheme that is more appropriate for high-
sample-rate sensors (ECG and EEG), which consume significant amounts of energy. If
we first process raw data in the sensor nodes themselves and then just transmit some
small chunks of data based on the processing results, we can reduce the transmission
rate significantly. In this scenario, whenever we detect an abnormal activity, we are
required to transmit the raw data corresponding to the abnormal event, in order to
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facilitate offline evaluation of the data. The computational energy in each sensor
node and data transmission rate directly depend on the intended application. We
evaluated seizure detection and arrhythmia detection as applications for EEG and
ECG sensors, respectively. The traditional computation that we have considered
for seizure/arrhythmia detection is as follows. First, we sample the signal at the
Nyquist sampling rate. Second, we use a feature extraction algorithm (spectral energy
analysis for EEG and Wavelet transform for ECG) to extract the important feature
of the signal and build a feature vector. Third, we classify the feature vectors using
a binary classifier [254,322,355–357].
Let us consider an EEG sensor first. We assume signal processing in this sensor
is based on a traditional algorithm for seizure detection, as described in [254, 322].
The frequency of epileptic seizures varies from person to person. In some cases,
seizures may even be separated by years. On the other extreme, seizures might occur
every day. Williamson et al. [358] studied 90 patients and reported the mean seizure
frequency and mean duration to be 4.7 per month (range: 3 to 9 per month) and
3.8 minutes (range: 1 to 20 minutes), respectively. Based on their result, if the
EEG sensor just transmits the small fraction of data corresponding to seizures, the
sensor needs to transmit information over a duration of 17.8 minutes per month,
on an average. Table 3.10 shows the average total energy consumption of the EEG
sensor when we use the traditional signal processing method described in [254, 322]
and only transmit important chunks of data whenever an abnormality is detected.
The minimum (maximum) value corresponds to the minimum (maximum) sampling
frequency. In this scheme, the processing module consumes the major part of energy.
Relative to the baseline, it provides up to 177× reduction in total energy consumption
for the EEG sensor. Table 3.11 shows the minimum and maximum battery lifetimes
of the EEG sensor in this scheme.
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Next, we consider ECG sensors, and assume that the signal processing method is
the traditional computation method for arrhythmia detection, as discussed in [322].
Unlike seizure, the frequency of occurrence of arrhythmia varies significantly. There
are different types of arrhythmia: each may lead to intermittent or consistent symp-
toms. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the frequency of occurrence for arrhythmia.
Fig. 3.3 shows the total energy consumption and battery lifetime of the ECG sensor
with respect to frequency of occurrence of arrhythmia in a day, respectively. We
assume that after detecting an abnormal event, the sensor transmits the information
of a standard one-minute ECG strip to the base station.
Table 3.10: Average total energy consumption of the EEG sensor for the anomaly-
driven method
Sensor Minimum (J/day) Maximum (J/day)
EEG 36.27 38.83
Table 3.11: Average battery lifetimes for the EEG sensor for the anomaly-driven
method
Sensor Minimum (days) Maximum (days)
EEG 69.53 74.44
3.5.3 CS-based computation and transmission
As the third scheme, we evaluate an approach for computation and data transmission
that can reduce the energy consumption of EEG and ECG sensors significantly. As
mentioned earlier, since the total energy consumption of EEG and ECG sensors is
very high due to their high data transmission rates, if we can process the raw data
in these sensors and transmit only small chunks of data upon the occurrence of an
abnormal event, the transmission energy may be reduced significantly. However, now
the computation energy becomes the major energy bottleneck. Hence, we try to
reduce it through CS-based computation. First, we briefly describe CS.
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Figure 3.3: Energy consumption and battery lifetime of the ECG sensor for the
anomaly-driven method with respect to frequency of occurrence of arrhythmia in a
day.
CS (also called compressive sampling or sparse sampling) is a signal processing
approach for efficiently sampling and reconstructing a signal [321]. The common
goal of various signal processing approaches is to reconstruct a signal from a finite
number of measurements. Without any prior knowledge or assumptions about the
signal, this task is not feasible due to the fact that there is no way to reconstruct an
arbitrary signal in an interval in which it is not measured. However, under certain
conditions and assumptions, the signal can be reconstructed using a finite number of
samples. In the CS approach, a signal can be recovered from far fewer samples than
required by Nyquist sampling. Recovering a signal using the CS approach relies on
two fundamental principles: sparsity and incoherence.
1. Sparsity: This requires that the signal be sparse in some domain (i.e., the
signal’s representation in some domain should have many coefficients close to
or equal to zero) [359,360]. CS can be used to compress an N -sample signal X
that is sparse in a secondary basis Ψ. Previous research has shown that ECG
and EEG signals are sparse enough in the Wavelet transform space [361] and
Gabor space [362–364], respectively.
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2. Incoherence: This indicates that unlike the signal of interest, the sam-
pling/sensing waveforms have an extremely dense representation in the
transformed domain.
The main limitation of the classical CS approach is as follows. Although the
signal can be recovered using only a few samples, the traditional signal processing
methods are not designed to process the compressed form of the signal. Therefore, the
signal needs to be reconstructed before processing by the traditional signal processing
methods. Unfortunately, reconstruction of a signal from its compressed representation
is an energy-intensive task and cannot be performed on sensors due to their energy
constraints. In WBANs, it is often necessary to process the data sampled by the
biomedical sensors, e.g., to detect anomalies or compute statistics of interest. In this
work, we evaluate a modified version of the classical CS approach that enables ECG
and EEG signals to be processed on the sensor without being reconstructed (Fig. 3.4).
The need for reconstruction can be circumvented by performing signal processing
computations directly in the CS domain. Shoaib et al. have developed precisely such
a method [254, 322], and demonstrated applications to various biomedical signals.
This method reduces the computation energy significantly because much fewer data
samples need to be processed. Generally, this method consists of three steps:
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Figure 3.4: Traditional CS vs. on-sensor CS-based computation.
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1. First, we compress the signal of interest using a low-rank random projection
matrix. If we can represent the signal (X) as Ψ ∗ s, where s is a vector of
K-sparse coefficients, a low-rank random matrix Φ can be found to transform
X to a set of M samples where O(Klog(N/K)) < M ≪ N . We can then use
the following equation for obtaining the compressed samples (denoted by Xˆ):
XˆM×1 = ΦM×N ×XN×1 (3.11)
2. Second, we generate a feature extraction operation in the CS domain (Hˆ) from
its equivalent in the Nyquist domain (H) by minimizing the error in the inner
product between feature vectors. For any feature extraction method, which can
be represented by matrix H, we can derive an equivalent Hˆ matrix in the CS
domain [254,322].
3. Third, we compute Yˆ = Hˆ × Xˆ and provide Yˆ to the classification process.
The compression ratio is given by α = N/M . It denotes the amount of compression
obtained by the projection. Because CS leads to a drastic reduction in the number
of samples, it has the potential for reducing the energy consumption of various sen-
sors, including biomedical sensors. Direct computation on compressively-sensed data
enables classification to be performed on the sensor node with one to two orders of
magnitude energy reduction. We exploit this method for long-term continuous health
monitoring.
In order to choose a reasonable compression ratio (α), we first need to compare
the outcomes of the CS-based method for different compression ratios. Next, we
discuss sensitivity (also called recall) and number of false alarms per hour (FA/h) for
different compression ratios. Sensitivity represents the true positive rate. It measures
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the percentage of actual positives that are correctly identified, such as the percentage
of seizure conditions that are correctly classified as seizure. FA/h is the number
of false positive outcomes in an hour of detection. Such an outcome is an error in
classification since a test result indicates the presence of a medical condition that is
not actually present.
Fig. 3.5 shows the sensitivity and FA/h for seizure detection with respect to dif-
ferent compression ratios. A compression ratio α of 8× is seen to maintain sensitivity
and FA/h for seizure classification. Moreover, an 8× compression ratio also exhibits
similar results for arrhythmia detection [254, 322]. Thus, we assume this ratio for
deriving the next set of results.
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Figure 3.5: Sensitivity and FA/h of seizure detection classification with respect to
compression ratio. Sensitivity and FA/h CS-based method using α = 8× are almost
equal to the sensitivity and FA/h of the traditional method using Nyquist sampling
(α = 1×).
Next, we examine the EEG sensor in the context of seizure detection. Using the
CS-based algorithm for seizure detection, the average value of total energy consump-
tion of the EEG sensor (Table 3.12) is much less than that of the anomaly-driven
signal processing method (Table 3.10). Relative to the baseline, the total energy
consumption of the EEG sensor is reduced by up to 724× in this scheme. Table 3.13
shows the battery lifetime of the EEG sensor, which improves by a similar ratio.
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Next, we examine an ECG sensor in the context of arrhythmia detection. Fig. 3.6
shows the total energy consumption and battery lifetime of the ECG sensor with
respect to the frequency of occurrence of arrhythmia in a day. Similar to the previous
scheme, we assumed that after detecting an arrhythmia, the ECG sensor transmits
the information of a standard one-minute ECG strip to the base station.
Table 3.12: Average total energy consumption of the EEG sensor for CS-based com-
putation
Sensor Minimum (J/day) Maximum (J/day)
EEG 6.93 9.50
Table 3.13: Average battery lifetimes of the EEG sensor for CS-based computation
Sensor Minimum (days) Maximum (days)
EEG 284.43 389.45
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Figure 3.6: Energy consumption and battery lifetime of the ECG sensor for the CS-
based method with respect to frequency of occurrence of arrhythmia in a day.
3.5.4 Summary of proposed schemes
Next, we summarize the results.
Fig. 3.7 shows the energy reduction in each sensor for the sample aggregation
scheme. The energy reduction is an order of magnitude relative to the baseline.
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Figure 3.7: Energy reduction in each sensor when the sensor accumulates multiple
samples in one packet. Raw data are assumed to be gathered at the maximum
frequency.
Fig. 3.8 shows the energy reduction in EEG and ECG sensors when the maximum
sampling frequency is employed. The CS-based approach can be seen to result in two
to three orders of magnitude energy reduction relative to the baseline.
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Figure 3.8: Energy reduction in EEG and ECG sensors. The number of arrhythmia
events in a day is assumed to be 32, and raw data are assumed to be gathered at the
maximum frequency.
3.6 Storage requirements
We have described three schemes for decreasing the energy consumption of sensors:
(i) sample aggregation, (ii) anomaly-driven, and (iii) CS-based computation in the
node. The first scheme cannot reduce the amount of required storage because we just
accumulate multiple packets in order to reduce the number of transmissions, but we
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still transmit all the data. However, if we can process the raw data in the sensor
nodes and just transmit a chunk of raw data that is essential for future analysis, we
would be able to reduce the amount of required storage significantly.
When anomaly-driven or CS-based signal processing is done on the sensor node,
the sensor node samples, processes, and then transmits the data based on the result
of processing. However, in the case of CS-based computation, the data can be trans-
mitted in compressed form and reconstructed in the base station or server for further
processing if needed.
Let us consider EEG sensors first. Based on the results in [358], we assume
the mean seizure frequency and mean seizure duration to be 4.7 per month and
3.8 minutes, respectively. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, the EEG sensor needs
to transmit information for a duration of 17.8 minutes per month, on an average.
Table 3.14 shows the average amount of storage required for storing the raw data in
the two schemes for seizure detection based on EEG signal analysis. In this table,
the minimum (maximum) value corresponds to the minimum (maximum) sampling
frequency. The anomaly-driven scheme can be seen to reduce the amount of storage
required for storing these signals by 2418×. The CS-based scheme provides another
8× reduction on top of this.
As mentioned earlier, unlike seizures, the frequency with which arrhythmia occurs
may vary significantly. In order to provide a quantitative analysis for storage require-
ments in the case of arrhythmia detection, we assume that, after each detection, the
sensor transmits the information of a standard one-minute ECG strip to the base
station. Fig. 3.9 shows the amount of required storage for the anomaly-driven and
CS-based schemes with respect to the frequency of occurrence. Again, we observe the
significant advantage of the CS-based scheme.
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Table 3.14: Average storage required for long-term storage of processed data
Sensor Minimum (MB/yr) Maximum (MB/yr)
EEG (Anomaly) 1.87 18.65
EEG (Compressed) 0.23 2.33
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Figure 3.9: The amount of storage required for storing important chunks of ECG
signals based on the results of computation.
3.7 Choosing the appropriate scheme and hard-
ware platform
In this section, we first compare the different schemes we presented, and discuss
how the appropriate scheme can be chosen for each sensor. Second, we discuss two
different types of hardware platforms: application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
and general-purpose commercial products. We describe the potential benefits of using
ASIC hardware.
3.7.1 The appropriate scheme for each sensor
Each scheme has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example, sample ag-
gregation decreases energy consumption at the cost of increased latency. Schemes
that use on-sensor computation can significantly increase battery lifetime, however,
provide less raw data to the physicians.
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Choosing an appropriate scheme for each sensor depends on medical considera-
tions such as tolerable latency and patient’s condition. Next, we discuss different
considerations that should be taken into account by designers, in addition to the
battery lifetime and storage requirement.
Latency : Latency is the time interval between the occurrence of an anomaly and
the response that is provided by medical devices, physicians or medical personnel.
Tolerable latency depends on the patient’s condition.
• Example 1: Consider a continuous health monitoring system that is used to
monitor a healthy subject who does not have any history of a serious illness.
The system can be configured for this subject to provide routine medical check
by collecting and sending medical information to physicians or hospitals at long
intervals (e.g., once a day). In fact, latency is not an important factor in this
case, and the sensor can be configured to minimize the energy and storage
requirements. For example, we can use the CS-based computation method for
both EEG and ECG sensors and use the aggregation method for other low-
frequency sensors (e.g., temperature) to maximize the battery lifetime of all
sensors.
• Example 2: Consider a continuous health monitoring system that is used to
monitor a subject who has previously been diagnosed with high blood glucose.
As a result, any rapid rise in blood glucose should be detected and addressed
immediately. In such a scenario, the latency that might be added by using
sample aggregation for blood glucose levels may not be acceptable.
Among all the discussed schemes, sample aggregation is the only one that may
lead to a non-negligible increase in latency. Therefore, the number of samples that
can be aggregated in one packet before transmission can be limited by the latency
that can be tolerated.
98
Table 3.15: Comparison of different schemes
Scheme Latency Amount of raw data transmitted Extensibility
Baseline Low All raw data High
Sample aggregation Varies All raw data High
Anomaly-driven Low A portion of collected data Low
CS-based Low A portion of compressed data Low
2. Amount of raw medical data transmitted : Physicians may want to examine
raw medical data over a specific time period to verify on-sensor computation. The
amount of raw information that needs to be transmitted and stored for further analysis
varies from one device to another. It also depends on the medical condition of the
patient.
Schemes that use on-sensor computation (anomaly-driven transmission and CS-
based computation and transmission) only transfer a small portion of raw data con-
taining important information about the occurrence of the anomaly. However, if
more medical information is required to be transferred to the base station, the de-
signers should use the other schemes or send more raw data (e.g., over an hour of
measurements) after detecting an anomaly.
3. Extensibility : This is a design consideration where the implementation takes
future modifications of the algorithms into consideration. High extensibility implies
that applications of a biomedical sensor can be extended in the future with a mini-
mum level of effort. Generally, schemes that rely on on-sensor computation are less
extensible in comparison to schemes that transfer raw data to the base station due to
the fact that they are designed to minimize the energy consumption and the amount
of required storage in certain applications (e.g., arrhythmia detection). Therefore, if
a physician wants to change the computation algorithm of the medical device, an-
other device should be designed and used, or at least the device’s firmware should be
updated each time.
Table 3.15 compares various schemes.
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Potentially, different schemes can be used in the health monitoring system for
different sensors. Since the sensors are located on different parts of the body, they
cannot share on-sensor resources (e.g., the battery). Thus, their battery lifetimes are
independent.
We can also use a combination of schemes even in just one sensor. For example,
we can combine one of the schemes that uses on-sensor computation (anomaly-driven
or CS-based) with the sample aggregation scheme to reduce total energy consumption
even more. However, since in anomaly-driven and CS-based schemes, the computation
energy is dominant and the transmission energy is only a small fraction of total
energy consumption, the addition of the sample aggregation scheme will not provide
a significant energy reduction.
3.7.2 The hardware platform
An appropriate hardware platform can be chosen from various general-purpose com-
mercial products or else designed as ASIC hardware. General-purpose commercial
products enable the designers to implement an algorithm or prototype of a biomed-
ical sensor quickly. However, they are not optimized for the specific application.
Anomaly-driven and CS-based schemes use some algorithms to process the raw data
on the EEG or ECG sensor nodes before transmission. An ASIC could be designed
for these algorithms. In particular, in our computation schemes, the on-sensor com-
putation algorithm uses a support vector machine as a classifier to detect anomalies
(arrhythmia and seizure). Specialized processors and architectures that enable ef-
ficient handling of data structures used by the classifier could reduce computation
energy even further [365–371]. Further energy reduction can be achieved through
supply voltage scaling. The total energy is determined primarily by the sum of dy-
namic (active-switching) energy and the static (leakage) energy. However, reduction
in active-switching energy due to supply voltage scaling is opposed by an increase
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in leakage energy. Therefore, there is an optimal supply voltage at which the cir-
cuit attains its minimum energy consumption and still work reliably. This could be
addressed in an ASIC. However, such an ASIC may not be desirable from a cost
perspective and does not improve transmission energy.
3.8 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we discussed a secure energy-efficient system for long-term continuous
health monitoring. We discussed and evaluated various schemes with the help of eight
biomedical sensors that would typically be part of a WBAN. We also evaluated the
storage requirements for long-term analysis and storage.
Among the four schemes we evaluated (including the baseline scheme), we showed
that the CS-based scheme provides the most computational energy savings (e.g., up to
724× for ECG sensors) because it needs to process much fewer signal samples. For low-
sample-rate sensors, we can achieve significant energy savings by simply accumulating
the raw data before transmitting them to the base station.
In addition, the CS-based scheme also allows us to reduce the storage requirements
significantly. For example, for an EEG sensor based seizure detection application, we
achieve total storage savings of up to 19344×. The results indicate that long-term
continuous health monitoring is indeed feasible from both energy and storage points
of view.
Finally, we compared all proposed schemes and discussed how a continuous long-
term health monitoring system should be configured based on patients’ needs and
physicians’ recommendations.
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Chapter 4
OpSecure: A Secure Optical
Communication Channel for
Implantable Medical Devices
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) are opening up new opportunities for holistic
health care by enabling continuous monitoring and treatment of various medical con-
ditions, leading to an ever-improving quality of life for patients. Integration of radio
frequency (RF) modules in IMDs has provided wireless connectivity and facilitated
access to on-device data and post-deployment tuning of essential therapy. However,
this has also made IMDs susceptible to various security attacks. Several lightweight
encryption mechanisms have been developed to prevent well-known attacks, e.g., in-
tegrity attacks that send malicious commands to the device, on IMDs. However, lack
of a secure key exchange protocol (that enables the exchange of the encryption key
while maintaining its confidentiality) and the immaturity of already-in-use wakeup
protocols (that are used to turn on the RF module before an authorized data trans-
mission) are two fundamental challenges that must be addressed to ensure the security
of wireless-enabled IMDs.
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In this chapter, we introduce OpSecure, an optical secure communication channel
between an IMD and an external device, e.g., a smartphone. OpSecure enables an
intrinsically user-perceptible unidirectional data transmission, suitable for physically-
secure communication with minimal size and energy overheads. Based on OpSecure,
we design and implement two protocols: (i) a low-power wakeup protocol that is
resilient against remote battery draining attacks, and (ii) a secure key exchange pro-
tocol to share the encryption key between the IMD and the external device. We
investigate the two protocols using a human body model [372].
4.1 Introduction
IMDs are revolutionizing health care by offering continuous monitoring, diagnosis, and
essential therapies for a variety of medical conditions. IMDs can capture, process, and
store various types of physiological signals, and are envisioned as the key to enabling
a holistic approach to health care [11]. Rapid technological advances in wireless com-
munication, sensing, signal processing, and low-power electronics are transforming
the design and development of IMDs. State-of-the-art IMDs, e.g., pacemakers and
implantable drug infusion systems, commonly support short-range wireless connectiv-
ity, which enables remote diagnosis and/or monitoring of chronic disorders and post-
deployment therapy adjustment [19]. Moreover, wireless connectivity allows health
care professionals to non-intrusively monitor the device status, e.g., physicians can
gauge the device battery level without performing any surgery.
Despite the numerous services that wireless connectivity offers, it may make an
IMD susceptible to various security attacks. Previous research efforts [18,19,112,272,
373, 374] have demonstrated how wireless connectivity may be a security loophole
that can be exploited by an attacker. For example, Halperin et al. [19] show how an
attacker can exploit the security susceptibilities of the wireless protocol utilized in
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an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) to perform a battery draining attack
against the device. This is an attack that aims to deplete the device battery by
frequently activating/using the RF module. Moreover, they show that it is feasible to
exploit these susceptibilities to change on-device data or the current operation of the
device. Gollakota et al. [373] explain how an adversary can eavesdrop on an insecure
communication channel between an IMD and its associated external device to extract
sensitive information about the patient.
To prevent battery draining attacks, an attack-resilient wakeup protocol, which
activates the RF module before every authorized communication, must be used. To-
day’s IMDs often employ a magnetic switch, which turns on their RF module in
the presence of an external magnet. Unfortunately, it has been shown that magnetic
switches cannot prevent battery draining attacks since they can be easily activated by
an attacker (without the presence of a nearby magnet) if a magnetic field of sufficient
strength is applied [19,375].
In order to secure the RF wireless channel between the IMD and the external
device and avert the risk of eavesdropping on the channel, the use of cryptographic
techniques, e.g., data encryption, has been suggested [17, 376]. However, traditional
cryptographic techniques are not suitable for IMDs due to limited on-device resources,
e.g., limited storage and battery energy. For example, asymmetric encryption mecha-
nisms are not applicable to resource-constrained IMDs since they would significantly
decrease the IMD battery lifetime [376, 377]. Several lightweight symmetric encryp-
tion mechanisms have been proposed in the last decade to ensure the security of
communication protocols utilized in IMDs (see [378] for a survey). While symmet-
ric cryptography may offer a secure lightweight solution, it is greatly dependent on
a secure key exchange protocol. Such a protocol enables sharing of the encryption
key between the IMD and the external device. As extensively described later in
Section 4.2.2, previously-proposed key exchange protocols have various shortcomings
104
since they either add significant overheads to the IMD or are susceptible to remote
eavesdropping.
In this chapter, we present practical key exchange and wakeup protocols, which
complement lightweight symmetric encryption mechanisms, to thwart common secu-
rity attacks against insecure communication channels. We introduce a secure optical
communication channel, which we call OpSecure. We discuss the design and imple-
mentation of a low-power wakeup protocol and a secure key exchange protocol based
on OpSecure. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We introduce OpSecure, an optical secure unidirectional (from the external
device to the IMD) communication channel.
2. We present an attack-resilient low-power wakeup protocol for IMDs based on
OpSecure.
3. We propose a secure key exchange protocol, which enables sharing of the en-
cryption key between IMDs and their associated external devices.
4. We discuss the design and implementation of a prototype IMD platform that
supports the proposed protocols and present evaluation results for the proto-
type.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we explain
why wakeup and key exchange protocols are essential for IMDs and briefly discuss the
shortcomings of previously-proposed protocols. We present OpSecure and summarize
its advantages in Section 4.3. We also propose a wakeup protocol and a key exchange
protocol based on OpSecure. In Section 4.4, we describe our prototype and exper-
imental setup. We evaluate the prototype implementation that supports both the
proposed protocols (wakeup and key exchange) in Section 4.5. Finally, we conclude
in Section 4.6.
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4.2 Problem definition
In this section, we first explain the role of wakeup and key exchange protocols in
providing secure communication for IMDs. Then, we present a brief overview of prior
related work on these protocols and summarize their shortcomings.
4.2.1 Wakeup and key exchange protocols
As mentioned earlier, the IMD and its associated external device commonly have
an RF channel that is used for bidirectional data communication. We assume that
both devices are capable of using symmetric encryption for protecting the data sent
over the RF channel. The overall system architecture that we target is illustrated in
Fig. 4.1.
ProgrammersIMDs
Bidirectional
RF channel
Figure 4.1: Overall system architecture: IMD and external device have a bidirectional
RF channel that supports symmetric encryption, e.g., Bluetooth Low Energy.
Due to severe on-sensor energy constraints, the RF module must be enabled only
when absolutely needed, e.g., when an authorized physician wants to access on-device
data. Thus, prior to each data transmission, the RF module should be activated
using a pre-defined wakeup protocol. This protocol must satisfy two main design
requirements. First, it must be resilient against battery draining attacks so that an
attacker cannot activate the RF module. Second, it should add negligible size and
energy overheads to the device.
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After enabling the RF module by the wakeup protocol, data can be transmitted
over the bidirectional communication channel that supports symmetric encryption.
Since symmetric encryption is based on an encryption key, an exchange protocol
must be used to securely exchange the encryption key between the IMD and the
external device. Every practical key exchange protocol must satisfy the following
design requirements. First, it must guarantee the confidentiality of the encryption
key and be resilient to remote eavesdropping. Second, its size and energy overheads
must be minimal. Third, it must ensure that health care professionals can access
and control the IMD without a notable delay in an emergency situation in which the
patient needs immediate medical assistance.
4.2.2 Related work
Next, we summarize previous research efforts on both wakeup and key exchange
protocols and highlight their shortcomings.
Wakeup protocols
As mentioned earlier, a magnetic switch is commonly integrated into today’s IMDs
to turn on the RF module when needed. However, magnetic switches are vulner-
able to battery draining attacks since they can be remotely activated [19]. A few
wakeup protocols have recently been presented in the academic literature. For exam-
ple, the wakeup protocol presented by Halperin et al. [19] relies on an authentication
technique in which the IMD harvests the RF energy supplied by the external device
itself. The RF module is powered by the battery only after the external device is au-
thenticated. However, the RF energy harvesting subsystem needs an antenna, which
imposes a significant size overhead on the IMD. Kim et al. [272] suggest a wakeup
scheme in which the IMD activates the RF module when it detects the vibration gen-
erated by an external electrical motor. Their scheme adds minimal size and energy
107
overheads to the IMD since it only needs the addition of a low-power accelerometer
to the IMD. However, in practice, the patient’s regular activities, e.g., running, may
unintentionally and frequently turn on the RF module, and as a result, deplete the
device battery.
Key exchange protocols
The use of a pre-defined password, which is stored on the device and known to the
user, is a longstanding tradition in the security community. However, a key exchange
approach that needs active user involvement, e.g., asking the user to remember a pass-
word and give it to authorized physicians upon request, is not suitable for IMDs since
the user may not be able to cooperate with health care professionals in an emergency,
e.g., when the patient is unconscious. In order to minimize user involvement, previ-
ous research studies have proposed several user-independent key exchange protocols.
Next, we summarize them and discuss their shortcomings.
1. Ultraviolet tattoos: Schechter [379] presented a scheme in which a fixed user-
selected human-readable key is tattooed directly on the patient’s body using ultravio-
let ink. In this protocol, all devices that need to communicate with the IMD must be
equipped with a small, reliable, and inexpensive ultraviolet light-emitting diode and
an input mechanism for key entry. This tattoo-based approach has two limitations.
First, the design requires the patient to agree to acquire a tattoo, which significantly
limits its applicability [380]. Second, if the password becomes compromised, access
by the attacker cannot be prevented easily since the password cannot be changed in
a user-convenient manner.
2. Physiological signal-based key generation: A few physiological signal-based
key generation protocols have been proposed [381–383], which can be used to gener-
ate a shared key for the IMD and the external device from synchronized readings of
physiological signals, such as an electrocardiogram (ECG). Unfortunately, the robust-
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ness and security properties of keys generated using such techniques have not been
well-established [272].
3. Using an acoustic side channel: Halperin et al. presented a key exchange
protocol based on acoustic side channels in [19]. Unfortunately, their protocol is
susceptible to remote acoustic eavesdropping attacks [384] and, as a result, does not
offer a secure key exchange protocol. Moreover, it is not reliable in noisy environments
since they utilized a carrier frequency within the audible range. Furthermore, it
imposes a significant size overhead [272].
4. Using a vibration side channel: Kim et al. [272] proposed a key exchange
protocol that relies on a vibration side channel, i.e., a channel in which the transmitter
is a vibration motor, and the receiver is an accelerometer embedded in the IMD.
This protocol requires negligible size and energy overheads. However, it has two
shortcomings. First, since electrical motors generate capturable electromagnetic and
acoustic waves during their normal operation [112], an adversary might be able to
extract the key from signals leaked from the vibration motor. Second, since the
method uses an accelerometer to detect vibrations, regular physical activities, e.g.,
running, may be interpreted as key transmission. This can reduce the battery lifetime
of the IMD since the device needs to listen to the communication channel even when
there is no actual transmission.
In this chapter, we aim to address the above-mentioned shortcomings of
previously-proposed protocols, in particular size/energy overheads and vulnera-
bility to eavesdropping, through a simple low-power, yet secure key exchange protocol
using visible light.
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4.3 The proposed channel and protocols
In this section, we first describe OpSecure and highlight its advantages. Then, we
discuss the two proposed protocols that are based on OpSecure.
4.3.1 OpSecure: The proposed channel
Optical data transmission (also called light-based wireless communication) is a well-
known communication type that has attracted increasing attention in recent years
due to its potential to offer high-speed wireless communication (as a complement
or an alternative to WiFi) for a variety of portable devices, e.g., smartphones and
laptops. Previous research studies [385,386] demonstrate that optical communication
channels can enable high-rate data transmission (the transmission rate can vary from
several hundred Mb/s to a few Gb/s). In an optical channel, data packets flow from
a light source (transmitter) to a light sensor (receiver). Therefore, to establish a
bidirectional communication channel between two devices, both devices must have a
light source and a light sensor.
There is a basic domain-specific challenge that must be addressed when developing
an optical communication scheme for IMDs: integration of light sources into IMDs
imposes significant size and energy overheads on these resource-constrained devices.
Hence, it is not feasible to transmit data from an IMD to an external device via
an optical channel even though such a channel can potentially enable two-way com-
munication. Unlike light sources, state-of-the-art already-in-market light sensors are
sufficiently compact and energy-efficient to be embedded in IMDs. Therefore, a one-
way communication channel, which transmits data from the external device to the
IMD, can be implemented with minimal size and energy overheads. We implement
such a channel and call it OpSecure.
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OpSecure is intrinsically secure due to its close proximity requirement and high
user perceptibility. Visible light attenuates fast in the body and, hence, can only
be captured within a very close range. As demonstrated later in Section 4.5, if the
light source is in contact with the body and directed at the IMD, it can penetrate
deep enough into the body to reach the IMD. However, a passive adversary cannot
eavesdrop on OpSecure without an eavesdropping device attached to the body, which
is very likely to be noticed by the patient.
As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, the external device may vary from specialized IMD
programmers, i.e., external devices that are specifically designed to query the IMD
data or send commands to the IMD, to general-purpose portable devices, e.g., smart-
phones. As in the case of vibration-based key exchange [272], we implement our
prototype using a smartphone used as the external device (see Fig. 4.2). This has
three advantages. First, the component that we need in the external device for estab-
lishing OpSecure is already present in smartphones (the flashlight can be used as a
light source). Second, smartphones have become the dominant form of base stations
for a large number of medical devices since they are ubiquitous and powerful, and
provide various technologies needed for numerous applications [94]. As a result, they
can be used as a base station for collecting and processing several types of physio-
logical data (including data collected by IMDs) [11]. Third, smartphones can easily
support highly-secure encrypted transmission, which deters several potential attacks
against the IMD [37].
However, note that OpSecure can also be implemented on other devices that are
used to communicate with the IMD with minimal overheads if they can be equipped
with a small light source and an input mechanism for key entry.
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Figure 4.2: The IMD (pacemaker) has an embedded light sensor, and the smartphone
flashlight acts as a light source.
4.3.2 The proposed protocols
Next, we describe both the wakeup and key exchange protocols that we have developed
based on OpSecure.
Wakeup protocol
As mentioned earlier, when the light source is in contact with the human body,
visible light can penetrate deep enough into the body to reach the IMD. However, it
attenuates very fast in the body. We exploit this fundamental characteristic of visible
light to develop a wakeup protocol that works as follows. The smartphone fully turns
on its flashlight and the IMD wakes up periodically to check if a light source is on
the body, i.e., it checks if the intensity of the light received by the IMD is above a
pre-defined threshold. The presence of an on-body light source that points to the IMD
is interpreted as the presence of a trusted external device.
As shown later in Section 4.5, the proposed wakeup protocol adds minimal size and
energy overheads to the device. Unlike a majority of previously-proposed protocols,
it also provides immunity against battery draining attacks. In fact, an attacker, who
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wants to wake up the RF module, needs to attach a light source to the patient’s body
at a location close to the IMD. Such an action can be easily detected by the patient.
Key exchange protocol
Assuming the IMD and the external device use a bidirectional RF communication
protocol that supports symmetric encryption, our protocol can be used to transmit a
randomly-generated key from the smartphone to the IMD. For each key exchange:
Step 1: The smartphone first generates a random key K ∈ {0,1}N = k1k2...kN of
length N , and prepares a key packet as Keypacket = Pre∣∣K ∣∣Post, where Pre and
Post are two fixed binary sequences that are concatenated with the key to mark the
beginning and end of a key packet.
Step 2: The physician places the smartphone on the patient’s body so that its
flashlight is directed at the light sensor of the IMD (IMDs commonly have a fixed
location and can be easily detected by the physician).
Step 3: The external device uses on-off keying (OOK) modulation to transmit
Keypacket: the flashlight is turned on (off) for a fixed period of time (Tstep) to trans-
mit bit “1” (“0”). Algorithm 1 shows a simplified pseudo-code for this step. It first
computes Tstep = 1000R ms, where R is the transmission rate given by the user. Then, it
calls the keySegmentation procedure, which divides Keypacket into smaller segments
such that each segment only consists of all “1”s or all “0”s. The keySegmentation
procedure outputs an array of integer numbers (segments[]) so that: (i) the absolute
value of each element in the array represents the length (the number of bits) of each
of the above-mentioned segments, and (ii) the sign of the element shows whether bits
of the segment are all “1”s or all “0”s, i.e., if all bits in the ith segment are “1”,
segments[i] > 0, otherwise, segments[i] < 0 (see Fig. 4.3 for an example). Finally,
Algorithm 1 turns on/off the flashlight with respect to the absolute values of the
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elements of segments[] and Tstep, i.e., Abs(segment) ∗Tstep determines how long the
flashlight must be kept on/off.
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Figure 4.3: keySegmentation outputs segments[] given Keypacket.
Algorithm 1: flashlightControl procedure
Given: The key packet (Keypacket) and transmission rate (R)
1. Tstep ← 1000/R
2. segments[]← keySegmentation(Keypacket)
3. For each segment in segments[]
4. If(segment > 0)
5. turnTheLightOn(Abs(segment) ∗ Tstep)
6. else
7. turnTheLightOff(Abs(segment) ∗ Tstep)
8. end
9. end
Step 4: The IMD demodulates the received visible light and recovers Keypacket.
Then, it extracts K from Keypacket by removing Pre and Post. Thereafter, it encrypts
a fixed pre-defined confirmation message Mconfirm using K and transmits this message
C = ENC(Mconfirm,K) to the smartphone.
Step 5: The smartphone checks if it can successfully decrypt the received message
C using K, i.e., if DEC(C,K) = Mconfirm. If the message can be successfully de-
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crypted, the smartphone knows that the IMD received the key K correctly, and then
subsequent RF data transmissions are encrypted using key K.
In addition to key exchange, the above-mentioned protocol (the first three steps)
can be used to transmit data/commands from the smartphone to the IMD without
using the RF module. For example, a predefined stream of bits can be reserved for
the shutdown command, i.e., a command that entirely disables the device, and sent
using this protocol when needed. Note that the IMD cannot provide any feedback via
OpSecure since the channel is unidirectional. However, modern IMDs commonly have
an embedded beeping component that warn the patient in different scenarios, e.g.,
when the RF module is activated [19] or when the device’s battery level is low [387].
Such a component can be also used to provide feedback when the IMD receives a
predefined message over OpSecure, e.g., the beeping component can generate three
beeps when the IMD receives the shutdown command via OpSecure.
4.4 The prototype implementation and body
model
In this section, we first describe the wireless-enabled IMD that we implemented and
the smartphone application that we developed. Then, we describe the human body
model, which we used to evaluate the prototype implementation.
4.4.1 Prototype implementation
As mentioned earlier, OpSecure establishes a unidirectional communication chan-
nel between the IMD and the external device. We implemented a wireless-enabled
IMD prototype based on ATmega168V [388] (a low-power microprocessor from At-
mel), TEMT6000 [389] (an ambient light sensor from Vishay Semiconductors), and
RFD77101 [390] (a Bluetooth Low Energy module from Simblee). The prototype
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does not offer any health monitoring/therapeutic operations. Indeed, it only imple-
ments the two proposed protocols. TEMT6000 enables OpSecure by receiving visible
light generated by the user’s smartphone, and RFD77101 provides the bidirectional
RF communication that can be secured using a symmetric encryption mechanism
for which the key can be exchanged over OpSecure. We also developed an Android
application that can be used to either wake the IMD up or generate and transmit
a random key to the IMD using the smartphone flashlight. The application allows
the user to set the key length (N) and transmission rate (R). Fig. 4.4 illustrates
the application and the prototype. It also demonstrates how the application turns
the flashlight on/off to transmit the key. For the key exchange example shown in
Fig. 4.4, the transmission rate and key length are set to 20 b/s and 4 b (in practice,
the N used would be much higher, e.g., 64 b), respectively. Thus, the smartphone
needs Tstep = 10004 = 50 ms for transmitting a single bit. In this implementation, the
application uses two 4-bit sequences (“1100” and “1111”) to mark the beginning and
end of the key.
5 cm
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Rate 20
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Pre || K || Post
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New Key
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Figure 4.4: The smartphone generates a 4-bit key and transmits the key over OpSe-
cure. The application allows the user to control both the key length (N) and trans-
mission rate (R).
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We evaluated our protocols using three different smartphones: Nexus 5s, Nexus
6, and MotoX.
4.4.2 The bacon-beef body model
The bacon-beef model for the human body has been previously used in several re-
search studies [19, 272, 373]. Although this model may not fully represent all the
characteristics of the human body, it has been accepted as a valid testing method-
ology by researchers working on IMDs [391] due to the difficulties associated with
more realistic experiments, e.g., laws that permit and control the use of animals for
scientific experimentation. The bacon-beef body model consists of a thin layer of
bacon on a thick layer of 85% lean ground beef (Fig. 4.5). In our experiments, the
IMD prototype is placed between the bacon and the ground beef, which reflects the
typical placement of ICDs [19]. The smartphone is placed on top of the bacon layer
above a transparent plastic sealing.
IMD
Light sensor Smartphone
Dh
Dv
Beef Bacon
Figure 4.5: Experimental setup: The smartphone is placed on top of the bacon layer
above a transparent plastic sealing.
4.5 Evaluation of the proposed protocols
In this section, we present evaluation results for the prototype implementation. In
particular, we evaluate the transmission range (how far the smartphone can be placed
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from the IMD and have the visible light still reach it), wakeup/exchange time (the
time needed by the wakeup/exchange protocol), protocol overheads (size and energy),
and their security.
4.5.1 Transmission range
We evaluated the prototype using the bacon-beef model for the human body. We
varied both the vertical distance and horizontal distance between the IMD and the
smartphone (shown as Dv and Dh in Fig. 4.5, respectively) to evaulate the vertical
and horizontal transmission range (maximum Dv and Dh at which the visible light
can still reach the IMD). We found that both maximum Dv and Dh are independent
of the key length and transmission rate. They mainly depend on the maximum
light intensity that the flashlight has to offer. For the three smartphones we used
in our experiments (Nexus 5s, Nexus 6, and MotoX), the maximum light intensity
generated by their flashlights is almost the same. Indeed, for all three smartphones,
the maximum vertical (horizontal) transmission range was about 2 cm (1.5 cm).
Thus, if the physician places the smartphone on the patient’s body and keeps the
smartphone within 1.5 cm of the IMD’s light sensor (Dh < 1.5 cm), the visible light
can easily reach a depth of 1 cm (the typical Dv for IMDs such as ICDs [19]). The IMD
location is fixed and easily recognizable by inspecting the patient’s skin under which
the IMD is implanted. Therefore, ensuring Dh < 1.5 cm would be straightforward for
a physician.
4.5.2 Transmission quality
We transmitted 100 different keys from each of the three smartphones to the IMD,
with each smartphone placed within the horizontal transmission range of OpSecure
(Dh < 1.5 cm), and with the IMD under a 2 cm layer of bacon (2 cm is the vertical
transmission range). We found that all keys were transmitted over OpSecure without
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any error. Therefore, the bit error rate (the number of received bits that have been
altered due to noise, interference, distortion, etc.) was zero in all these transmissions.
In order to evaluate the effect of ambient noise (e.g., other light sources in the en-
vironment such as sunlight or a car’s headlight) on transmission quality, we placed
a powerful (3000-lumen) light source at a close distance (1 m) from the IMD. We
noticed that the intensity of the visible light received by the IMD remained almost
the same in the presence of the external light source. Indeed, the external light source
did not negatively impact the quality of transmission at all.
4.5.3 Wakeup/exchange time
Next, we evaluated the wakeup time (the time that the wakeup protocol takes to
detect the presence of the external device and turn on the RF module) and the
exchange time (how long the key exchange protocol takes to exchange the encryption
key).
Wakeup time : As mentioned in Section 4.3, the wakeup protocol periodically places
the light sensor in the full operating mode, in which the sensor samples the light in-
tensity, to check if the smartphone flashlight is present. The wakeup time depends on
two parameters: (i) how long the light sensor is in the full operating mode (Toperation),
and (ii) how long the light sensor remains in the standby mode (Tstandby) in which the
sensor is disabled. Toperation and Tstandby should be set with regard to the maximum
tolerable wakeup time and energy consumption of the wakeup protocol. For example,
if we set Tstandby = 1.8 s and Toperation = 0.2 s, the IMD turns on the light sensor
for 0.2 s and then disables it for 1.8 s. In this case, the worst-case wake up time
will be Tstandby + Toperation = 2 s. As described later in Section 4.5.4, the worst-case
wakeup time can be traded off against energy consumption by varying either Tstandby
or Toperation.
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Exchange time : The exchange time can be readily calculated as TEX = N/R, where
N and R are the key length and transmission rate, respectively. N depends on the
encryption mechanism and is commonly 64 b or 128 b. The transmission rate generally
depends on two parameters: (i) the blinking frequency of the light source, i.e., how
fast the light source can be turned on and off, and (ii) how fast the light sensor
can sample the visible light. In our experiments, the maximum blinking frequency
offered by the smartphones was within a 20-30 Hz range, and the light sensor was
able to sample visible light with a sampling rate of a few hundred Hz (a sampling
rate of 60 Hz is sufficient to recover the key when the blinking frequency is 30 Hz).
Therefore, the maximum blinking frequency of the smartphone flashlight limited the
transmission rate. In fact, the maximum transmission rate was within the range of
20 b/s (for MotoX) to 30 b/s (for Nexus 6). As a result, the minimum time needed
for exchanging a packet, that includes a key of length 64 b (128 b) and both Pre and
Post, was within the range of 2.4 s to 3.6 s (4.5 s to 6.8 s).
Note that different smartphones may offer different maximum transmission rates.
However, the IMD does not need to know the transmission rate R beforehand since
R can be computed based on the binary sequence Pre, which is known to the IMD.
In our prototype implementation, where the first two bits of Pre are always “11” (as
mentioned in Section 4.4, Pre=“1100”), R can be computed as follows: R = 1000Tstep ms,
where 1000Tstep ms is half of the duration of the time frame in which the IMD observes
the Pre sequence.
4.5.4 Size and energy overheads
Next, we examine the size and energy overheads that the proposed protocols add to
the IMD.
Light sensors commonly consist of a phototransistor in series with a small resistor
that converts received light to a voltage. Light sensors typically also have an analog-
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to-digital converter (ADC) that converts this voltage to a digital number. Therefore,
a light sensor consists of simple circuitry that can be implemented in a very small
area. In order to save more area on the chip, manufacturers may also use an ADC
already incorporated into the IMD and just add a phototransistor/resistor. In both
cases, the size overhead is negligible.
The energy overhead is the additional energy consumed by the light sensor, which
is added to the IMD to enable transmission over OpSecure. The energy consumption
of a light sensor (even one with a built-in ADC) is typically very small, and thus results
in negligible energy overhead on the IMD. We investigate the energy overheads for
each protocol using a realistic example next.
Consider a typical ICD with a 1.5-Ah battery and 90-month lifetime (it consumes
about 23.14 µA current on an average). We can either use a light sensor with a
built-in ADC such as MAX44007 [388] or a light sensor without an ADC such as
TEMT6000 [389] (used in our prototype). Next, we discuss the energy overheads of
wakeup and key exchange protocols for the ICD in both cases.
Wakeup protocol : We configure the IMD so that the light sensor is in the full
operating mode for Toperation = 0.2 s after being in the standby mode for Tstandby = 1.8
s. Thus, the light sensor only spends 10% of the time in the full operating mode.
MAX44007 drains 0.65 µA (100 pA) from the battery in the full operating (standby)
mode, thus draining 65.09 nA on an average. In this case, the energy overhead of
the wakeup protocol is less than 0.3% of the total energy consumption. If we use
TEMT6000, the phototransistor in series with the resistor and the built-in ADC,
when operating in the full operating mode, drain a few nA [389] and tens of nA [11]
from the battery, respectively. Therefore, their energy overheads are negligible in
comparison to the total energy consumption of the ICD. Reducing
Toperation
Toperation+Tstandby
makes the energy overhead even smaller.
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Key exchange protocol : After waking up the RF module, the physician can use
the smartphone to initiate the key exchange procedure in which the IMD configures
the light sensor to sense in the full operating mode for a few seconds. However, key
exchange is a very rare event for two reasons. First, a key that is exchanged once can
typically be used for a long period of time unless the user suspects that the key is
compromised. Second, the communication between the IMD and the external device
is very sporadic (e.g., the number of transmissions varies from a few times per day to
a few times per year). Thus, even if the external device transmits a new key for each
communication session, the timeframe in which the light sensor operates in the full
operating mode to exchange the key is negligible in comparison to the device lifetime.
Consequently, the key exchange protocol adds almost-zero overhead to the IMD.
4.5.5 Security analysis
In this section, we evaluate the feasibility of two types of security attacks on OpSecure.
Eavesdropping : We investigated the possibility of both near-IMD and remote eaves-
dropping attacks.
We first placed the smartphone on the chest of a human subject and placed a light
sensor close to the smartphone to measure the light intensity on the body surface at
varying distances from the smartphone flashlight. As expected, the visible light atten-
uated very fast and the light sensor was not able to detect the light from the flashlight
as the distance between them became greater than 2 cm. Thus, an eavesdropping
device to pick up the light and extract the key would need to be placed on the body
surface within 2 cm of the IMD, which is not likely to be feasible since the patient
can easily detect such a device.
We next investigated the feasibility of launching remote eavesdropping (without
an on-body sensor). We noticed that the smartphone flashlight creates a red circular
area on the user’s chest when it is on. We investigated if an attacker may be able to
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use a camera to capture a video from the user’s chest and process the video to extract
the key. In order to examine the feasibility of such an attack, we asked a subject to
hold the smartphone over his chest and use his right hand to cover the smartphone.
Then, we placed a 12-megapixel camera at a distance of 1 m (a reasonable distance
for remote eavesdropping) from the user’s chest, and captured two sets of videos
in a dark room: four videos when the smartphone flashlight was on and four when
the flashlight was off. The videos were captured in the dark room to simulate the
worst-case scenario since in a dark environment the effect of ambient light sources
is minimized and, as a result, the red spot created by the flashlight becomes more
visible. We extracted 1000 frames from each video. For each video in the first set,
we compared all of its frames to the ones of all videos in the second set using the
concept of RGB Euclidean distance [392]. This is a metric that represents the color
difference between two frames. For each video in the first set, the RGB Euclidean
distances between its frames and the frames of other videos in the first set were similar
to distances between its frames and the frames of videos in the second set, i.e., the
videos in the first set were not distinguishable from the videos in the second set. This
indicates that the attacker cannot detect the red spot created by the smartphone
flashlight when the smartphone is placed on the user’s chest and the user covers the
smartphone by his hand. Thus, in this scenario, the attacker cannot distinguish bit
“1” from “0” when the key exchange protocol is sending the key.
Key injection : As mentioned earlier, the horizontal transmission range is about
1.5 cm and the physician should keep the smartphone within this range to transfer
the key to the IMD. Due to this proximity requirement, the attacker cannot place an
unauthorized smartphone on the patient’s body within the horizontal transmission
range without raising suspicion. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 4.5.2, the presence
of an external powerful light source, which is not attached to the body, does not affect
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the intensity of the light received by the in-body light sensor. This significantly limits
the attacker’s ability to inject data (such as his encryption key) into OpSecure.
To sum up, the attacker can neither attach a device to the patient’s body without
raising suspicions nor remotely attack the device.
4.5.6 Summary of evaluations
Table 4.1 summarizes the results of our analyses.
Table 4.1: Summary of evaluations
Horizontal transmission range (Dh) 1.5 cm
Vertical transmission range (Dv) 2 cm
Bit error rate 0
Wakeup time a few seconds
Key exchange time 2.4 s to 3.6 s (key of length 64 b)
4.5 s to 6.8 s (key of length 128 b)
Size overhead negligible
Energy overhead less than 0.3%
Security guarantees prevents eavesdropping and key injection
4.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we described why attack-resilient wakeup and secure key exchange
protocols are essential for establishing a secure RF-based communication link between
the IMD and the external device. We discussed the shortcomings of previously-
proposed protocols. We presented OpSecure, an optical secure communication chan-
nel between an IMD and an external device, e.g., smartphone, that enables an in-
trinsically short-range, user-perceptible one-way data transmission (from the external
device to the IMD). Based on OpSecure, we proposed a wakeup and a key exchange
protocol. In order to evaluate the proposed protocols, we implemented an IMD pro-
totype and developed an Android application that can be used to wake up the IMD
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and transmit the encryption key from the smartphone to the IMD. We evaluated
our prototype implementation using a human body model. The experimental re-
sults demonstrated that OpSecure can be used to implement both wakeup and key
exchange protocols for IMDs with minimal size and energy overheads.
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Chapter 5
Physiological Information Leakage
Information security has become an important concern in healthcare systems, owing
to the increasing prevalence of medical devices and the growing use of wearable and
mobile computing platforms for health and lifestyle monitoring. Previous work in
the area of health information security has largely focused on attacks on the wire-
less communication channel of medical devices, or on health data stored in online
databases.
In this chapter, we pursue an entirely different angle to health information security,
motivated by the insight that the human body itself is a rich source (acoustic, visual,
and electromagnetic) of data. We propose a new class of information security attacks
that exploit physiological information leakage, i.e., various forms of information that
naturally leak from the human body, to compromise privacy. As an example, we
demonstrate attacks that exploit acoustic leakage from the heart and lungs.
The medical devices deployed within or on our bodies also add to natural sources
of physiological information leakage, thereby increasing opportunities for attackers.
Unlike previous attacks on medical devices, which target the wireless communication
to/from them, we propose privacy attacks that exploit information leaked by the very
operation of these devices. As an example, we demonstrate how the acoustic leakage
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from an insulin pump can reveal important information about its operation, such as
the duration and dosage of insulin injection. Moreover, we show how an adversary
can estimate blood pressure (BP) by capturing and processing the electromagnetic
radiation of an ambulatory BP monitoring device [112].
5.1 Introduction
Implantable and wearable medical devices (IWMDs) promise to transform healthcare,
by enabling diagnosis, monitoring, and therapy for a wide range of medical conditions
and by facilitating improved and healthier lifestyles. Rapid advances in electronic de-
vices are revolutionizing the capabilities of IWMDs [17]. New generations of IWMDs
feature increased functional complexity, programmability, and wireless connectivity to
body-area networks (BANs). Standardized communication protocols, such as Blue-
tooth [393] and ZigBee [244], are opening up new opportunities for providing low-
power and reliable communication to IWMDs. These features facilitate convenient
collection of medical data and personalized tuning of therapy through communica-
tion between different IWMDs and an external device (e.g., smartphone or clinical
diagnostic equipment).
Advances in IWMDs have, unfortunately, also greatly increased the possibility
of security attacks against them. Many recent research efforts have addressed the
possibility of exploiting the wireless communication of IWMDs to compromise pa-
tients’ privacy, or to send malicious commands that can cause unintended behav-
ior. For example, Halperin et al. showed that the unencrypted wireless channel of
a pacemaker can be exploited to compromise the confidentiality of data or to send
unauthorized commands that cause the pacemaker to deliver therapy even when it
was not needed [19]. Subsequently, a successful attack on an insulin pump, exploiting
the wireless channel between the device and remote controller, was shown in [18]. By
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reverse-engineering the customized radio communication and interpreting the unen-
crypted packets sent from a remote controller to an insulin pump, the attacker can
launch radio attacks to inject insulin into the patient’s body beyond the dosage regi-
men. Finally, attacks that drain the battery of IWMDs by sending packets that fail
authentication have also been proposed [19].
In this chapter, we demonstrate that medical privacy concerns extend far be-
yond the wireless communication to/from IWMDs. We make two main contributions.
First, we describe the possibility of privacy attacks that target physiological informa-
tion leakage, i.e., signals that continuously emanate from the human body due to the
normal functioning of its organs. These attacks are a concern even when there is no
medical device present, and hence have a much wider scope.
As our second contribution, we target IWMDs. We propose several novel attacks
on privacy by leveraging information leaked from them during their normal operation.
We demonstrate attacks on two medical devices based on acoustic and electromag-
netic (EM) leakage from them. Moreover, we investigate a novel metadata-based
attack that extracts critical health-related information by monitoring the communi-
cation channel, although the data may be completely encrypted. We note that the
proposed attacks are applicable even when medical devices have no wireless commu-
nication, or when the wireless communication is encrypted, unlike previous attacks
that compromise unencrypted wireless channels [18,19].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the threat
model. Section 5.3 discusses the sources and various types of physiological information
leakage. Section 5.4 describes how we capture different types of leaked physiologi-
cal signals. Section 5.5 presents our bevy of proposed privacy attacks. Section 5.6
suggests some countermeasures against the attacks, and Section 5.7 concludes the
chapter.
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5.2 Threat model
In this section, we first describe potential adversaries. Then, we describe potential
risks that may arise from loss of privacy.
5.2.1 Adversary
We consider an adversary to be any potentially untrusted person who has a short-
term physical proximity to the patient. The proposed attacks, while not impossible,
may be difficult to deploy in a secure location such as the patient’s home or a medical
facility such as a hospital. However, none of our attacks require access to specialized
medical equipment such as the ones used in hospitals. We also assume that long-term
physical access to the patient or monitoring of the patient, e.g., using a camera that
continuously monitors the subject’s activities, is not feasible. In our attack scenarios,
the adversary gains the required physical access to the patient in any public location.
Crowded places, such as train stations, bus stops, and shopping malls, may provide
opportunities for the adversary to come closer to the subject, while hiding the required
equipment. A potential adversary might be an employer who intends to discriminate
against a chronically-ill patient, a criminal group seeking to sell valuable medical
information to the highest bidder [100], a private investigator who has been hired to
spy on the subject, or a political operative who wants to expose the medical condition
of the subject for political advantage.
5.2.2 Potential risks
The patient’s physiological signals may be exploited in various ways. We describe
some of the consequences of such information leakage next.
1. Job/insurance loss: Revelation of medical conditions may negatively impact a
person’s employment prospects or make it more difficult for him to obtain insurance.
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Leakage of this sensitive information from the human body or IWMDs, such as the
presence of a serious illness, level of the illness, exposure of a condition that may
carry social stigma, and exposure of physical, emotional or mental conditions would
naturally raise serious privacy concerns.
2. Unauthorized interviews: An unauthorized interviewer may be able to com-
bine lie detection (also called deception detection) questioning methods with the
privacy attack techniques proposed in this chapter to ascertain the truth or falsehood
of responses given by the subject, without his consent. Several researchers have in-
vestigated variations in vital health signals, such as the respiratory rate and heart
rate, in the presence of acute emotional stress (e.g., when the person is lying) or a
mental problem [394–396]. For instance, Sung et al. have demonstrated changes in
the heart and respiratory rates in live poker game scenarios [77].
3. Indirect consequences : Although disclosure of medical information using the
proposed privacy attacks might not be directly lethal, unlike attacks on the integrity
of the medical device [18,19], it may lead to a subsequent tailored integrity attack. For
instance, as described later, extracting medical device information, model, type, and
configuration from the device using EM leakage may provide enough information to an
adversary to design a more effective integrity attack using the extracted parameters.
Moreover, detection of usage of certain medical devices by adversaries may endanger
the safety of the patient, e.g., if the device is very expensive and attracts theft, or
embarrass the subject if the medical condition carries a social stigma [100].
5.3 Information leakage
In this section, we discuss the possible sources of information leakage, followed by
brief descriptions of different types of signal leakages addressed in this chapter.
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5.3.1 Leakage sources
We consider two sources of information leakage: (i) human body and (ii) IWMDs.
Each source continuously leaks information through different types of signals.
Several organs in our body generate biomedical signals. Some of these signals
can be remotely captured and analyzed. For example, our lungs generate an acoustic
wave called respiration sound, which can be captured by a microphone.
In addition to body organs, IWMDs may also reveal critical health information
under normal operation even when not using any wireless communication to transmit
data. For example, the electrical motor of an insulin pump generates an acoustic
signal when injecting insulin. As described later in Section 5.5, performing simple
signal processing on this acoustic signal can reveal the prescribed insulin dose.
5.3.2 Leakage types
In general, leaked physiological signals can be divided into two types: (i) acoustic
and (ii) EM signals. Fig. 5.1 demonstrates the sources of leakage, as well as the
different types of signals that we consider in this chapter. Body organs, such as heart
and lungs, produce an acoustic signal that can be captured remotely and analyzed.
IWMDs, such as an insulin pump or BP monitor, may also generate acoustic and EM
signals during their normal operation even if they are not transmitting any data. The
following subsections describe these signals in detail.
Body-related information
The human body consists of several continuously-operating organs. Various acoustic
and EM signals are generated as a result. The majority of these signals are too weak
to be captured without physical contact or may be absorbed by other organs before
emanating from the body. For example, electrical activities originating from nerves
carry real-time information about health status. The two commonly-used methods for
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Figure 5.1: Sources of leakage and different types of signals that are continuously
leaking from the human body and IWMDs.
measuring these signals are electroencephalography (EEG) and electrocardiography
(ECG). The amplitudes of EEG and ECG signals vary from tens of microvolts to few
millivolts. The frequencies of most of these signals are below 40 Hz [397]. Another
example is the acoustic signal generated by blood circulating through internal organs.
However, this is absorbed by the surrounding muscles and tissues.
If an EM or acoustic signal generated by an organ emanates from the human
body, it may be captured and analyzed to reveal health-related information. For
example, one such signal is the respiration sound that is generated by chest vibration
and airflow through the mouth. Next, we discuss different types of signals that might
leak from the human body during normal operation.
Acoustic signals emanating from the human body : Some of the body organs
generate acoustic signals during their normal operation. In this chapter, we examine
the feasibility of capturing such naturally-occurring acoustic signals from a distance
to reveal confidential health information of a person. Specifically, we show how cap-
turing acoustic signals generated by two organs, heart and lungs, can reveal critical
information.
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As discussed later in Section 5.5, a simple signal processing algorithm enables
us to count the number of peaks in the raw heart sound signal and thus compute
the heart rate. The heart rate may be an indicator of several critical illnesses [398]
or a sudden emotional stress. For example, when a person lies, his heart rate gets
elevated above the normal [399]. Therefore, if an adversary can monitor the heart
rate remotely, he may even be able to assess whether the person is telling the truth.
Respiratory sounds also reveal valuable information about the health condition
of an individual. The process of recording respiratory sounds and analyzing them
is referred to as computerized respiratory sound analysis [400]; it provides crucial
information on respiratory dysfunction, and changes in the respiratory characteristics
(e.g., duration, timing).
EM signals emanating from the human body : The human body continuously
emits infrared radiation that carries health information. These raw data can be
captured and processed by an attacker at a distance.
The use of thermal images has increased dramatically in the medical applications
during the last decade. Thermal imaging cameras highlight warm objects against
cooler backgrounds. As a result, the human body is easily visible in the environment.
Moreover, some physiological variations in the human body can also be detected
with thermal imaging techniques employed in medical diagnostic procedures. Several
research projects on thermal imaging have been discussed in the medical literature.
Using these methods [401–403], an eavesdropper can easily reveal the health status
of a person. For example, in [401], Arora et al. showed the effectiveness of detecting
breast cancer using digital infrared thermal imaging. The possibility of fever detection
using thermal imaging techniques is described in [402].
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IWMD-related information
As mentioned earlier, IWMDs are used for monitoring and therapeutic purposes.
An IWMD may leak health-related data or metadata that compromise the patient’s
privacy. We describe next how IWMDs can leak information through acoustic and
EM signals.
Acoustic signals emanating from IWMDs : First, we describe acoustic leakage
from IWMDs. Acoustic waves propagate through a transmission medium using adi-
abatic compression and decompression. These waves are generated by a source. The
source vibrates the medium, leading to propagation of vibrations from the source.
Electronic devices with microelectromechanical parts generate unintentional
acoustic signals during normal operation. Some recent research efforts have demon-
strated the feasibility of revealing critical information by interpreting acoustic
emanations from peripheral computer devices. For example, researchers have shown
that acoustic emanations from matrix printers carry substantial information about
the printed text [404]. Moreover, Zhuang et al. have demonstrated the feasibility
of recovering keystrokes typed on a keyboard from a sound recording of the user
typing [405].
In this chapter, we demonstrate how acoustic signals generated by an IWMD (e.g.,
an insulin pump) may carry significant information about the patient’s health status
and the functioning of the medical device.
EM signals emanating from IWMDs: We divide the EM radiations into two
classes: (i) unintentionally-generated and (ii) intentionally-generated. Generally, an
electronic equipment may emit unintentional EM signals that can be used as side-
channel information, allowing eavesdroppers to reconstruct processed data at a dis-
tance [406]. This has been a concern in the design of military hardware for over half a
century [407]. IWMDs can also unintentionally generate EM signals while performing
their regular tasks. These signals may reveal critical information about the status of
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Table 5.1: Sources of leakage, types of leakage, and descriptions
Source Type Description
Human Body Acoustic The vibrations generated by a human organ
due to the normal functioning of organs
IWMDs
Acoustic The sound made by electrical components
during the normal operation of the device
EM (unintentional) The unintentionally-generated EM emanat-
ion due to the normal operation of the circ-
uitry inside the device
EM (wireless) The EM radiation that is intentionally gen-
erated by the device for communication
the medical device and patient’s health condition. In this chapter, we demonstrate
how an insulin pump can leak information about its function by emitting unintentional
EM radiations. Medical devices may also use EM signals intentionally to wirelessly
transmit medical data. Eavesdropping on unencrypted wireless communication has
been addressed in several research articles [18, 19]. Moreover, potential information
leakage from fully-encrypted data packets has been discussed in computer science
literature [408–411]. In this chapter, we focus on the metadata that leaks through
wireless communication even when the packets are fully encrypted.
5.4 Leaked signals and capture methods
Before discussing various attacks on the privacy of medical data, we need to describe
how we capture different types of signals that naturally leak from the human body.
Table 5.1 summarizes the sources of physiological information leakage, the types of
leakage, and a short description of each form of leakage, which we have used to
extract valuable medical information. Then, we briefly describe different capture
methods that we have utilized in our experiments.
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5.4.1 Capturing acoustic signals emanating from body or-
gans
Here, we describe how we can capture the acoustic signals leaked during the normal
functioning of lungs and heart. We describe two methods for remotely capturing
small vibrations or weak acoustic signals generated by these organs.
Displacement-based laser microphone
We have designed and built a displacement-based laser microphone that uses a laser
beam to detect sound vibrations from a distance (Fig. 5.2). Laser microphones were
invented to eavesdrop on a conversation with a minimal chance of exposure. Although
they have been used for surveillance purposes for a long time [412], for the first
time, we employ these microphones in the context of a privacy attack on patients’
medical data. We have built an inexpensive laser microphone to detect vibrations
emanating from the human heart and lungs. This device is based on detecting the
varying amounts of reflected laser beam received by a single ambient light sensor. As
illustrated in Fig. 5.3, the laser beam forms a small incident angle with the surface.
Surface vibration along the normal vector causes displacement of the reflected beam,
and as a result, the amount of laser signal reaching the receiver varies for different
displacements.
Parabolic microphone
The second capture method we propose is based on a parabolic microphone (KJB-
Det [413]) to capture weak acoustic signals generated by the lungs. It uses a parabolic
reflector to collect and focus sound waves onto a receiver. It amplifies the acoustic
signal by concentrating all of the sonic energy at the focal point, thus increasing the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). KJB-Det comes with parabolic dish that has a diameter
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of 50 cm. In addition, electronic amplifiers used in KJB-Det can increase the overall
level of both the noise and acoustic signal, without degrading the SNR.
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Figure 5.2: The displacement-based laser microphone.
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Figure 5.3: Schematic for displacement-based laser microphone: The laser beam forms
a small incident angle with the surface. The fraction of light beam received by the
light sensor depends on the vibration of the surface.
5.4.2 Capturing acoustic signal generated by IWMDs
In order to capture the acoustic signal leaked from IWMDs, several sound-recording
equipments can be used, ranging from simple microphones to sophisticated parabolic
microphones. In this chapter, we describe two different privacy attacks based on
acoustic signals leaked from an insulin pump (electrical motor’s sound and acoustic
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alarm generated by its safety system) and one privacy attack based on the acoustic
leakage from an ambulatory BP monitoring device (acoustic signals generated by the
various components of the device when it is measuring BP). In the privacy attack
based on the signal generated by insulin pump motor, we capture and amplify the
sound of the electrical motor using a parabolic microphone (KJB-Det). In other
attacks, we use a simple microphone to record the required acoustic signal.
5.4.3 Capturing unintentional EM signals
We use an oscilloscope to detect the unintentionally-generated EM signals. The EM
side-channel information that we capture is available during the normal operation of
the medical device even when the device is not transmitting any data (e.g., using
a USB cable or wireless communication). We capture the raw EM signal directly
from the antenna that is connected to the oscilloscope, instead of a filtered and
demodulated signal with limited bandwidth. We use an antenna (75 Ohms VHA 9103
Dipol Balun) to improve the SNR for signals in the 25 MHz to 500 MHz frequency
band. Moreover, we check if these EM signals can be captured using a small portable
antenna, such as a simple loop of copper wire with 50 cm circumference.
EM signals may remain undetected using standard techniques. Spectral analyz-
ers need static carrier signals of significant amplitude. The demodulation process
may eliminate the interesting components of unintentionally-emitted EM signals. In
addition, the scanning process of wide-band receivers may take a lot of time [414].
5.4.4 Capturing the metadata of wireless communication
In order to monitor fully-encrypted wireless communication and extract the metadata
from the communication channel, we first need to find the frequency band of the
transmission. If the model and type of the device are known, the frequency range can
be extracted from manufacturer’s documentation.
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In general, an IWMD should make its existence and type unknown to unautho-
rized parties. If a device reveals its existence, its type should still remain hidden
to unauthorized persons for many different reasons. For example, the device might
be extremely expensive. More importantly, knowing the specific model of a device
may provide critical information to potential adversaries. As we elaborate later, if
the type, characteristics, and settings of an IWMD are known, designing a tailored
attack becomes much easier. A tailored attack is a smart attack based on the specific
features and configurations of a known device. Therefore, we assume that the model
and type of the IWMD are not known to the attacker.
A fast approach for detecting the frequency band of a wireless transmission is
through an oscilloscope that uses a loop of wire as an antenna. The eavesdropper
can scan different frequency ranges when the communication channel is active and
guess the frequency range. In addition, the frequency band of communication for
an unknown IWMD can usually be obtained by scanning some specific bands based
on the fact that FDA regulations impose specific limits on the frequency bands of
medical devices. The majority of medical devices communicate at 450 MHz, 600
MHz, 900 MHz, 1.4 GHz, and 2.4 GHz.
After finding the frequency band of transmission, the encrypted packets can be
captured using one or multiple universal software radio peripherals (USRPs) [415].
We demonstrate how examining the frequency band of the channel and characteristics
of the packets can reveal critical health information.
5.5 Proposed privacy attacks
In this section, we propose several privacy attacks to demonstrate how processing
physiological leakage from the human body and IWMDs can reveal various medi-
cal conditions and provide valuable information about the device (e.g., device type,
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Figure 5.4: Different types of privacy attacks, capture methods, and the private
information that each type of attack can extract from different leaked signals
model, and manufacturer). Fig. 5.4 depicts different types of privacy attacks, cap-
ture methods that we use to record the leaked signals, and the private information,
which each type of attacks can extract from different physiological leaked signals. We
demonstrate next several privacy attacks for each type.
5.5.1 Acoustic signal based body-related attacks
Here, we first describe a method to estimate the heart and respiration rates from the
captured acoustic signal. Then, we discuss the parameters that affect the accuracy
and detection range of the attack when each of the two capture methods (parabolic
microphone and laser-displacement microphone) is used.
For obtaining the heart and respiration rates, we use a simple algorithm to find the
local maxima. In order to reduce the effect of noise, the algorithm ensures that the
distance between two consecutive peaks is more than the value of a parameter called
distanceThreshold. The maximum possible human heart rate (200 pulses per minute)
and respiration rate (80 breaths per minute) are used to define distanceThreshold.
Thus, distanceThreshold is set to 300 ms and 750 ms for the heart and respiration
rates, respectively. We perform 20 trials to estimate the heart and respiratory rates
based on the leaked acoustic signals. For each trial, we compare our estimates with
the actual values. We discuss how accurately our algorithm can estimate the heart
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and respiratory rates. We discuss the accuracy of our algorithm for each capture
method (parabolic microphone and laser-displacement microphone).
Laser-displacement microphone : we use the laser-displacement microphone for
capturing acoustic signals from both the lungs and heart. The sound quality obtained
by this microphone depends on two factors: (a) reflection fraction, which is the
fraction of the incident beam that is reflected by the surface, and (b) the displacement
of the received beam. The first parameter depends on the nature of the surface. For
example, the human skin absorbs a large fraction of the incident beam; therefore,
the sensor should be placed close to the skin to receive the beam. However, the
displacement of the received beam on the sensor decreases as the sensor gets nearer
the reflecting surface. We were able to accurately extract the respiration rate from 5
cm away. If the person wears a metallic/reflecting necklace, we can point the incident
beam towards the necklace instead, which is a better reflector than the human skin.
We were able to accurately extract the respiration rate from 6m away when the person
wore a flat steel necklace. We also used a displacement-based laser microphone to
detect the heart rate. In the absence of an attached reflector surface, the acoustic
signal was used by the laser microphone to detect the heart rate with over 95%
accuracy at a distance of 5 cm. At greater distances, the amount of received beam
reduces drastically and the accuracy drops.
Parabolic microphone : The audio gain of a parabolic microphone increases as the
frequency increases. The gain of an ideal dish with a diameter of 50 cm and a perfect
parabolic shape and focus is characterized by a curve starting from 0 dB at 200 Hz.
In order to enhance the amplification of our parabolic microphone, we replaced its
dish with a larger dish with a diameter of 1 m that provides a 6 dB amplification at
200 Hz. At lower frequencies, the most important parameters are dish size and the
quality of the microphone. The modified parabolic microphone was able to detect the
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respiration rate at a distance of 5 m. However, the parabolic microphone was unable
to detect the heart rate.
5.5.2 Acoustic signal based IWMD-related attacks
Here, we describe the privacy attacks that exploit acoustic information leakage from
IWMDs. Acoustic signals generated by an IWMD can provide valuable information
to an unauthorized party. Each IWMD consists of several components. Some of
these components (e.g., electrical motors and relays) can unintentionally produce a
capturable sound during normal operation. An unintentionally-generated acoustic
signal can be used as a side-channel information to reveal the status of the medical
device and the patient’s condition. In addition to this class of acoustic signals, some
IWMDs intentionally produce acoustic signals to notify the users of conditions that
require immediate attention. Many medical devices have alarm systems; among them
are insulin pumps, pulse oximetry devices, and BP monitors. These alarms offer
necessary warnings to inform patients of changes in their health condition. They
usually provide sophisticated mechanisms for safety checks. These alarms make the
patient aware of an unusual situation. Generally, the audible frequency range for
a human is between 20 Hz and 20 kHz. Frequency ranges of 2 kHz to 4 kHz
are most easily heard. For this reason, most alarms emit sound in this frequency
range. Different acoustic warnings and alarms generated by IWMDs may also provide
valuable information to an adversary.
We discuss next different attacks based on unintentionally- and intentionally-
generated acoustic signals generated by IWMDs.
Extracting injected dosage and estimating level of diabetes
Here, we propose privacy attacks based on the acoustic signals leaked from an insulin
delivery system (Fig. 5.5). In this medical device, the electrical motor unintentionally
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generates acoustic signals and the speaker intentionally produces different alarms as
reminders for calibration and high/low glucose, and as predictive high/low glucose
alerts. The components marked in red (motor and buzzer) generate the acoustic
signals that we can interpret to reveal the medical data.
We present two attacks on an insulin pump using both unintentionally- and
intentionally-generated acoustic signals. First, we demonstrate how capturing and
interpreting the unintentional acoustic signal generated by its electrical motor can
reveal the prescribed dosage, and hence the level of diabetes. Second, we use the
acoustic signals generated by its safety system to remotely examine the status of the
device and extract the prescribed dosage.
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Figure 5.5: A schematic view of an insulin pump. The components marked in red
(motor and buzzer) generate the acoustic signals that can be interpreted to reveal the
medical data.
Attack 1: Extracting information from motor sounds of an insulin pump:
We show below how processing the weak acoustic signal generated by the electrical
motor of an insulin pump can reveal the exact amount of injected insulin, and as a
result, provide an estimation of initial blood sugar, and level of diabetes. As men-
tioned earlier, we used a parabolic microphone to capture the acoustic signal in this
case. We propose two signal processing algorithms for this attack.
In an insulin pump, a step motor is used in the injection procedure. Our experi-
ments demonstrate that there is a linear relationship between the number of rotation
steps of the electrical motor and the amount of injected insulin (Fig. 5.6). Fig. 5.7
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Figure 5.6: Dose of injected insulin vs. the number of rotation steps of the electrical
motor.
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Figure 5.7: Acoustic signal generated by the electrical motor of an insulin pump while
injecting 0.8 unit of insulin.
illustrates the acoustic signal generated by the electrical motor while injecting 0.8
unit of insulin. Each peak corresponds to one step of the motor. The first processing
algorithm finds the number of peaks. Thus, for this case, the total number of steps
is calculated as 16, thereby inferring that 0.8 unit of insulin was injected. Algorithm
1 shows the pseudo-code of the algorithm. It calculates the exact amount of injected
insulin based on the number of motor steps. Its four inputs are: (i) acousticSignal,
which is the acoustic signal of the electrical motor sampled at 22 kHz, (ii) distance,
which indicates the minimum acceptable distance between two consecutive peaks
(steps), (iii) threshold, which is the minimum acceptable amplitude of a peak, and
(iv) widthThreshold, which is the width of a step in the absence of environmental
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noise. We obtain the number of steps from the number of peaks in acousticSignal us-
ing subroutine stepCount. Then, using another subroutine stepWidth, we calculate
the width of each step that is defined as the time when the peak and its neighboring
points are greater than widthThreshold. After finding the number of peaks and the
width of each peak, we estimate the number of steps that might be corrupted by
comparing the width of each peak to widthThreshold. If the width is more than
widthThreshold, it is likely to contain noise in the area around the peak.
Algorithm 1: Calculating the insulin dosage from the acoustic signal.
Given: acousticSignal, distance, threshold, and widthThreshold
1. steps← stepCount(acousticSignal, threshold, distance)
2. widths← stepWidth(acousticSignal, threshold, distance)
3. for each width in widths
4. if(width > widthThreshold)
5. noisy ← noisy + (width/widthThreshold)
6. end
7. end
8. if(noisy > 3)
9. Print “ Warning: Inaccurate ”
10. return −1
11. else
12. dosage← ⌈steps/4⌉ ∗ 0.2
13. Print dosage
14. return 0
15. end
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This algorithm is able to automatically detect the number of peaks in
acousticSignal that are corrupted. If the number of corrupted locations in
acousticSignal is more than three, there will not be enough information in
acousticSignal to reveal the exact insulin dose. Therefore, the attacker should
discard that waveform, and try again later when background noise is less powerful.
In order to evaluate and compare our acoustic signal based algorithms, we con-
structed a test set consisting of 20 acoustic signals generated by the insulin pump
when injecting four different doses of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 unit of insulin (five in-
jections for each dose). We captured the first 10 acoustic signals in a silent office
(low-noise environment). We captured the other acoustic signals in the presence of
background noise generated by a conversation. The algorithm could extract the in-
jected dose exactly for the first 10 cases. In the presence of the conversation, the
algorithm correctly detected the corrupted signal in four cases, and extracted the
exact injected dose in the other six cases.
In addition to counting the number of steps, we can calculate the duration of an
injection. Calculating the duration is more robust against noise. Using our second
algorithm, we show how an adversary can use an estimation of the injection duration
to find the exact amount of injected insulin without knowing the exact number of
steps.
The amount of injected insulin is quantized to a multiple of 0.2 unit of insulin.
As a result, the injection duration is quantized and is a multiple of 7 seconds. For
example, the injection of 0.2 and 0.4 unit of insulin takes about 7 and 14 seconds,
respectively. Fig. 5.8 shows the amount of injected insulin with respect to injection
duration. It shows there is an almost-linear relationship between the amount of
injected insulin and injection duration. Therefore, if the attacker can only estimate
the injection duration by calculating the time during which the sound of the electrical
motor is present, he can find the exact amount of injected insulin even when a large
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fraction of the acoustic signal is dominated by background noise and counting the
total number of steps is not feasible (Fig. 5.9). Using the test set described earlier,
our duration-based algorithm was able to extract the exact amount of insulin in 18
of the 20 cases (10 under low-noise signals and 8 under noisy signals). Similar to the
previous method, this algorithm was also able to automatically detect the situations
in which the presence of noise affects the computed results.
In summary, capturing and processing the acoustic signal generated by the elec-
trical motor of an insulin pump may reveal the injected dosage, and as a result, reveal
the medical condition of the patient. The medical literature suggests that one unit of
insulin is required per 50 mg/dl above 120 mg/dl of blood sugar [416]. Therefore, af-
ter measuring the insulin dosage, we can also estimate the level of blood sugar before
injection.
Injected dose ≈ 0.2 * (Duration of Injection / 7) 
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Figure 5.8: Dose of injected insulin vs. injection duration.
Attack 2: Eavesdropping on alarms of an insulin pump: We describe below
how the safety system of an insulin pump, which intentionally generates acoustic sig-
nals to inform patients, can unintentionally leak critical information about the health
condition of a patient. As mentioned earlier, alarms are intended to alert patients
of special events. The controller unit of the insulin pump (Fig. 5.5) is responsible
for handling alerts and alarms, and the speaker generates audible signals in vari-
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Figure 5.9: Acoustic signal generated by the electrical motor of an insulin pump
when 0.8 unit of insulin is injected. For a large fraction of time, the acoustic signal
is dominated by background noise, and counting the number of rotation steps is not
feasible.
ous situations, including blockage, low/high sugar level, initialization, and end of an
injection.
Each injection procedure has four different phases: (i) initialization, (ii) confir-
mation, (iii) injection, and (iv) end of injection. Fig. 5.10 shows the acoustic signal
generated by the alarm system of an insulin pump when a user tries to inject 0.8 unit
of insulin. The four phases of the injection procedure are demonstrated in this figure.
After the patient sends the injection command, the beginning of the initialization
phase is reported by a single beep sound. Then, the user sets the dosage by repeat-
edly pressing a button. In the confirmation phase, multiple beeps are generated based
on the desired dosage. In this phase, one beep is generated by the safety system for
every increment of 0.2 unit in insulin dose. However, the frequency of beeps in this
phase is 2× higher than that in the initialization phase. Then, the injection begins
and finally the end of injection is reported to the patient by a single beep.
We used three methods to find the exact amount of injected insulin by interpreting
the acoustic signal: (i) initialization-based method that counts the number of peaks
(beeps) in the initialization phase, (ii) confirmation-based method that counts the
number of peaks in the confirmation phase, and (iii) duration-based method that
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calculates injection duration. Although the first two methods are straightforward,
the third method is more accurate, especially in noisy environments. Similar to
Attack 1, by extracting the quantized values of injection duration and dose, the exact
prescribed dosage can be calculated, even if the attacker cannot count the number of
beeps, but only estimate the injection duration. The injected dosage can be directly
computed based on the almost-linear relationship between injection duration and
injected dosage (Fig. 5.8).
In order to evaluate the accuracy of each algorithm, we constructed a similar test
set to the one we used earlier. We captured the acoustic signal from 10 m away. The
raw signal was amplified using a cheap amplifier before processing. All three methods
could accurately extract the injected dose in the low-noise environment. Table 5.2
shows the number of correct and incorrect calculations and accuracy of each method
in the noisy environment. The duration-based method showed the best accuracy,
where accuracy is defined as the percentage of correctly-calculated doses.
Table 5.2: Accuracy of the three methods for eavesdropping on the alarm system of
an insulin pump
Method Correct Incorrect Accuracy (%)
Initialization-based 6 4 60
Confirmation-based 7 3 70
Duration-based 10 0 100
In addition to compromising health-related information of a patient, the status
of the medical device, such as blockage and low-battery state, can also be directly
extracted by capturing and analyzing the alarms generated by the insulin pump.
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Figure 5.10: Acoustic signal generated by the safety system of an insulin pump when
the user tries to inject 0.8 unit of insulin.
Estimating BP by interpreting leaked acoustic signal of an ambulatory BP
monitoring device
In this section, we target an ambulatory BP monitoring device. Fig. 5.11 shows a
block diagram of such a device. The components shown in red are the major sources of
acoustic leakage. We interpret the sound generated by its electrical pump to estimate
the patient’s BP, which is the pressure generated by circulating blood upon the walls
of blood veins. A simple microphone suffices to capture the acoustic signals from a
distance of up to 10 m in this case. BP is commonly represented by two numbers
(systolic and diastolic), and is measured in millimeters of mercury (mmHg). Non-
invasive ambulatory BP monitoring is being increasingly used to continuously monitor
patients’ BP. A digital BP monitor has a cuff and digital pressure sensor. When a
user inserts his arm in the cuff, it is automatically inflated by an electric motor. The
digital monitor determines the BP and heart rate by measuring the small oscillations
when the pressure is slowly released from the cuff. Common BP monitoring devices
use a simple algorithm to derive an upper bound on systolic BP. They inflate the cuff
to reach the upper bound in every measurement. However, in order to ensure patient’s
comfort, some new BP devices often use a technology known as fuzzy logic, which
anticipates systolic BP to prevent over-inflation. In these devices, the highest pressure
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in the cuff is approximately 10 mmHg to 15 mmHg more than the actual systolic
pressure. In this chapter, we have targeted a commercially available BP monitoring
system. We choose not to disclose its brand and model number. We discuss how
the sound generated by the electrical pump can provide enough information for an
eavesdropper to accurately estimate the BP (both systolic and diastolic).
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Figure 5.11: Block diagram of an ambulatory BP monitoring device. The components
shown in red are the major sources of acoustic leakage.
Our experiments demonstrate that each measurement consists of three consecutive
phases: (i) inflation phase in which the cuff pressure increases to reach its upper
bound value, (ii) step-wise deflation phase in which the monitoring device opens an
air valve to slowly decrease the cuff pressure and measure the BP, and (iii) restart
phase. Fig. 5.12 shows the acoustic signal generated during the measurement.
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Figure 5.12: Acoustic signal generated by the ambulatory BP monitoring device.
Three phases of measurement are shown.
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In the BP monitoring device used in our experiments, the cuff pressure decreases
about 9 mmHg for each step of deflation in the second phase of measurement. In
addition, we found that the systolic BP was detected after three or four steps in the
step-wise deflation phase, which suggests that the systolic BP should be in the range
of (Ph−27) mmHg to (Ph−36) mmHg, where Ph is the maximum cuff pressure in the
inflation phase. Moreover, based on our experimental results, the diastolic pressure
is usually detected in the range of Pl mmHg to (Pl + 9) mmHg, where Pl is the
minimum cuff pressure during the step-wise deflation phase before the device enters
the restart phase. In order to examine the accuracy of the above claim, we used 25
BP measurements. The systolic BP was in the range of (Ph−27) mmHg to (Ph−36)
mmHg for 21 out of 25 measurements. Moreover, for 23 out of 25 measurements,
the diastolic BP was in the range of Pl mmHg to (Pl + 9) mmHg. Therefore, if we
can develop a method to detect Ph and Pl, the systolic and diastolic pressure can be
estimated as (Ph − 27 + Ph − 36)/2 mmHg and (Pl + Pl + 9)/2 mmHg, respectively.
We describe next how we can use the acoustic signal generated by the electrical
pump to extract Ph and Pl and thus estimate the BP. The cuff pressure reaches its
maximum value at the end of the inflation phase. In order to find the maximum value
for an arbitrary measurement, we construct a look-up table that maps the maximum
pressure (Ph) to the duration of inflation (Th), where Ph varies from 100 mmHg to
180 mmHg. For each measurement, we first calculate Th by finding the part of the
acoustic signal in which the pumping sound is present. Then, we use the look-up
table to find Ph. Thereafter, we count the number of steps before deflation and
compute Pl = Ph − numberOfSteps ∗ 9. Then, we calculate the range of systolic and
diastolic pressures, and report the middle points of these ranges as their estimate.
Our experimental results show that for 19 out of 25 arbitrary measurements, this
algorithm calculates both systolic and diastolic pressures with maximum absolute
error less than 8% (4.5% average absolute error for systolic pressure and 7.0% for
152
diastolic pressure), where error is defined as the difference between the estimated and
actual values divided by the actual value. The main reason for the six failed cases was
re-inflation. Re-inflation occurs when the patient suddenly changes his arm position
during the step-wise deflation phase. In this case, the monitoring device increases
the cuff pressure again. It is easy to modify the method to detect the situation in
which re-inflation occurs. Algorithm 2 gives the pseudo-code for the improved version
of our algorithm. We define a function, called infCount, which finds the number of
inflation phases separated by deflation steps. This improved algorithm automatically
detects whether the algorithm is unable to calculate the BP accurately.
5.5.3 EM radiation based IWMD-related attacks
We target two classes of EM radiations: (i) unintentional EM radiations that are
signals generated by different components of an IWMD (e.g., processor, controller),
and (ii) intentional EM radiations that are encrypted wireless communications that
transmit medical data. We discuss two EM radiation based attacks using each class of
EM radiations, namely from the pump in a BP monitor, and based on the metadata
of wireless communications of an insulin pump.
Estimating BP from unintentional EM radiations
Here, we discuss an attack based on capturing and analyzing the EM radiation that
is unintentionally generated by the BP monitoring device.
Using the EM signals captured from the BP monitoring device, we were able to
estimate the patient’s BP. EM radiations reveal the activity of the electrical pump
in the different phases of a measurement (inflation, step-wise deflation, and restart).
The duration of the inflation phase can be revealed by calculating the time when the
electrical motor produces the EM radiations, and as a result, the systolic BP can be
extracted by using the method discussed earlier. Moreover, by monitoring the activity
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of the device in the deflation phase, the number of deflation steps could be detected.
Estimating the BP using EM signals was as accurate as when it was estimated from
acoustic signals. However, this method can be easily used in a crowded environment,
where the acoustic signal may be dominated by background noise.
Algorithm 2: Estimating systolic and diastolic BP
Given: acousticSignal, table where table ∶ Th → Ph
1. infNumber ← infCount(acousticSignal)
2. if(InfNumber > 1)
3. Print “ Warning: Inaccurate ”
4. return − 1
5. end
6. Th ← calculateT imeOfInflation(acousticSignal)
7. Ph ← lookUp(Th, table)
8. Steps← CountPeaks(acousticSignal)
9. upperSystolic← Ph − 27
10. lowerSystolic← Ph − 36
11. Pl ← Ph − numberOfSteps ∗ 9
12. upperDiastolic← Pl
13. lowerDiastolic← Pl + 9
14. systolic← upperSystolic+lowerSystolic
2
15. diastolic← upperDiastolic+lowerDiastolic
2
16. Print diastolic, systolic
17. return 0
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The activity of the electrical pump in the inflation phase was completely detectable
from 15 cm away when we used the VHA antenna. Moreover, when we replaced the
VHA antenna with a wire of 50 cm circumference, we were able to detect the activity
from 10 cm away. The deflation steps were detectable using the VHA antenna and
wire from 10 cm and 5 cm away, respectively.
Extracting insulin dosage regimen from the wireless communication meta-
data of the insulin pump
Here, we describe how capturing and processing the metadata leaked from the commu-
nication channel of an insulin pump can reveal critical medical information, including
the injected dose of insulin, number of injections, and level of diabetes.
Different manufacturers have different priorities and considerations. As a result,
the metadata of the communication channel of one device are different from those of
others. The metadata-based attack that we discuss next consists of two main steps:
(i) the eavesdropper first extracts the metadata from the communication channel to
reveal valuable information about the type and model of the IWMD, and (ii) when the
device type is known, the attacker designs a tailored attack that specifically targets
the known device. We discuss six classes of metadata leaked from the communication
channel that can be used to find valuable information about the device: (i) frequency
of communication, (ii) time between two consecutive transmissions, (iii) communi-
cation protocol, (iv) packet size, (v) detection range, and (vi) modulation protocol.
However, in most cases, a subset of these classes can uniquely identify the model and
type of the device.
We describe an example of metadata-based privacy attack using the insulin pump
delivery system. For the insulin pump we used in this research, the frequency of com-
munication (around 900 MHz), time between two packets (5 minutes), and modula-
tion protocol (on-off keying) would be conclusive enough for an adversary to uniquely
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identify the insulin pump and its manufacturer. In addition, the detection range (20
m) and packet size (80 b) match the information given in the documentation of the
device.
We describe a tailored attack against an insulin pump. We assume all communi-
cations are fully encrypted. In the first step of the metadata-based attack, we find
the model and type of the insulin pump. This specific model comes with a remote
control. The remote control is a device that controls and programs the insulin pump
and allows the user to deliver a discrete bolus dose or stop/resume insulin delivery.
Each button on the remote control sends a specific command to the insulin pump.
The size of remote control is usually small to ensure patient’s convenience, and as
a result, there are only a few buttons on the remote control. Different sequences of
buttons on the insulin pump are to be pressed in different situations. For the remote
control that we used in our experiment, the patient should use at least three button
presses to start the injection: (i) the first button tells the device to initialize the
injection, (ii) the second button is used to set the dosage of injection, and (iii) the
third button confirms the injection. The patient can press the second button multiple
times to increase the dosage. In this scenario, interpreting the number of consecutive
packets can uniquely reveal the occurrence of the injection, and the insulin dosage.
In order to verify this claim, we designed an experimental setup using the insulin
delivery system, its remote control, and a USRP. We performed 10 trials in which the
amount of injected insulin varies from 0.2 to 2 units of insulin. All trials confirmed
that the amount of injected insulin can be easily computed as: dosage = (N − 2)∗ 0.2
unit, where N refers to the number of transmitted packets. For example, if seven
packets are captured by the USRP in this case, the first and last packets would rep-
resent initialization and confirmation. The other five packets can be assumed to be
sent to increase the amount of injected insulin. Therefore, dosage = (7− 2)∗ 0.2 = 1.0
unit.
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To sum up, the number of injections can be extracted by counting the number
of transmissions that have more than three packets. This approach is completely
accurate when the distance between the USRP and the remote control is less than 6
m.
5.6 Possible countermeasures
In this section, we briefly discuss some possible countermeasures to protect the patient
against the privacy attacks described in this chapter. We hope these initial suggestions
would spur further research on countermeasures against such attacks. We discuss
different countermeasures for each source of leaked signals (human body and IWMDs).
Hiding information that leaks from the body is difficult because there are many local
sources of leakage, e.g., lungs, heart, and skin. We can hide some of this information
using cloth as a shield. However, since it is typically not possible to cover the whole
body, medical information may at least leak from the face. For example, the EM
radiation from the face leaks enough information to detect if a person has fever.
As mentioned earlier, many components inside medical devices may generate
acoustic or EM signals: the motherboard, communication cables, processor, and ac-
tuators. Potential solutions for eliminating the leakage of compromising information
from IWMDs can be divided into three main categories: strength reduction, informa-
tion reduction [417, 418], and noise addition techniques [408, 418, 419]. We describe
each category next.
Signal strength reduction techniques
The main goal of these techniques is to reduce the strength of unintentionally-leaked
signals such that their detection range reduces drastically. These methods include
circuit redesign, using low-power components, utilizing shielding, and designing iso-
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lating containers (i.e., containers that are usually made of a metal mesh and can block
acoustic/EM signals of certain frequencies). However, incorporating these techniques
will increase IWMD price and thus may not be desirable from a cost perspective.
Information reduction techniques
These techniques focus on minimizing the amount of information leakage. One obvi-
ous solution for reducing information leakage from IWMDs is to use standard com-
munication protocols and implementations. If different manufacturers adopt such
standards (e.g., they use the same frequency band, modulation protocol, and packet
size), unintentionally-leaked signals from various devices would be similar to each
other and carry minimum discriminatory information. However, enforcing the use of
a single standard communication protocol and a set of design requirements is difficult
due to the fact that different medical companies have different priorities. For exam-
ple, many manufacturers prefer to use standard communication protocols at 2.4 GHz
(e.g., Bluetooth and ZigBee) in their medical devices for connection to smart phones,
whereas other manufacturers mainly use a customized communication protocol to
minimize energy or increase the communication range.
Noise addition techniques
Such techniques can be implemented in either hardware or software. In software-based
defense schemes, IWMDs and their remote controllers can be programmed to produce
superfluous packets to significantly degrade the accuracy of attacks based on counting
the number of packets or any other statistical analysis. For example, our EM-based
attack against the insulin pump can be mitigated as follows. As mentioned earlier, the
variation in the number of packets can reveal the exact amount of injected insulin. Our
experimental results demonstrate that the total number of packets that might be sent
by the remote control to the insulin pump for each injection process is between 3 to 52.
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Thus, if the remote control is programmed such that it produces some fake packets for
each injection step and always sends 52 packets, then counting the number of packets
will not provide any meaningful information. However, for the majority of patients,
adding fewer fake packets may be sufficient to drastically reduce the accuracy of the
attack. Unfortunately, producing fake packets may drastically increase the energy
consumption of the device, and shorten its battery lifetime significantly. Hardware-
based countermeasures can also be useful in protecting the user from the privacy
attacks based on physiological information leakage. The local sources of leakage
(e.g., motherboard, wires, and display board) can be identified during the design
or manufacturing process. Afterwards, extra components may be added to generate
intended acoustic/EM noise in a specific frequency range to overpower the valuable
signal during the normal operation of the device. However, the noise generator should
not corrupt intentionally-generated signals (e.g., alarms from the insulin delivery
system). Although noise addition techniques can provide promising countermeasures
to protect the patient against privacy attacks, they have two main drawbacks. First,
they increase the cost of manufacture. Second, adding a noise generator may increase
the energy consumption of the device and thus reduce its battery lifetime.
5.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we discussed two sources, namely the human body and IWMDs,
that continuously leak health information under normal operation. We targeted two
types of signals for each source: acoustic and EM. We then described a variety of
attacks on the privacy of health data by capturing and processing unintentionally-
generated leaked signals. Moreover, we discussed the feasibility of using intentionally-
generated acoustic signals (as a side-channel information) and EM signals (as a carrier
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of metadata) to compromise the patient’s health privacy. Finally, we suggested some
countermeasures.
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Chapter 6
DISASTER: Dedicated Intelligent
Security Attacks on
Sensor-triggered Emergency
Responses
In this chapter, we introduce a new class of attacks against cyber-physical systems
(CPSs), called dedicated intelligent security attacks against sensor-triggered emer-
gency responses (DISASTER). DISASTER targets safety mechanisms deployed in
automation/monitoring CPSs and exploits design flaws and security weaknesses of
such mechanisms to trigger emergency responses even in the absence of a real emer-
gency. Launching DISASTER can lead to serious consequences for three main reasons.
First, almost all CPSs offer specific emergency responses and, as a result, are poten-
tially susceptible to such attacks. Second, DISASTER can be easily designed to target
a large number of CPSs, e.g., the anti-theft systems of all buildings in a residential
community. Third, the widespread deployment of insecure sensors in already-in-use
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safety mechanisms along with the endless variety of CPS-based applications magnifies
the impact of launching DISASTER.
In addition to introducing DISASTER, we describe the serious consequences of
such attacks. We demonstrate the feasibility of launching DISASTER against the
two most widely-used CPSs: residential and industrial automation/monitoring sys-
tems. Moreover, we suggest several countermeasures that can potentially prevent
DISASTER and discuss their advantages and drawbacks [420].
6.1 Introduction
CPSs offer a transformative approach to automation and monitoring through inte-
gration of processing, networking, and control. This combination and active collab-
oration of computational elements, e.g., powerful base stations, and small embedded
devices, e.g., sensors, enable CPSs to reliably and efficiently control physical entities.
Recent and ongoing advances in microelectronics, networking, and computer sci-
ence have resulted in significant CPS growth. Such systems facilitate automation and
monitoring in various application domains, e.g., smart manufacturing lines, smart
homes, smart cities, smart grids, and smart vehicles. Moreover, with the emergence
of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) paradigm and IoT-enabled CPSs in the last decade,
it has become clear that the economic and societal potential of such systems is far
beyond what may have been imagined. Thus, major investments have been made
worldwide to design and develop CPSs.
As a side effect of the rapid development and pervasive use of CPSs, the number of
potential threats and possible attacks against the security of such systems is increasing
drastically, while, unfortunately, their security needs are not yet well-recognized [421–
423].
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An essential component of a majority of CPSs is a safety mechanism, which aims
to minimize harm to users’ well-being or damage to equipment upon the detection
of risks, hazards, or unplanned events. The security of safety mechanisms is an
emerging research topic that is attracting increasing attention in academic, industrial
as well as governmental research. A few real-world attacks and recent research efforts
have demonstrated that generic classes of security attacks, e.g., computer worms,
man-in-the-middle attacks, and denial of service (DoS), which have been extensively
studied in the network/computer security domains, can be modified to disable the
safety mechanisms of CPSs. For example, in 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected
the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio, USA, and disabled the plant’s safety
parameter display system and plant process computer for several hours [424]. Stuxnet
[121, 122], a real-world high-impact man-in-the-middle attack, was launched against
safety mechanisms employed in thousands of industrial CPSs in 2012. Stuxnet faked
industrial process control sensor signals so that safety mechanisms of infected systems
were disabled, and as a result, their emergency responses were not activated even in
the presence of a real emergency. Furthermore, Lamb developed a DoS attack against
residential intrusion detection systems in which the attacker continuously jams the
communication channel between motion sensors and the base station to suppress the
system’s alarm that is supposed to be triggered in the presence of an intruder [425].
In this chapter, we present and extensively describe a new class of attacks against
CPSs, refereed to as DISASTER. As opposed to the previously-proposed attacks that
mainly aim to disable emergency responses of safety mechanisms in the presence of
an emergency situation, DISASTER attempts to trigger the system’s emergency
responses in the absence of a real emergency.
Our key contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We introduce DISASTER and discuss potential attackers who may be motivated
to launch such security attacks.
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2. We discuss the impact of DISASTER by describing the consequences of launch-
ing such attacks.
3. We examine common design flaws and security weaknesses of safety mecha-
nisms and their components, which may be exploited by an attacker to launch
DISASTER.
4. We demonstrate the feasibility of launching DISASTER in realistic scenarios,
e.g., residential and industrial automation/monitoring systems.
5. We suggest several countermeasures to proactively address DISASTER, and
discuss their advantages and drawbacks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the
threat model. Section 6.3 describes the typical architecture of CPSs that we consider
in this chapter. Then, it discusses different components, design flaws, and security
weaknesses of their safety mechanisms. Section 6.4 describes potential consequences
of launching DISASTER. Section 6.5 demonstrates how it is feasible to launch the
proposed attacks against two real CPSs. Section 6.6 suggests several countermeasures
to prevent DISASTER and describes why proactive countermeasures might not always
be able to provide sufficient protection against the proposed attacks. Finally, Section
6.7 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Threat model
In this section, we first describe what enables DISASTER and makes CPSs suscep-
tible to such attacks, and discuss why launching DISASTER can be disastrous in
real-word scenarios. Second, we discuss who the potential attackers may be who ex-
ploit vulnerabilities of CPSs to launch the proposed security attacks, and what their
motivations may be.
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6.2.1 Problem definition
As described later in Section 6.3, in a typical CPS, a centralized processing unit
(commonly referred to as base station) obtains a description of the environment based
on the data that it collects from different sensors, and it processes the sensory data
along with user inputs to control physical objects. Given direct interactions of such a
system with both the environment and users, safety and security are two fundamental
requirements of CPSs. Safety mechanisms employed in CPSs protect users from
undesirable outcomes, risks, hazards, or unplanned events that may result in death,
injury, illness, or other harm to individual’s well-being, damage to equipment or harm
to organizations, while security protocols are focused on protecting the system from
intentional attacks [426].
Although safety and security seem to share very similar goals at first glance,
a close examination of various safety and security requirements demonstrates that
ensuring both safety and security of CPSs is not always possible due to the existence
of unavoidable safety-security conflicts [427, 428]. When ensuring both safety and
security is not feasible, safety is typically given preference and safety mechanisms
willingly sacrifice security of the system to ensure users’ safety. For example, modern
vehicles commonly support an automatic door unlocking mechanism [429], which
opens the vehicle’s doors upon the detection of a collision. This safety mechanism
ensures passengers’ safety by completely disabling the car’s security system after
detecting an accident.
The unavoidable safety-security conflicts along with different design flaws and
security weaknesses of components, e.g., sensors and base stations, used in safety
mechanisms facilitate DISASTER. In DISASTER, the attacker exploits such con-
flicts/weaknesses to fool the under-attack safety mechanism into falsely labeling a
normal situation as an emergency in an attempt to activate emergency responses
when they are not needed. As discussed later in Section 6.4, activating emergency
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responses in the absence of an emergency can lead to catastrophic situations, ranging
from system shutdown to life-threatening conditions.
Launching DISASTER can have severe negative consequences in real-world sce-
narios for three reasons. First, since the majority of CPSs offer emergency responses,
they are susceptible to such attacks. Second, as demonstrated later in Section 6.5.2,
DISASTER can be implemented to simultaneously target a large number of CPSs,
e.g., the anti-theft systems of all buildings in a residential community. Third, the
widespread use of vulnerable sensors along with the endless variety of CPS-based
applications magnifies negative consequences of launching DISASTER.
Despite the fact that safety mechanisms are designed to control hazards and emer-
gency situations and minimize their associated risks, a careless design of a safety
mechanism endangers both users’ safety and the system’s security.
6.2.2 Potential attackers
Next, we discuss potential attackers who may target CPSs, and what their motivations
might be.
As discussed earlier, DISASTER is widely applicable since CPSs used for au-
tomation/monitoring are in widespread use in our everyday lives. Such systems may
manage a huge amount of information and be used for many services, ranging from
industrial management to residential monitoring. This has made such CPSs targets
of interest for a multitude of attackers, including, but not limited to, cyberthieves,
hacktivists, occasional hackers, and cyberterrorists. Unfortunately, as described later
in Section 6.5.2, an attacker with very limited resources, e.g., a very cheap radio trans-
mitter such as HackRF [430], can easily launch powerful large-scale attacks against
CPSs.
As extensively discussed later in Section 6.4, the attackers might launch DISAS-
TER to access restricted areas, cause economic damage to companies or individuals,
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trigger life-threatening operations, or halt automation/monitoring processes. More-
over, they might try to make CPS use so inconvenient to the user that he is forced
to shut down the whole system.
6.3 Typical components and weaknesses of safety
mechanisms
In this section, we first describe the typical architecture of CPSs that we consider
in this chapter, and discuss different components of their safety mechanisms, and
two main types of emergency responses that they provide. Second, we discuss design
flaws and security weaknesses, which are commonly present in widely-used safety
mechanisms.
6.3.1 Typical CPS architecture
Fig. 6.1 illustrates a common CPS architecture that includes safety mechanisms. A
typical CPS consists of: (i) a base station, which collects and processes environment-
related data and controls other components, (ii) wireless sensors that continuously
collect data and transmit them to the base station, and (iii) physical objects that
are controlled by the base station. State-of-the-art CPSs may also allow the user
to remotely control, configure, or access the system over the Internet. The base
station gathers data from different sources, e.g., sensors, cloud servers, and user
inputs, and processes them to control different physical objects. Furthermore, a
majority of modern CPSs have a safety mechanism, which typically needs two extra
components: a safety unit and warning devices, e.g., speakers. The safety unit is
usually integrated into the base station. When it detects an emergency, e.g., a fire
or an accident, it activates warning devices or overrides control signals of physical
objects to minimize safety risks associated with the situation. In each application
167
domain, certain conditions and states are defined as emergency situations in which
safety risks are present and should be actively and aggressively addressed.
Figure 6.1: Common architecture of CPS. Upon the detection of an emergency, the
safety unit directly controls the physical objects or warns the users by activating the
passive components.
Although emergency responses vary significantly from one application to another,
there are two main types of emergency responses: active and passive. Next, we briefly
describe each.
1. Active response : Such a response actively attempts to minimize the safety risks
by controlling various actuators and components in the system. When the human
operator is unable to provide a sufficiently fast response, it is required that the CPS
offer an active response to minimize damages associated with the emergency situation.
Typically, when a CPS provides an active response, it initiates a specific emergency
procedure or halts the system’s normal operation. For example, consider an insulin
delivery system that continuously monitors blood glucose and injects insulin into the
patient’s body in order to regulate the blood glucose level. If the system detects a
life-threatening low level of blood sugar, it immediately halts the injection procedure
to ensure patient safety.
2. Passive response : A passive emergency response is provided by the system to
warn human operators, proximate people, e.g., residents of a building, or emergency
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departments, e.g., fire department, about the need to take immediate action. Un-
like an active response, it does not directly control physical entities. For example,
consider a simple fire detection system. Upon detecting a fire, the system provides
a passive response that activates various notification appliances, e.g., flashing lights
and electromechanical horns.
6.3.2 Common design flaws and security weaknesses
Due to the inevitable complexities of CPSs, heterogeneity of entities that form them,
and limitation of on-sensor resources (e.g., small amount of on-sensor storage), design-
ing completely-secure safety mechanisms and finding perfect safety design strategies
are very daunting. As a result, it is easy to find several already-in-market products
that are vulnerable to DISASTER. Next, we discuss three design flaws and security
weaknesses of safety mechanisms that may enable an attacker to launch such attacks.
Using insecure sensors
As mentioned earlier, wireless sensors continuously collect and transmit data that are
needed for detecting emergency situations. A fundamental consideration in the design
of wireless sensors is choosing the communication protocol. Many manufacturers have
decided to design and use customized wireless protocols in an attempt to minimize
expenses and maximize battery lifetime. We examined 70 already-in-market sensors
from 10 different manufacturers (we reviewed documentations of 62 sensors, and as
discussed later in Section 6.5.2, we closely inspected and attacked eight sensors under
realistic scenarios) that are widely used in safety mechanisms. We noticed that the
communication protocol of each sensor has at least one of the following security
weaknesses.
1. Lack of data encryption or obfuscation : Unfortunately, a great number of
customized wireless communication protocols used in already-in-market sensors sup-
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port neither strong encryption nor obfuscation mechanisms and are, hence, susceptible
to various forms of security attacks. In particular, due to the specific requirements
of safety systems (e.g., fast response time and monitorability) and common limita-
tions of sensing platforms (e.g., limited on-sensor energy, small amount of available
memory, and limited computation power), the majority of sensors utilized in safety
mechanisms transmit unencrypted non-obfuscated packets over the communication
channel. As a result, an attacker can reverse-engineer the system’s communication
protocol and generate illegitimate packets (packets not created by legitimate sensors)
using his equipment.
2. Lack of timestamp: A great number of sensors do not include a timestamp
(i.e., a sequence of encrypted information identifying when the transmission occurred)
in their packets. As a result, the system’s base station is unable to distinguish new
legitimate packets generated by the sensor from old seemingly legitimate ones, which
are recorded and retransmitted by an attacker.
3. Using default passwords : Setting non-random default passwords at the manu-
facturing/installation time is a very common mistake that can lead to severe security
attacks against the system even when strong encryption mechanisms are utilized to
secure the communication channel. It is very common for system administrators or
user to forget to change the system’s default password at installation time. A re-
cent article provided a list of more than 73,000 cameras in 256 countries that use
standard communication protocols and a strong encryption mechanism, yet are not
immune to security attacks because they use a default password for encrypting their
communications [431].
4. Using short sensor identifiers: In order to distinguish different sensors from
each other and enhance the security of the communication protocol, most sensors
include their identifier (also referred to as the pin code or identification number) in
all packets they transmit over the communication channel. The base station uses the
170
sensor’s identification code to ensure that the incoming packet comes from one of the
already-registered sensors, which are known to the system. However, as demonstrated
later in Section 6.5.2, several in-market sensors from well-known manufacturers use
very short sensor identifiers (4-8 bits). As a result, they are susceptible to brute-
force attacks (i.e., attacks consisting of systematically checking all possible sensor
identifiers until the correct one is found).
Offering inessential sacrifices
As mentioned earlier, upon the detection of an emergency situation, automa-
tion/monitoring CPSs willingly sacrifice some of their security mechanisms to ensure
users’ safety. As an example, fire evacuation systems open all doors to enable fire-
fighters to access different rooms and allow the occupants to safely leave the building.
Although this evacuation mechanism seems essential to ensuring occupant safety,
it might enable an attacker to access restricted areas by triggering an emergency
response. This example demonstrates that designers should take both safety and
security considerations into account, when designing emergency responses of a CPS.
Relying on a single sensor type
In order to provide a reactive emergency response when required, the automa-
tion/monitoring CPS must be able to correctly distinguish abnormal situations from
normal ones. In fact, the most important steps in minimizing safety risks is detecting
emergency situations. Therefore, before providing any response, the CPS needs to
collect sufficient sensory data to obtain a clear description of its environment. If
insufficient information is given to the system, it might fail to correctly recognize
emergency situations. Unfortunately, in order to minimize costs, the majority of
the already-in-use automation/monitoring CPSs only process a single environmental
attribute. For example, consider a fire evacuation system that only relies on smoke
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detection sensors. Such a system provides an emergency response when at least one
of the sensors detects the existence of smoke. Thus, an attacker can easily trigger the
emergency response by only targeting a single vulnerable smoke detection sensor.
6.4 Potential consequences of launching DISAS-
TER
As mentioned earlier, CPSs are in widespread use and handle sensitive tasks in var-
ious application domains. Hence, launching tailored attacks, like DISASTER, that
are applicable to various forms of automation/monitoring CPSs, can lead to serious
consequences. Such consequences depend on the type of emergency response acti-
vated by the attack. Generally, the negative impact of triggering an active response
is more significant than the impact of triggering a passive response due to the fact
that the former can actively control various critical operations and even bypass hu-
man operators’ decisions. Next, we describe possible consequences associated with
launching DISASTER.
6.4.1 Life-threatening conditions
Triggering the emergency response of a CPS that handles critical operations, e.g.,
medical or industrial automation tasks, can lead to serious life-threatening conditions.
This can range from conditions affecting an individual to those affecting a large
number of people. For example, consider an insulin delivery system that is equipped
with a safety mechanism, which monitors the blood glucose and immediately stops
the injection procedure when it detects the patient has hypoglycemia, i.e., a life-
threatening low level of blood glucose. Triggering the active emergency response of the
insulin delivery system immediately shuts down the device. An attacker might be able
to trigger such an active response even when the blood glucose level is normal/high
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to halt the delivery system and cause hyperglycemia, i.e., a life-threatening high level
of blood glucose.
6.4.2 Economic collateral damage
Economic damages refer to monetary losses, including, but not limited to, loss of
property, machinery, equipment, and business opportunities, costs of repair or re-
placement, the economic value of domestic services, and increased medical expenses.
Almost all emergency responses have associated costs, even when they are triggered
by a real emergency situation. For example, consider a vehicular CPS that is designed
to inflate the vehicle’s airbags in a collision to provide protection in an accident. In a
minor collision that results in the deployment of airbags, the whole dashboard panel,
steering wheel, and all airbags have to be replaced. In such cases, the active emer-
gency response provided by the CPS is quite costly. Therefore, if an attacker can
activate such an emergency response, he will be able to cause collateral economic
damage.
The cost associated with triggering emergency responses varies significantly from
one application domain to another. For example, the economic collateral damage
that results from triggering an emergency response of a vehicular CPS is much less
than that of an industrial CPS that controls a manufacturing line.
6.4.3 Overriding access control mechanisms
In the presence of an emergency situation, a CPS might also be able to command
the access control systems that control which users are authorized to access different
restricted areas. Such a control is important for two reasons. First, the CPS can
facilitate the evacuation procedure in the case of an emergency. Second, the system
can lock down particular areas to prevent an intruder from escaping. For example,
a residential CPS, which is able to control door locks, may open the main entrance
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to ensure that firefighters can easily access restricted areas and residents can safely
evacuate the building. However, if an attacker can trigger this safety mechanism in
the absence of an emergency situation, he might be able to bypass physical security
mechanisms and access restricted areas.
6.4.4 Unintended ignorance
As mentioned earlier, CPSs provide both passive and active responses to minimize
damage associated with an emergency situation. A majority of emergency responses
could be extremely annoying to the proximate people if they are activated in the
absence of an emergency situation. For example, upon the detection of an emergency
situation, a great number of CPSs activate notification appliances, e.g., electrome-
chanical horn and speaker, that generate a high-pitched noise to inform the nearby
people about the need to take immediate action. If an attacker launches DISASTER
that activates notification appliances several times in a short time frame, the system
administrator might be convinced that the system is faulty and turn off the emer-
gency responses. This might lead to serious safety/security risks for the duration the
emergency responses remain off.
6.5 Launching DISASTER
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of launching DISASTER in realistic sce-
narios, e.g., residential and industrial automation/monitoring systems. As mentioned
in Section 6.3.2, communication protocols utilized in wireless sensors commonly have
various security weaknesses. Next, we first briefly describe two well-known types of
attacks that exploit security weaknesses of communication protocols to create and
transmit illegitimate packets. Second, we demonstrate how an attacker can tailor
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these generic forms of attacks to trigger the emergency responses of safety mecha-
nisms and endanger both user safety and system security.
6.5.1 Creating and transmitting illegitimate packets
Here, we briefly describe two attacks against sensors that enable the attacker to
send illegitimate packets to the base station. In both attacks, we use GNURa-
dio [432], a development toolkit that can be used along with an external radio fre-
quency (RF) hardware, e.g., HackRF [430], to implement various software-defined
transmitters/receivers that are implemented as software programs to control external
RF devices.
Attack 1: Retransmitting recorded packets : In this approach, an attacker aims
to record data packets and retransmit them to the base station without processing
or modifying their contents. To do so, the attacker first builds an RF receiver that
listens to the communication channel between sensors and the base station and records
the transmitted packets. Then, he uses an RF transmitter, which can retransmit
previously-recorded packets on the same communication channel. If the frequency of
the communication channel is known to the attacker, he can implement the above-
mentioned receiver/transmitter using the built-in libraries of GNURadio.
The frequency of the communication channel can be extracted from documents
submitted to Federal Communications Commission (FCC). FCC is an independent
U.S. government agency that tests all wireless products sold in the U.S. and provides a
public database, which includes test reports and documentations of the products [433].
In order to find the frequency of the communication channel used by a sensor, the
attacker only needs to find the sensor’s documentations by searching its FCC code
(i.e., an identification code that specifies the sensor’s manufacturer and type) in FCC’s
public database. FCC codes are commonly written on the sensor’s cover.
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Attack 2: Reverse engineering the communication protocol : In this
approach, the attacker records several data packets and processes them to explore
how the communication protocol sends digital data over the communication channel.
We describe next how an attacker can reverse-engineer the communication protocol
of an arbitrary sensor using HackRF and GNURadio.
1. The attacker first obtains the communication frequency of the sensor and
records several packets from the sensor using the method discussed in the
previous approach.
2. Then, the attacker finds the modulation type of the communication protocol.
The two most commonly-used communication protocols used in wireless sensors
are on-off keying (OOK) and binary frequency-shift keying (BFSK). OOK is the
simplest form of amplitude-shift keying modulation in which digital data are
presented as the presence/absence of a carrier wave, and BFSK is the simplest
form of frequency-shift keying (FSK) that uses a pair of discrete frequencies
to transmit binary digital data. The modulation type of a communication
protocol can be easily detected by examining the Fourier transform of a packet
received by HackRF. A single peak (two discrete peaks) in the Fourier transform
represents an OOK (BFSK) modulation.
3. After finding the modulation type of a communication protocol, the attacker
implements a software-defined demodulator in GNURadio that extracts the
transmitted digital data from the recorded analog signal. Fig. 6.2 demonstrates
the implementation of an OOK demodulator in GNURadio.
4. If the sensor does not support any encryption mechanism, the attacker can
easily examine the digital data to determine what each bit represents, and how
he can generate seemingly legitimate packets with arbitrary content.
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Figure 6.2: The implementation of an OOK demodulator in GNURadio
This approach provides two fundamental advantages over the previous approach.
First, the attacker does not need to capture any packets from the actual sensors that
he targets. In fact, he can conduct several experiments in a test environment, e.g., a
laboratory, to discover potential vulnerabilities in the system. Second, the attacker
can improve the quality of the transmitted signal and increase its signal-to-noise ratio
in an attempt to launch an attack against the system from a large distance.
6.5.2 DISASTER case studies
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of launching DISASTER against the
two most widely-used automation/monitoring CPSs: residential and industrial.
Case I: Residential automation/monitoring CPSs
We first briefly discuss what a typical residential CPS does, what types of sensors
are commonly used in such a system, and what emergency responses it offers in the
presence of an emergency. Second, we demonstrate how an attacker can use the two
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Table 6.1: Different sensors used in a typical residential CPS, their descriptions, and
services
Sensor type Description Service
Humidity sensor measures moisture content Heating/cooling
Temperature sensor measures the current temperature Heating/cooling
Light sensor measures the luminance Lighting
Motion sensor detects the presence of a person Anti-theft mechanism
Door sensor checks if a door has been opened Anti-theft mechanism
Smoke detector detects the presence of smoke/fire Fire detection
well-known generic types of attacks discussed in Section 6.5.1 to trigger the emergency
responses of residential CPSs in real-world scenarios.
Residential CPSs, their services and emergency responses: A residential
CPS is mainly designed to offer physical security mechanisms, enhance residents’
convenience, and minimize energy consumption. It can also offer increased quality of
life to the residents who need special assistance, e.g., the elderly and disabled people.
It processes the data collected by various sensors to control lighting, heating, and
cooling, and to monitor/command the security locks of gates and doors. In addition,
the base station continuously collects and processes real-time environment-related
data gathered by sensors to detect emergency situations. Table 6.1 includes different
sensors that are commonly used in residential CPSs, a short description of each sensor,
and services that rely on each sensor.
State-of-the-art residential CPSs are able to detect two common emergency sit-
uations: fire and ongoing burglary, and provide three typical emergency responses:
two passive and one active. Next, we elaborate on these responses and discuss the
negative consequences of activating each response.
Passive response I: Activating warning devices: In the presence of an emergency situa-
tion, notification appliances, e.g., flashing lights, electromechanical horns, or speakers,
are activated to warn the proximate people about the need to take immediate action.
A majority of notification appliances generate a high-pitched sound to attract the
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attention of those nearby. The generated sound could be extremely annoying if it
is activated in the absence of an emergency situation. Hence, if a potential attacker
can trigger this emergency response several times in the absence of an emergency
situation, residents might be convinced that the system is faulty and turn off the
emergency response. This might lead to serious safety/security risks and concerns.
For example, a burglar might try to trigger the anti-theft alarm several times in a
short period of time, e.g., in an hour, in the hope of convincing the user to turn off
the monitoring system.
Passive response II: Informing police/fire department: Requesting immediate help
from the police/fire department, when a real threat is not present, puts firefighters,
police officers, as well as the public at risk by needlessly placing heavy, expensive
equipment on the streets while wasting fuel and causing traffic jams. Moreover, if an
attacker can initiate a help request several times in a short period of time, he might
be able to persuade firefighters, police officers, and occupants to believe that when
an alarm goes off it is likely a false alarm. As demonstrated later, DISASTER can be
launched from a large distance (e.g., over 100 m from the base station). Therefore, an
attacker might be able to design a large-scale attack (e.g., he can launch DISASTER
using HackRF, while driving in a residential community, to trigger the alarm systems
of all houses in the community) to impose significant additional cost on both residents
and the responsible governmental department, and convince the residents to turn off
their security/safety alarms.
Active response: Controlling door locks: As mentioned earlier, a residential automa-
tion/monitoring system may be able to automatically control the locks upon the de-
tection of a fire or burglary. In the presence of a fire, it opens the main doors/entrances
to ensure that firefighters can enter the affected areas and residents can safely evacu-
ate the building. Moreover, in the presence of an ongoing burglary, it locks the main
entrances to ensure that the thief is not able to leave the crime scene until police
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officers arrive. Although this emergency response is offered to minimize potential
safety risks, triggering this response by an attacker in the absence of an emergency
situation could lead to serious security issues. For example, if the attacker triggers
the fire evacuation procedure, he will be able to bypass the physical security mech-
anism of the building by unlocking main entrances. Similarly, the attacker might be
able to confine the residents inside the house by initiating the anti-theft lock-down
procedure.
Demonstration of DISASTER against residential CPSs : In order to exam-
ine the feasibility of launching DISASTER against residential CPSs, we developed
two experimental scenarios using the approaches described in Section 6.5. In both
scenarios, we targeted three types of sensors (highlighted in red in Table 6.1). The
residential CPS processes the data gathered by these sensors to detect emergency
situations (fire or burglary). In our experimental setup, we closely inspected six
already-in-market sensors (two motion detectors, three smoke detectors, one door
sensor) made by well-known manufacturers that cater to the home automation indus-
try. Since these sensors are deployed in numerous already-in-use systems, we choose
not to disclose their brand and model number in this chapter.
Next, we describe how the two previously-mentioned generic attacks can be used
to launch DISASTER and activate emergency responses of the system.
Experimental scenario 1: Retransmitting packets: In our experimental setup, we
captured and retransmitted 20 packets from each sensor (120 packets in all) using
the software-defined transmitter/receiver described in Section 6.5.1. Fig. 6.3 demon-
strates a packet generated by the door sensor and captured by HackRF. The base sta-
tion of all the under-experiment sensors accepted previously-recorded packets. This
indicates that the packets generated by these sensors include neither a timestamp nor
a sequence number. Thus, an attacker can record a packet from each of these sensors
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and retransmit it to the base station of the CPS that utilizes the sensor in an attempt
to trigger emergency responses.
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Figure 6.3: The door sensor generates a packet as soon as it detects the door is
open. The spike in the fast Fourier transform of the analog signal shows a single
transmission using OOK modulation.
In this experimental scenario, we placed HackRF at different distances from each
under-experiment sensor to find the maximum recording distance from which the
attacker can record a packet using HackRF. Moreover, we increased the distance
between HackRF and the base station to find the maximum retransmission distance
for each sensor from which a previously-captured packet can be received and accepted
by the sensor’s base station. Table 6.2 summarizes results of this experiment for
different sensors.
Sensors that enable the anti-theft mechanism (motion and door sensors) transmit
data very frequently even when the mechanism is completely disabled. The motion
sensor transmits a packet when it detects a moving object, and the door sensor trans-
mits a packet when it detects an open door. For such sensors, an attacker can simply
capture a packet when the mechanism is disabled, e.g., when the residents are inside,
and retransmit the packet when it is enabled. Unlike motion/door sensors, smoke
sensors rarely transmit a packet to the base station since their event-driven transmis-
sion protocol only transmits a packet to the base station when an actual threat, e.g.,
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Table 6.2: Maximum recording distance and maximum retransmission distance for
each sensor in Experimental scenario 1
Sensor Maximum recording Maximum retransmission
distance (m) distance (m)
Motion sensor I 58 54
Motion sensor II 110 105
Smoke detector I 67 50
Smoke detector II 52 55
Smoke detector III 54 48
Door sensor 56 54
a fire, is present. Thus, capturing and retransmitting a packet that is generated by
smoke sensors are difficult and potentially very time-consuming for the attacker. In
the second experimental scenario, we discuss how the attacker can reverse-engineer
communication protocols deployed in smoke detectors to easily launch DISASTER
against the system.
Experimental scenario 2: Reverse engineering: As mentioned in Section 6.5, in this
approach, the attacker records and demodulates transmitted packets in a test envi-
ronment, e.g., a laboratory, to examine how a sensor transfers digital data over the
communication channel.
We examined the communication protocol used in the six under-experiment sen-
sors. The examination revealed that all sensors share a common security weakness:
in order to provide a cost-effective solution, the manufacturers used very simple non-
standard transmission protocols that do not provide any cryptographic mechanism.
Indeed, the packets transmitted from these sensors to their base stations are neither
cryptographically protected nor completely obfuscated. Fig. 6.4 demonstrates the
bitstream transmitted by a door sensor to the base station of a residential CPS. The
analog signal (Fig. 6.3) captured by HackRF is demodulated using the OOK demod-
ulator (Fig. 6.2). This sensor repeatedly (20 times) transmits a single static packet
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(that does not change over time), which includes its 4-bit pin number (a very short
sensor identification code), to its base station.
Figure 6.4: The bitstream transmitted by the door sensor to the base station of the
residential CPS. The door sensor repeatedly transmits a single static packet, which
includes its 4-bit pin number, to its base station.
We were able to completely reverse-engineer the six communication protocols used
in these sensors and determine that all of them generate static packets, which include
fixed pin numbers. In other words, the only unknown field in the bitstream of an
arbitrary packet generated by the sensors was the device’s pin number. Table 6.3
specifies the communication frequency, modulation type, and pin length of each under-
experiment sensor.
Table 6.3: Communication frequency, modulation type, and pin length of each resi-
dential sensor
Sensor Communication Modulation Pin length
frequency (MHz) (bits)
Motion sensor I 433 OOK 4
Motion sensor II 433 OOK 8
Smoke detector I 920 OOK 8
Smoke detector II 920 OOK 8
Smoke detector III 433 OOK 8
Door sensor 433 OOK 4
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After completely reverse engineering the protocol, we implemented a brute-force
attack using different possible values of the pin numbers of the sensors. We were able
to find the actual pin numbers of all sensors in less than five seconds. Then, we placed
HackRF at different distances from the base station of the under-experiment sensors
and used the maximum transmission power of HackRF to determine the maximum
transmission distance from which this attack is possible. Table 6.4 summarizes the
results of this experiment for different sensors.
Table 6.4: Maximum transmission distance for each residential sensor in Experimental
scenario 2
Sensor Maximum transmission distance (m)
Motion sensor I 75
Motion sensor II 85
Smoke detector I 75
Smoke detector II 80
Smoke detector III 80
Door sensor 75
Case II: Industrial automation/monitoring CPS
We first briefly discuss different services and emergency responses offered by a typical
industrial CPS. Second, we demonstrate how an attacker can trigger the emergency
responses of industrial CPSs.
Industrial CPSs, their services and emergency responses: A typical indus-
trial automation/monitoring CPS offers various automatic mechanisms to operate
the equipment, e.g., machinery and boilers, with minimal human intervention, and
several approaches that enable remote monitoring of the industrial environment. Gen-
erally, industrial automation/monitoring CPSs deal primarily with the automation
of manufacturing, quality control, and material-handling processes. In addition, al-
most all modern industrial automation/monitoring CPSs continuously monitor the
184
environment to detect emergency situations. These situations need to be aggressively
addressed due to the fact they can be catastrophic in a large industrial setting.
State-of-the-art industrial CPSs are able to detect a variety of emergency situ-
ations, e.g., a tank overflow, system failure, or a fire. Upon the detection of an
emergency situation, they commonly provide four emergency responses, including two
passive responses and two active responses. The two passive responses are similar to
the ones provided by residential CPSs. Hence, we discuss the two active responses
that are commonly offered by industrial CPSs and discuss the negative consequences
of activating each response.
Active response I: Halting normal operation: A halting procedure is initiated to shut
down a part, e.g., a plant or control unit, of the industrial setting or the whole
production line when necessary. Upon the detection of an emergency situation, the
centralized base station responds by placing the controllable elements, e.g., valves
and pumps, into a safe state. For example, a halting procedure controls valves to
stop the flow of a hazardous fluid or external gases upon the detection of a dangerous
event. This provides protection against possible harm to people, equipment or the
environment. Launching DISASTER against an industrial CPS, which activates the
halting procedure, may lead to two consequences: production loss and profit penalty.
A halting procedure shuts down specific units or the entire facility. This can lead
to a significant production loss in chemical industries, e.g., gasoline-centric refinery,
where shutting down a unit may stop chemical reactions from completing. Moreover,
several time-consuming safety checks need to be done before restarting the normal
operation. Thus, the facility might need to be shut down for a substantial amount of
time. This could cause a significant impact on profits. For example, an average-sized
U.S. Gulf Coast oil refinery loses 68,000 dollars a day for a downed unit [434].
Active response II: Initiating a damage control mechanism: Damage control mecha-
nisms include any prudent action aimed at preventing/reducing any expected damage
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to the industrial setting, stabilize the situation caused by the damage or alleviate the
effects of damage. The main purpose of damage control is to offer a way to return
the production line to its normal operation with minimal loss of property or life. A
common damage control mechanism in an industrial environment is automatic fire
suppression, which employs a combination of dry chemicals and wet agents to extin-
guish a fire. It applies an extinguishing agent to a three-dimensional enclosed space
in order to achieve a concentration of the agent that is sufficient to suppress the fire.
A fire suppression system that primarily injects gases into enclosed spaces presents
a risk of suffocation. Numerous incidents have been documented where individuals
in such spaces have been killed by carbon dioxide agent release [435, 436]. More-
over, the positive pressure caused by these gases may be sufficient to break windows
and even walls and destroy the surrounding equipment. Thus, launching DISASTER
against an industrial CPS that triggers its fire suppression mechanism may lead to se-
rious consequences, ranging from severe damage to the equipment to life-threatening
conditions.
Demonstration of DISASTER against industrial CPSs : In order to investi-
gate the feasibility of launching DISASTER against industrial CPSs, we targeted two
industrial systems that use level sensors to monitor liquid level changes in storage
tanks (Fig. 6.5). Level monitoring-based safety mechanisms are commonly used in
various industrial environments, e.g., the oil industry, to detect an emergency situa-
tion that is called tank overflow.
To activate the emergency responses of such a system, the attacker can transmit
an illegitimate packet to the base station that indicates that the storage tank is
full. Using each of the two approaches described in Section 6.5, an attacker can
generate such packets. However, capturing and retransmitting level sensors’ regular
data packets (i.e., the packets that are periodically transmitted to the base station to
report the level of liquid) cannot activate the system’s emergency responses. In fact,
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Flow sensor
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Figure 6.5: A simple industrial automation/monitoring CPS
the attacker needs to record a packet in the presence of a real emergency situation,
which is extremely rare in real-world industrial environments, and use it later. Thus,
the first approach may not be practical for launching DISASTER against industrial
systems described above.
A close examination of two commonly-used industrial level monitoring-based CPSs
revealed that none of their sensors uses a secure transmission protocol. Indeed,
communications between the sensors and their corresponding base stations are not
cryptographically-protected. Therefore, we were able to completely reverse-engineer
the communication protocols used in these sensors. To do this, we captured and
demodulated 40 data packets (80 packets in all) generated by each sensor. Fig. 6.6
demonstrates the bitstream transmitted by one of the level sensors.
We found that one of the level sensors simply transmits an unecrypted packet that
includes a 10-bit pin number and a data field that represents the liquid level in the
tank. In order to trigger the emergency response of the CPS that uses this sensor,
we transmitted 1024 packets with different pin numbers. We were able to trigger the
emergency alarm in less than 10 seconds for this sensor.
We observed that the other sensor transmits unencrypted packets that only con-
tain data and a 1-byte sequence number. Therefore, in order to trigger the emergency
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Figure 6.6: The bitstream transmitted by one of the level sensors to the base station
of the industrial CPS.
response of the CPS that uses this sensor, an attack can be implemented as follows.
The attacker first captures a packet from the sensor and extracts the sequence num-
ber. Then he creates and transmits a packet in which the data field is set to its
maximum value and the sequence number field is set to the sequence number ex-
tracted from the captured packet plus one. We implemented this attack and were
able to successfully trigger the emergency responses of the system.
Table 6.5 specifies communication frequency, modulation type, and pin length for
each level sensor.
Table 6.5: Communication frequency, modulation type, and pin length for each level
sensor
Sensor Communication Modulation Pin length Sequence
frequency (MHz) (bits) number
LS I 433 OOK 10 No
LS II 920 OOK 0 (no pin) Yes (1 byte)
Moreover, we placed HackRF at different distances from the base stations of the
two sensors to find the maximum transmission distance. Table 6.6 summarizes re-
sults of this experiment. In real-world industrial CPSs, where signal repeaters (i.e.,
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electronic devices that receive signals and retransmit them at a higher power) are in
widespread use to support long-range communications, sensors may be located several
miles away from the base station. Unfortunately, the attacker can also exploit these
repeaters to extend the attack range up to tens of miles, e.g., the attacker can place
a HackRF hundred meters away from a repeater that is located several miles away
from the under-attack base station of the CPS.
Table 6.6: Maximum transmission distance for each industrial level sensor examined
in Experimental scenario 2
Sensor Maximum transmission distance (m)
LS I 70
LS II 250
6.6 Suggested countermeasures
In this section, we first suggest three approaches to mitigate the consequences of
launching DISASTER, and for each approach, we briefly describe its limitations and
disadvantages. Second, we discuss why preventing DISASTER may not always be
feasible due to the existence of unpredictable situations.
6.6.1 Proactive countermeasures
Next, we describe three proactive approaches, which can be deployed in the design
and verification phases of manufacturing, to prevent DISASTER.
Utilizing cryptographic mechanisms
As demonstrated in Section 6.5.2, using simple customized communication protocols
to provide short-range communication between sensors and the centralized base sta-
tion can lead to serious security issues and enable an attacker to reverse-engineer the
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protocol. The main weakness of the majority of non-standard communication proto-
cols is that they do not offer any cryptographic mechanisms to ensure confidentiality
and integrity of data transmitted by sensors. Utilizing standard communication pro-
tocols, which provide strong encryption mechanisms to ensure confidentiality and
integrity, or adding encryption mechanisms to customized communication protocols
can significantly limit the ability of an attacker to launch a security attack against
the system. Bluetooth [245] and ZigBee [247] are instances of standardized com-
munication protocols that offer lightweight encryption mechanisms (e.g., encrypted
timestamp and data encryption), yet provide a long battery lifetime. Despite the
advantages of encryption mechanisms, utilizing strong encryption in the sensors used
in CPS safety mechanisms may not be feasible in the current state of technology
due to several domain-specific limitations of CPSs (e.g., lack of enough sources of
randomness and limited energy/computation resources) and special requirements of
safety mechanisms (e.g., low cost and short response time).
In addition to encryption, obfuscation (i.e., a procedure applied to data to in-
tentionally make them hard to understand without knowing the procedure that was
applied) can make reverse engineering of the protocol harder. However, obfuscation
cannot truly secure the system since a skilled attacker may eventually be able to
reverse-engineer the obfuscation procedure. In fact, obfuscation can only delay (not
prevent) reverse engineering of the communication protocol.
Security/safety-oriented verification
As mentioned earlier, common design flaws and security weaknesses of safety mech-
anisms along with ignorance of common security-safety conflicts/trade-offs can en-
danger both security and safety of the system. There is a great body of literature
on different types of design verification approaches and several commercialized verifi-
cation approaches that manufacturers can use to detect and address common design
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flaws before introducing their product into the market. Such verification approaches
have traditionally been used to ensure that a product, service, or system works cor-
rectly, meets specific requirements, and fulfills its intended purposes. Unfortunately,
traditional verification mechanisms do not typically target a comprehensive set of
security and safety requirements. Recently, a few verification approaches [437–440]
have begun to take various security and safety considerations into account. Moreover,
a few proposals (e.g., [428]) have offered theoretical approaches to detect different
safety-security conflicts/trade-offs in CPSs.
Utilizing such newly-proposed approaches can enable designers and manufactur-
ers to predict or detect design flaws, security weaknesses, and safety-security conflicts
before releasing a product to the market. However, relying on such methods cannot
completely prevent DISASTER due to: (i) the existence of serious disagreements be-
tween some security and safety requirements that forces the manufacturer to consider
some requirements and ignore others, (ii) inefficiency and imperfections of verification
mechanisms, and (iii) unpredictability of threats against CPSs.
Designing multimodal systems
In order to plan and execute an appropriate emergency response, a CPS must reason
about its surroundings and obtain a precise description of the environment. Such a
system can gather and process data from its surroundings using various types of sen-
sors. Generally, a CPS that uses multiple types of sensors (referred to as a multimodal
system) can obtain more information about the environment than a CPS that only
relies on one type (referred to as a unimodal system). As a result, multimodal CPSs
provide two fundamental advantages over unimodal systems. First, they offer a higher
accuracy in detecting emergency situations due to the fact that they can obtain more
information about the environment and utilize sensor fusion methods (that combine
various sensory data to improve the resolution and accuracy of specific sensor data)
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to achieve an accurate description of the environment. Second, multimodal CPSs
are typically more difficult to attack since the attacker has to simultaneously target
several sensor types to launch DISASTER. For example, a fire detection mechanism
that relies on both temperature and smoke detection sensors is clearly more accurate
and secure in comparison to a system that only uses smoke detection sensors.
However, multimodal CPSs generally have two disadvantages over unimodal sys-
tems: (i) multimodal systems are more complex and expensive, (ii) since the multi-
modal systems need to process more information, they are slower in detecting emer-
gency situations. Moreover, if all sensors utilized in a multimodal CPS have common
design flaws and weaknesses (e.g., all sensors use the same communication protocol
that support neither obfuscation nor encryption), launching DISASTER against the
multimodal system may not be significantly harder than launching an attack against
a unimodal system.
6.6.2 Unpredictable situations
Although the three previously-mentioned approaches can significantly limit the ability
of a potential attacker, providing a comprehensive solution for eliminating the security
risk associated with DISASTER is hard for two reasons. First, DISASTER might be
feasible as a result of the existence of a situation that is not predictable at design
time. Second, modeling human errors, e.g., pitfalls in the installation procedure,
which might make a system susceptible to the proposed attacks, is very difficult.
For instance, suppose a company sends certified installers to install a residential
automation system that provides a fire evacuation mechanism, which is able to unlock
the doors upon the detection of a fire. A month later, another company installs an
air conditioner unit that is accessible from outside the building. In this scenario, an
attacker might be able to inject smoke into the residence using the routing paths of
the air conditioner and trigger the fire evacuation mechanism even when there is no
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fire. In fact, the air conditioner provides the means to a potential attacker to have
physical access to the home automation system and trigger its emergency responses.
6.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we introduced DISASTER, which exploits design flaws and security
weaknesses of safety mechanisms deployed in CPSs along with safety-security conflicts
to trigger the system’s emergency responses even in the absence of a real emergency
situation. This can lead to serious consequences, ranging from economic collateral
damage to life-threatening conditions.
We examined several already-in-use sensors and listed common design flaws and
security weaknesses of safety mechanisms. We discussed the various impacts of DIS-
ASTER and described potential consequences of such attacks. We also demonstrated
the feasibility of launching DISASTER in realistic scenarios, e.g., residential and in-
dustrial automation/monitoring CPSs. Finally, we suggested several countermeasures
against the proposed attacks, and discussed how unpredictable situations may give
rise to significant security problems in presumably secure CPSs.
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Chapter 7
CABA: Continuous Authentication
Based on BioAura
Most computer systems authenticate users only once at the time of initial login, which
can lead to security concerns. Continuous authentication has been explored as an ap-
proach for alleviating such concerns. Previous methods for continuous authentication
primarily use biometrics, e.g., fingerprint and face recognition, or behaviometrics,
e.g., key stroke patterns. We describe CABA, a novel continuous authentication
system that is inspired by and leverages the emergence of sensors for pervasive and
continuous health monitoring. CABA authenticates users based on their BioAura, an
ensemble of biomedical signal streams that can be collected continuously and non-
invasively using wearable medical devices. While each such signal may not be highly
discriminative by itself, we demonstrate that a collection of such signals, along with
robust machine learning, can provide high accuracy levels. We demonstrate the fea-
sibility of CABA through analysis of traces from the MIMIC-II dataset [441]. We
propose various applications of CABA, and describe how it can be extended to user
identification and adaptive access control authorization. Finally, we discuss possible
attacks on the proposed scheme and suggest corresponding countermeasures [37].
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7.1 Introduction
Authentication refers to the process of verifying a user based on certain credentials,
before granting access to a secure system, resource, or area [442]. Traditionally,
authentication is only performed when the user initially interacts with the system
[443]. In these scenarios, the user faces a knowledge-based authentication challenge,
e.g., a password inquiry, and the user is authenticated only if he offers the correct
answer, e.g., the password.
Although one-time authentication has been the dominant authentication mecha-
nism for decades [444], several issues spanning user inconvenience to security flaws
have been investigated by researchers [445, 446]. For example, the user has to focus
on several authentication steps when he tries to unlock a smartphone based on a
password/pattern-based authentication method. This may lead to safety risks, e.g.,
distraction when the user is driving. A serious security flaw of one-time authentica-
tion is its inability to detect intruders after initial authentication has been performed.
For example, an unauthorized user can access private resources of the authorized user
if the latter leaves his authenticated device unattended, or forgets to log out [447].
The above concerns have led to the investigation of continuous authentication
mechanisms. Such mechanisms monitor the user’s interactions with the device even
after initial login to ensure that the initially-authenticated user is still the one using
the device. Initial efforts in this direction were based on simple security policies
that lock the user’s device after a period of inactivity, and ask the user to re-enter
the password. However, such schemes may be annoying to users while they still
expose a window of vulnerability, leaving much room for improvement [448]. Thus,
a rapidly-growing body of literature on the usage of biometrics, i.e., strongly-reliable
biological traits such as facial features, and behaviometrics, i.e., measurable behavior
such as frequency of keystrokes, for continuous authentication has emerged in the last
decade [447,449].
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Recently, wearable medical sensors (WMSs), which measure biomedical signals,
e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, and body temperature, have drawn a lot of attention
from researchers and begun to be adopted in practice [450, 451]. A recent report by
Business Insider [452] claims that 33 million wearable health monitoring devices were
sold in 2015. It forecasts that this number will reach 148 million by 2019, and con-
tinue to grow rapidly thereafter. We suggest that, since such biomedical signals will
be collected anyway for health monitoring purposes, they can also be used to aid au-
thentication. The use of continuously-collected biomedical data for user verification
and identification seems promising for three reasons. First, if the biomedical signals
are collected by WMSs for medical purposes, using them for authentication does not
require any extra device that is not already on the body. Second, this information is
collected transparently to the user, i.e., with minimal user involvement. Third, unlike
traditional biometrics/behaviometrics, e.g., face features and keystroke patterns, in-
formation that may frequently become unavailable, the stream of biomedical signals
collected by WMSs is always available when the person is wearing WMSs.
In this chapter, we present CABA, a transparent continuous authentication
system based on an ensemble of biomedical signal streams (Biostreams in short)
that we call BioAura 1. A Biostream is a sequence of biomedical signal samples
that are continuously gathered by a WMS for medical diagnosis and therapeutic
purposes. The most important difference between a Biostream and a biometric trait
is that a Biostream alone does not have enough discriminatory power to distinguish
individuals. Thus, an authentication decision based on a single Biostream, e.g., body
temperature or blood pressure, is unlikely to be sufficiently discriminative. However,
when multiple Biostreams are combined into a BioAura, it leads to a powerful
continuous authentication scheme.
1Aura is traditionally defined as the energy field around a person. Analogously, we use the term
BioAura to define the biological field around a person, manifested as a set of Biostreams.
196
Our key contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We suggest a list of design requirements for any continuous authentication sys-
tem.
2. In order to analyze the discriminatory power of BioAura, we propose a contin-
uous authentication system based on BioAura (called CABA) and investigate
it from both accuracy and scalability perspectives.
3. We suggest an adaptive authorization scheme and describe how it can be used
to alleviate user inconveniences associated with the use of continuous authenti-
cation systems that might falsely reject the user.
4. We describe various possible attacks against the proposed continuous authenti-
cation system along with several countermeasures to prevent such attacks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 describes the require-
ments that should be targeted in the design of continuous authentication systems and
discusses how CABA addresses such requirements. Section 7.3 describes BioAura and
the Biostreams that form the proposed BioAura. Section 7.4 discusses the scope of
CABA applications. Section 7.5 describes the CABA prototype and our experimental
setup. Section 7.6 investigates CABA from both accuracy and scalability perspec-
tives. Section 7.7 describes how CABA can support identification, i.e., the process of
recognizing a user without knowing his user ID. Section 7.8 presents an adaptive au-
thorization scheme that can be used along with CABA to enhance user convenience.
Section 7.9 discusses possible attacks against the proposed authentication system and
describes different countermeasures against each attack. Section 7.10 discusses related
work and compares CABA with previously-proposed continuous authentication sys-
tems. Section 7.11 briefly describes possible privacy concerns surrounding the use of
biomedical signals, how CABA can be used as a stand-alone one-time authentication
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system, and the effects of temporal conditions on authentication results. Finally,
Section 7.12 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Desirable authentication requirements
In this section, we first describe the desirable requirements that every continuous
authentication system must satisfy. Then, we discuss how CABA addresses such
requirements.
7.2.1 Design-octagon
Even though several continuous authentication systems have been proposed in the
past, they have not been evaluated against a comprehensive list of design require-
ments. A few studies, e.g., [453–455], consider a small set of requirements, e.g., cost
and accuracy. However, there is no standard list of design requirements that a con-
tinuous authentication system must satisfy. We suggest such a list below (that also
includes some of the desiderata of typical WMS-based systems, as shown in Fig. 1.5).
We call it the Design-octagon since it comprises eight design requirements (Fig. 7.1):
Availability
Extensibility
Low cost
Scalability
Efficiency
Accuracy
Passiveness
Stability
Authentication 	

requirements
Figure 7.1: Design-octagon: Desiderata for a continuous authentication system.
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1. Passiveness : A user-friendly system must not require frequent user involve-
ment [456]. For example, if the authentication system asks the user to re-enter his
credentials often, it may be quite annoying to the user [454].
2. Availability : The system should provide a reliable authentication system at
all time instances [454]. Lack of continuous availability is a significant drawback of
several previously-proposed continuous authentication systems – they may often fail
due to a lack of sufficient information [457]. For instance, a keyboard-based system
may unintentionally reject a legitimate user when he is watching a movie and not
using the keyboard.
3. High accuracy : Undoubtedly, the most important requirement of every authen-
tication system is high accuracy. The system should be able to confidently and accu-
rately distinguish legitimate users from impostors, and reject impostors’ requests.
4. Scalability : The system should be able to handle a growing amount of work
when the number of users increases [444]. In particular, its time and space complex-
ity should increase modestly with an increase in the number of users [458].
5. Efficiency : A short response time, i.e., the time required to capture a test
sample, process it, and provide a decision, is very desirable for two reasons. First,
it is desirable for the system to quickly authenticate a legitimate user and reject an
impostor to ensure user convenience [444]. Second, security may also suffer if there is
an appreciable delay. For example, if authorization takes five minutes, an impostor
may be able to control the system and access restricted resources in that five-minute
timeframe, while the system is still processing.
6. Low cost : Cost is an important factor in authentication systems used in low-
security environments, e.g., in personal computers [454, 459]. In such environments,
the cost of adding or modifying the authentication system should ideally be negligi-
ble. Thus, systems that do not need extra peripherals, such as retina scanners, would
be generally preferred. However, for highly-secure environments, e.g., military bases,
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expensive authentication systems could be deployed [455].
7. Stability : Any trait that is recorded for processing for authentication purposes
must ideally have only slight changes or maintain its pattern over a certain time pe-
riod [459,460].
8. Extensibility : The authentication system should be able to function on a wide
variety of devices regardless of underlying hardware. Ideally, the system should not
require dedicated hardware. One of the advantages of password-based authentication
is that it can be easily extended to protect a large number of systems, devices, and
resources with minimal system modification [444].
7.2.2 Addressing desirable requirements
In this subsection, we describe how CABA ensures all of the requirements discussed
above.
1. Passiveness: In CABA, passiveness is addressed through the use of WMSs.
These are small and compact sensors that are specifically designed to take the pas-
siveness requirement into account, since continuous health monitoring needs to mini-
mize user involvement. Thus, passiveness is not only a very desirable requirement for
continuous authentication, but also a significant consideration in designing WMSs.
Unfortunately, major biometrics-based systems, e.g., fingerprint-based, do not pro-
vide a high level of passiveness.
2. Availability : The use of WMSs as capture devices also ensures a continuous
stream of information since this is also required for continuous health monitoring.
However, neither biometrics nor behaviometrics guarantees availability. For example,
keyboard/mouse-based continuous authentication systems fail when the user stops
using the dedicated peripherals.
3. Accuracy : The accuracy of CABA is extensively investigated in Section 7.6
in various experimental scenarios. Section 7.10 demonstrates that the accuracy of
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CABA, which is based on an ensemble of weakly discriminative Biostreams, is com-
parable to previously-proposed systems, which are based on strong biometrics.
4. Scalability : The scalability of CABA is investigated in Section 7.6 based on two
scalability metrics (time complexity and space complexity). Our analysis shows that
an increase in the number of users can be easily handled in this system.
5. Efficiency : Authentication can be done in a few milliseconds. For each authen-
tication attempt, the user can immediately provide the required data since the data
are already collected using WMSs. The efficiency of the system is described in more
detail in Section 7.6.
6. Low cost : As discussed later in Section 7.3, the proposed BioAura consists of
Biostreams that are collected for continuous health monitoring. If the user is already
using a continuous health monitoring system, CABA can offer continuous authenti-
cation with minimal cost.
7. Stability : Our investigations of different Biostreams and their high authenti-
cation accuracy over different timeframes demonstrate that the collected Biostreams
maintain their pattern over time. Therefore, they can be used as authentication
traits.
8. Extensibility : By decoupling the collection of Biostreams from the authen-
ticating device, CABA can be implemented in any general-purpose computing de-
vice with sufficient memory capacity and computation power. Unfortunately, neither
biometrics- nor behaviometrics-based systems provide significant extensibility. For ex-
ample, the nature of keyboard/mouse-based authentication schemes inherently limits
their applications, i.e., they can only be used for implementing an authentication
mechanism in a system that has a keyboard or a mouse.
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7.3 BioAura
In this section, we first briefly describe how Biostreams can be collected using WMSs.
Then, we discuss which Biostreams constitute the BioAura.
As mentioned earlier, BioAura is an ensemble of Biostreams, which are gathered
by WMSs for medical diagnosis and continuous health monitoring. The most widely-
used scheme for continuous health monitoring consists of two classes of components:
(i) WMSs and (ii) a base station [11]. All WMSs transmit their data to the base sta-
tion either for further processing or long-term storage. In recent years, smartphones
have become the dominant base station since they are powerful and ubiquitous, and
their energy resources are less limited relative to WMSs [11,461]. Fig. 7.2 illustrates a
simple continuous health monitoring system that consists of several small lightweight
WMSs, which transmit their biomedical data to the smartphone over a Bluetooth
communication link (similar to the left side of the personal health care system illus-
trated in Fig. 3.1).
Smartphones can perform simple preprocessing to extract values of some impor-
tant features from the data, and transmit those values. In CABA, the smartphone
first executes a very simple feature extraction function that computes the average
value of the samples in each Biostream over the last one-minute timeframe of data.
Then, it only transmits a feature vector that contains these average values.
As mentioned earlier in Section 7.1, with the expected widespread use of WMSs,
CABA can be used to provide a continuous authentication system as a side benefit of
continuous health monitoring systems. Our proposed BioAura consists of Biostreams
that are essential for routine continuous health monitoring, and their collection needs
minimum user involvement. Such Biostreams are expected to be included in long-term
continuous health monitoring systems.
Table 7.1 shows the most widely-used Biostreams, their abbreviations/notations
used in the medical literature, and their units [11, 462]. In this chapter, we exclude
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Figure 7.2: A continuous health monitoring system consisting of several small
lightweight WMSs that transmit biomedical data to the smartphone.
the first three ones from the proposed BioAura, and include the other nine. Next, we
discuss why the three Biostreams are excluded.
1. Electroencephalogram (EEG): EEG is excluded from BioAura because it can-
not be conveniently captured. The current method for capturing EEG requires the
user to wear a cap. Moreover, its capture devices cannot be miniaturized further
because electrodes need to form a minimum diameter to be noise-robust [87].
2. Electrocardiogram (ECG): Even performing a low-complexity feature ex-
traction on one minute of ECG signals requires at least 400× more operations than
performing a simple statistical feature extraction, e.g., averaging, on the respiratory
rate values [463]. This would place a significant computational and energy demand
on battery-powered devices such as smartphones and wearables. If we try to avoid
the preprocessing, i.e., feature extraction, on the smartphone and just transmit the
ECG signals to the authentication system, this would also entail significant energy
consumption since ECG waveforms contain at least 200 samples/s [11, 464].
3. Blood glucose (BG): BG is excluded because currently the devices that mea-
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sure BG are invasive, i.e., they require a sample of the user’s blood.
Although we have currently used nine Biostreams to form the BioAura in the
prototype implementation, CABA need not necessarily be limited to these nine. As
other compact WMSs become available in the future, they could also be made part
of the BioAura.
Table 7.1: Biostreams, their abbreviations/notations, and units
Biostream Abbreviations/Notations Unit
Electroencephalogram EEG µV
Electrocardiogram ECG µV
Blood glucose BG mg/dL
Arterial systolic blood pressure ABPSYS mmHg
Arterial diastolic blood pressure ABPDIAS mmHg
Arterial average blood pressure ABPMEAN mmHg
Heart rate HR 1/min
Pulmonary systolic artery pressure PAPSYS mmHg
Pulmonary diastolic artery pressure PAPDIAS mmHg
Body temperature T Celsius
Oxygen saturation SPO2 %
Respiratory rate RESP 1/min
7.4 Scope of applications
In this section, we describe the possible applications of CABA. The concept of contin-
uous authentication based on BioAura can be used to protect (i) personal computing
devices and servers, (ii) software applications, and (iii) restricted physical spaces.
Next, we conceptually describe how CABA can be used to protect each domain.
Computing devices, e.g., personal computers, laptops, tablets, and cell phones, or
servers can employ two different approaches to utilize CABA: (i) they can use their
own computing resources to implement a stand-alone version of CABA, or (ii) they
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can simply use decisions made by a version of the scheme implemented on a trusted
server. We investigate both approaches.
Example 1 : Suppose a tablet wants to authenticate its user. The tablet may be
unable to dedicate its limited memory/energy resources to support the whole authen-
tication process. In such a scenario, it can use decisions made by a trusted server
running CABA. Fig. 7.3 illustrates this scenario. When the user tries to unlock the
tablet, it informs the user’s smartphone. The smartphone asks the trusted server to
open a secure communication channel. The smartphone then sends the information
required for specifying the device that needs to be unlocked, e.g., the tablet ID, along
with the information that needs to be processed to authenticate the user, e.g., the
user ID and a preprocessed frame of data points from his BioAura, to the trusted
server. The server then authenticates the user and sends this decision to the tablet.
After initial login, the trusted server demands fresh data points at certain intervals.
Example 2 Suppose the user wants to login to his personal computer. In this case,
the computer has enough computational power and energy capacity to implement a
stand-alone version of CABA. This case is similar to the one in Example 1, except
that there is no need for a trusted server (Fig. 7.4).
Similarly, CABA has the potential to provide continuous authentication for appli-
cations that need strong authentication, e.g., e-commerce applications. Its authenti-
cation decisions can be made on the same device that runs the application or on a
powerful trusted server and then transmitted to the device that runs the application.
Example 3 : Consider an online banking application that is installed on the user’s
smartphone. When the user opens the application to access his bank account, the
smartphone opens a secure communication channel with the trusted server. Then,
the smartphone sends the required information for specifying the application, e.g.,
the application ID, along with information needed for authenticating the user. The
rest of the protocol is the same as before.
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Figure 7.3: The tablet wants to authenticate the user. The vertical arrows depict the
timeline.
Finally, CABA can be used to control access to restricted physical spaces, e.g.,
buildings. Typically, the electronic device that controls the entrance, e.g., a smart
lock, would not have enough computation power to use a stand-alone version of
CABA. Hence, in such cases, the scheme can be implemented on a trusted server,
and decisions then transmitted to the device. This case is similar to the one depicted
in Fig. 7.3, with the tablet replaced by the lock.
7.5 Implementation and experimental setup
In this section, we first describe our implementation of CABA. We then discuss our
experimental setup and different metrics that we used to investigate the proposed
system.
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Figure 7.4: The laptop wants to authenticate the user before allowing the user to
utilize its resources or software applications.
7.5.1 Prototype implementation
Similar to other authentication systems, CABA has two operating phases: (i) enroll-
ment phase in which CABA builds machine learning-based models for each user, given
the training data, and (ii) user authentication phase in which the system continuously
authenticates the user. The description of the two phases is presented next.
Enrollment phase
In the enrollment phase, the authentication system is given a training dataset. The
system builds the model using a supervised learning approach, i.e., a machine learning
approach in which the model is built based on labeled training data points.
Generally, the amount of information needed to build a model varies from one
application to another. As we elaborate later in Section 7.6, we evaluated the number
of training data points needed to investigate how much information should be sent
to the authentication system to build a reliable and accurate model. Each data
point in the training set is nine-dimensional and consists of the average values of
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successive measurements of a Biostream over a one-minute timeframe. The value of
each dimension is represented using half-precision floating-point format that requires
two bytes of storage. Therefore, if the smartphone needs to transmit data points
extracted over a one-hour period, it only needs to send 1080 bytes of data to the
authentication system over this period.
In order to maintain reliability, CABA should train a new model based on fresh
biomedical data obtained at certain intervals. In other words, CABA should update
the model regularly to ensure that the model maintains accuracy and can distinguish
legitimate users from impostors. The frequency of model update, i.e., how frequently
CABA should repeat the enrollment phase, depends on several factors, such as re-
quired accuracy and learning time. As we show later in Section 7.6, our experimental
results indicate that when CABA re-trains the model every four hours, it achieves
the best accuracy and the learning time is only a few minutes. Learning can be done
transparently to the user. In other words, CABA can re-train the model while the
user continues to be authenticated. For example, suppose the enrollment phase takes
five minutes each time and is repeated every four hours, i.e., each model is used for
four hours. CABA can start re-training to generate a new model after 3 hours and
55 minutes, and be ready with it after four hours have elapsed.
User authentication phase
In this phase, the system makes decisions using the already-trained model. In a con-
tinuous authentication scenario, the system should verify the user’s identity at certain
intervals. The frequency of authentication depends on several factors, such as the
required level of security and the amount of information required for one authentica-
tion. In our prototype implementation, CABA re-authenticates the user every minute
based on a given nine-dimensional data point Y that contains the average values of
the chosen Biostreams over a specified time interval. When the user approaches the
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authentication system and requests authentication, the smartphone performs a simple
computation on the already-gathered Biostreams and provides Y . Therefore, unlike
most previously-proposed continuous authentication systems, e.g., keyboard/mouse-
based systems, that require the user to wait while they collect authentication infor-
mation, CABA obtains the required information almost instantaneously because the
information has already been gathered and stored on the smartphone for the purpose
of health monitoring.
Fig. 7.5 illustrates how CABA works when the user requests authentication. In a
single verification attempt:
1. The smartphone preprocesses one minute of Biostreams collected from the user’s
BioAura. Then, it transmits the preprocessed information (Y ) along with user
ID to the authentication system.
2. The Look-up stage sends Y to the appropriate classifier in the Jury stage based
on the given user ID.
3. The dedicated classifier processes Y and outputs a binary decision (accept or
reject).
Jury
Classifier 1
Look-up
#ID #ADD
1
2
N
.
[Y,ID]
[Decision]
...
[Y] Classifier 2
Classifier N
..
Verification system
Smartphone
Figure 7.5: User authentication phase: The user’s smartphone provides Y and the
user ID, and CABA outputs the decision.
Next, we provide a detailed description of Look-up and Jury stages.
1. Look-up stage : This stage forwards the nine-dimensional vector Y provided
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by the smartphone to the appropriate classifier based on the given user ID. In order
to provide a fast search mechanism to find the appropriate classifier, this stage can
be implemented using a hash table that associates user IDs with pointers to the
classifiers.
2. Jury stage : The Jury stage consists of N binary classifiers, where N is the
number of people who need to be authenticated. The i-th classifier is trained to only
accept the data point Y that is extracted by the i-th user’s smartphone from his
BioAura. The training set of the i-th classifier consists of the i-th user’s data points
labeled as “accept” and others’ data points labeled as “reject”.
We have used two well-known binary classification methods to build our model:
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [258] and Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) [465]. Next,
we briefly describe each method.
• SVM: The basic concept in an SVM is to find a hyperplane that separates the n-
dimensional data into two classes. However, since the data points in the dataset
are not usually linearly separable, SVMs introduce the concept of kernel trick
that projects the points into a higher-dimensional space, where they are linearly
separable. When no prior knowledge about the dataset is available, SVMs
usually demonstrate promising results and generalize well. A great number of
previous research studies that perform authentication using machine learning
methods only consider SVM with a linear kernel [466] or radial basis function
(RBF) kernel [467]. We decided to investigate both.
• AdaBoost: Although SVM has been commonly used in previously-proposed con-
tinuous authentication systems in a variety of scenarios, we decided to include
AdaBoost as well. The idea behind AdaBoost is to build a highly accurate
classifier by combining many weak classifiers that always perform a little bit
better than random guessing on every distribution over the training set [465].
Since biomedical signals are individually slightly discriminative, they lead to
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weak classifiers, which can be collectively turned into a strong classifier us-
ing AdaBoost. Choosing appropriate types of weak classifiers is a significant
consideration in AdaBoost. The most commonly used weak learning methods
for implementing AdaBoost-based classifiers are decision stumps (also called
one-node tree) and decision trees.
7.5.2 Experimental setup and metrics
Here, we first describe the parameters and dataset used in our experiments. Then,
we discuss the accuracy and scalability metrics used to investigate the proposed au-
thentication system.
Experimental parameters and dataset
Next, we discuss the parameters used in our experimental setup and describe the
dataset.
Parameters : We need the following five parameters in our experiments.
• Dataset length (L): This is the duration of Biostreams measurements, i.e., the
number of hours of information we have for each person in our data set. In our
experiments, we used 14 hours of data for each individual, i.e., L = 14 h.
• Dataset dimension (n): This is the number of Biostreams that form the BioAura
of an individual. In our setup, we have included nine Biostreams for each person,
i.e., n = 9.
• Dataset size (N): This is the number of people in the dataset.
• Training window size (TRW ): This represents the duration of the signal mea-
surements (expressed in hours) for each individual that we used for training the
model in the enrollment phase. For example, if TRW is 1 hour, it means we
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have included 60 data points in our training set, where each point is a nine-
dimensional vector consisting of the average values of successive measurements
of the nine Biostreams over a one-minute timeframe. We vary TRW in our
experiments to study its impact on the model’s accuracy.
• Testing window size (TEW ): This represents the duration of signal measure-
ments (expressed in hours) for each individual for investigating the accuracy of
the trained model in the user authentication phase. We vary the value of TEW
in our experiments to investigate its impact on the performance of CABA.
Dataset : In order to investigate the accuracy of CABA, we used a freely avail-
able multi-parameter dataset, called MIMIC-II [441]. MIMIC-II was gathered in a
controlled environment in which each user remains almost stationary during data
collection. It has been extensively used in the medical and biomedical fields. It con-
sists of several anonymized high-resolution vital sign trends, waveforms, and sampled
biomedical signals for many individuals. For our experiments, we could only find
37 users (N = 37) in MIMIC-II for whom the data: (i) include the nine targeted
Biostreams, and (ii) are available over several hours (at least 14 hours) with minimal
missing values (we excluded a user for whom the data were not available for more
than two consecutive hours). Biostreams were sampled using patient monitors (Com-
ponent Monitoring System Intellivue MP-70 and Philips Healthcare) at the sampling
rate of 125 Hz [441].
Accuracy metrics
Next, we describe five metrics that we used for analyzing the accuracy of the proposed
authentication system. The first three are traditionally used for examining authen-
tication systems. We define two more to investigate the accuracy in the context of
continuous authentication.
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• False acceptance rate (FAR): This is the ratio of falsely accepted unauthorized
users to the total number of invalid requests made by impostors trying to access
the system. In the context of continuous authentication, we use the notation
FARt=TEW to denote FAR under TEW . A lower FAR is preferred in cases in
which security is very important [82].
• False rejection rate (FRR): This refers to the ratio of falsely rejected requests
to the total number of valid requests made by legitimate users trying to access
the system. We use the notation FRRt=TEW to denote FRR under TEW . A
lower FRR is preferred for user convenience [82].
• Equal error rate (EER): This is the point where FAR equals FRR. Reporting
only FRR or FAR does not provide the complete picture because there is a
trade-off between the two since we can make one of them low by letting the
other one become high. Therefore, we use EER (instead of FRR or FAR)
for reporting CABA’s accuracy. As before, we use the notation EERt=TEW to
denote EER under TEW .
• False acceptance worst-case interval (FAW ): The output of the authentica-
tion system in a time period T is a sequence of accept/reject decisions. As
an example, Fig. 7.6 shows two possible output sequences over a ten-minute
authentication timeframe when an impostor is trying to get authenticated. In
both sequences, the number of falsely accepted requests is the same. However,
in a continuous authentication scenario, the second sequence would be consid-
ered worse since the impostor can use the system over a four-minute timeframe
without being detected, whereas in the first case the impostor can only use the
system over a one-minute timeframe. We define FAW as the longest time in-
terval (expressed in minutes for CABA) over which an impostor can be falsely
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accepted as a legitimate user. In the example of Fig. 7.6, FAW is one minute
and four minutes for the first and second cases, respectively.
… A R A R A R R R A R …
… R A A A A R R R R R …
Sequence 1
Sequence 2
Figure 7.6: Two possible output sequences over a ten-minute authentication time-
frame. A (R) refers to an accept (reject) decision.
• False rejection worst-case interval (FRW ): Analogously to FAW , we define
FRW as the longest time interval (expressed in minutes) over which a legitimate
user might be falsely rejected and marked as an impostor.
Scalability metrics
As mentioned in Section 7.2, the time and space complexity of the authentication
system should increase modestly with an increase in the number of users. In order
to investigate the scalability of the proposed method, we express the time and space
complexities of CABA using the well-known O notation, as a function of N (number
of the people in the dataset).
7.6 Authentication results
In this section, we investigate CABA from both the accuracy and scalability perspec-
tives.
7.6.1 Authentication accuracy
In order to investigate the accuracy of the authentication system, we implemented a
prototype of CABA in MATLAB.
The accuracy of a model is generally investigated using a set of data points that is
different from the set used in constructing the model. Thus, in order to train and test a
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model, the dataset can be divided into two parts: training and test sets. The classical
K-fold cross-validation is not suitable for estimating the performance of a system
that processes a time series, i.e., a sequence of data points consisting of successive
measurements, because potential local dependencies across observations in a time
series define a structure in the data that will be ignored by cross-validation [468].
Thus, in this work, instead of using traditional cross-validation, we designed several
experimental scenarios for evaluating the accuracy of the authentication system. We
describe these scenarios next.
1. Baseline: In the baseline scenario, we break the available dataset into two equal
parts, i.e., TEW = TRW = 7 h. We use the first half of the dataset (the first
seven hours) of each individual to train the model and the second half to test
it. We use all the Biostreams, i.e., n = 9, to train and test our system. We use
two classification methods: SVM and AdaBoost. In the case of SVM, we use
two kernels (linear and RBF). In the case of AdaBoost, we consider decision
stumps (one-node tree) and decision trees with 5, 10, 15, and 20 nodes as
weak classifiers. We run 40 iterations for all Adaboost-based classifiers since we
determined experimentally that the training error becomes zero within these
many iterations and testing error becomes minimum. The value of EERt=7h
is reported in Table 7.2 for all classifiers. AdaBoost with a tree size of 15,
i.e., with 15 nodes in the tree, has the minimum value of EERt=7h. Increasing
tree size usually improves the accuracy of Adaboost-based classifiers. However,
using larger trees leads to more complex models, which are more susceptible to
overfitting [469]. This can be seen when we move from a tree size of 15 to 20.
Table 7.3 summarizes FAW and FRW for all classification schemes. Consider
RBF SVM as an example. Its FAW is 4 minutes, which suggests that, in the
worst case, an impostor can deceive the authentication system for a 4-minute
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Table 7.2: Classifiers and their EERt=7h
Type of classifier Specification EERt=7h (%)
SVM
Kernel = Linear 3.0
Kernel = RBF 2.6
AdaBoost
Tree size = 1 3.1
Tree size = 5 2.9
Tree size = 10 2.9
Tree size = 15 2.4
Tree size = 20 2.5
timeframe. Its FRW is 3 minutes, which suggests that, in the worst case, a
legitimate user is falsely rejected for a stretch of 3 minutes.
Table 7.3: Classifiers and their FAW and FRW
Type of classifier Specification FAW (min) FRW (min)
SVM
Kernel = Linear 4 3
Kernel = RBF 4 3
AdaBoost
Tree size = 1 5 3
Tree size = 5 4 3
Tree size = 10 4 3
Tree size = 15 4 3
Tree size = 20 4 4
2. Biased FARt/FRRt: Even though it is easier to compare authentication meth-
ods based on their EERt, we may want to minimize FARt in highly-secure
environments in order to ensure that an impostor is not authorized or minimize
FRRt to enhance user convenience. A low FARt indicates a high security level
and a low FRRt ensures user convenience. In this experimental scenario, we use
the same parameters that are used in the baseline. However, false acceptance
and false rejection are penalized differently. We consider two cases: (i) try to
make FARt close to zero (FARt=7h < 0.1%) and measure FRRt, and (ii) try to
make FRRt close to zero (FRRt=7h < 0.1%) and measure FARt. Tables 7.4 and
7.5 summarize the results for these two cases. Based on Table 7.4, CABA can
be seen to ensure that impostors are not accepted, but at the cost of an increase
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in FRR. Based on Table 7.5, CABA can be seen to not negatively impact user
convenience, i.e., not falsely reject the user, while rejecting impostors in more
than 90% of the cases.
Table 7.4: Classifiers and their FRR (FAR ≈ 0)
Type of classifier Specification FRR(%)
SVM
Kernel = Linear 10.2
Kernel = RBF 9.6
AdaBoost
Tree size = 1 10.0
Tree size = 5 9.7
Tree size = 10 8.7
Tree size = 15 8.4
Tree size = 20 8.9
Table 7.5: Classifiers and their FAR (FRR ≈ 0)
Type of classifier Specification FAR(%)
SVM
Kernel = Linear 8.9
Kernel = RBF 7.6
AdaBoost
Tree size = 1 10.7
Tree size = 5 9.2
Tree size = 10 7.8
Tree size = 15 7.6
Tree size = 20 8.2
3. Variable window size: As mentioned earlier, we set the training and testing
window sizes to 7 h in the baseline. Here, we change the size of the training and
testing windows such that TRW = 2,3,⋯,12h and TEW+TRW = 14 h. Fig. 7.7
shows the average EERt for different classifiers with respect to TRW . For all
classifiers, as we increase TRW from 2 h to 6 h, EERt decreases drastically.
Then it remains almost constant until TRW reaches 11 h. Above this TRW ,
EER starts increasing for two possible reasons. First, the model may become
overfitted. Second, the number of test points may be inadequate.
4. Moving training window: In this scenario, the training window moves behind
the testing window (Fig. 7.8). We consider TEW = TRW = 1,2,⋯,7 h. Our
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Figure 7.7: Average EERt for different classifiers with respect to TRW .
experimental results demonstrate that this verification scheme provides the best
result for TEW = TRW = 4 h, for which the average EERt is 1.9% and the
classification method is AdaBoost with a tree size of 15 nodes. This suggests
that we can achieve the best accuracy for TRW = 4 h, under the assumption
that the trained model is valid for the next four hours.
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Figure 7.8: Moving training window.
5. Reducing the number of Biostreams: We also investigate the impact of dropping
a Biostream. Traditionally, feature reduction is used to remove redundant or
irrelevant features from the data set before commencing on the training process
in order to decrease unnecessary computational cost. However, in our scenario,
the main purpose of feature reduction is to investigate how each feature affects
accuracy. If CABA can provide an acceptable accuracy with fewer features,
fewer WMSs would be required. We dropped one feature at a time and com-
puted EERt=7h of the system. All other configurations are kept the same as in
the baseline. Fig. 7.9 illustrates how EERt=7h changes for each of the seven clas-
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sifiers used in our experiments (two SVM classifiers with different kernel types
and five AdaBoost classifiers with different tree sizes) when we drop different
Biostreams. The green bar shows the baseline scenario in which no feature is
dropped. We can see that dropping the respiratory rate (temperature) has max-
imum (minimum) negative impact on authentication accuracy. Thus, the most
and least important Biostreams are respiratory rate and body temperature,
respectively.
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Figure 7.9: EERt=7h for different classifiers when Biostreams are dropped one at a
time. The green bar depicts the baseline scenario in which no feature is dropped.
The abbreviations/notations provided in Table 7.1 are used to label other bars.
7.6.2 CABA scalability
We discuss below the worst-case time and space complexities of CABA.
Time complexity
As discussed earlier, CABA can be implemented in such a manner that the time
required by the enrollment phase is hidden from the user’s perspective. Hence, we
focus on the time complexity of the user authentication process. We found that the
required time for processing an authentication request for N = 37 was on the order of
a few milliseconds for all classification methods, when CABA was implemented on a
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MacBook Pro (2.3 GHz Intel Core i7 processor with 8 GB memory). This suggests
that CABA can re-authenticate the user very quickly.
When a person requests authentication by providing his ID and feature vector
Y , the Look-up stage forwards Y to one and only one classifier in the Jury stage
based on the given user ID. Then, the classifier’s decision is the final decision of the
authentication system. Hence, in order to analyze the time complexity of a single
user authentication process, we need to consider the time complexity of the Look-up
stage, and one classifier in the Jury stage, as follows:
• Look-up stage: If the Look-up stage is implemented using a hash table that
associates user IDs with pointers to classifiers, then its search operation (finding
the location of the classifier associated with the user ID) can be performed in
O(1) time.
• One classifier in the Jury stage: The time complexity of the classifier varies from
one classification algorithm to another. The time complexities of AdaBoost
classifiers and the SVM classifier with a linear kernel do not depend on N , i.e.,
they have time complexity of O(1). The time complexity of SVM with an RBF
kernel is O(nSV ), where nSV is the number of support vectors. Theoretically,
nSV grows linearly with a linear increase in N . Thus, the SVM classifier with
an RBF kernel has a time complexity of O(N).
Hence, the overall time complexity of user authentication is O(1) for AdaBoost
classifiers and the SVM classifier with a linear kernel, and O(N) for the SVM classifier
with an RBF kernel.
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Space complexity
We first investigate how much memory is required for our prototype implementation
of CABA. Then, we discuss how the amount of memory required to store the two
stages (Look-up and Jury) increases with N .
The amount of memory required for storing the Look-up stage in our prototype,
where N = 37, was less than 1 kB. The amount of memory required for storing
a single classifier in the Jury stage varies from tens of bytes (for SVM with a linear
kernel) to a few kB (for AdaBoost with a tree size of 20). Therefore, the total amount
of memory allocated to the authentication system is less than 1 MB.
We investigate the space complexity as a function of N .
• Look-up stage: If the Look-up stage is implemented using a hash table, its space
complexity is O(N).
• Jury stage: The space complexity of a single classifier in the Jury stage depends
on the type of classifier. The space complexities of AdaBoost classifiers and the
SVM classifier with a linear kernel do not depend on N , i.e., they have space
complexity of O(1). However, the space complexity of the SVM with an RBF
kernel is O(N). Since the number of classifiers in the Jury stage increases
linearly with N , its space complexity is O(N) (when an AdaBoost classifier or
SVM classifier with a linear kernel is used) or O(N2) (when the SVM classifier
with the RBF kernel is employed).
7.7 Using BioAura for identification
The majority of continuous authentication systems only support continuous verifica-
tion in which the user provides a user ID and the system checks if the user is the
person he purports to be. In this section, we describe how CABA can be slightly
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modified to also identify the user from a database of users by processing feature vec-
tor Y provided by the smartphone. An identification scenario consists of four steps.
The first three steps are similar to the ones discussed in Section 7.5 for continuous
authentication. In the fourth step, CABA processes the decisions of all classifiers in
the Jury stage to indicate that the user is not in the database, or conclude that he is,
in which case it returns his user ID. This step can be implemented in different ways.
In our implementation, CABA processes all outputs of the Jury stage and outputs
the user ID if there is only one classifier whose output is an accept decision. Other-
wise, it indicates no match. Our experimental results demonstrate that this scheme
provides the best result, for which the identification rate is 96.1%, with the AdaBoost
classification method with a tree size of 15 nodes. Identification rate is a commonly
used metric for this scenario [82]. It is defined as the percentage of attempts correctly
identified to the total number of attempts made.
7.8 Real-time adaptive authorization
In this section, we first define the concept of authorization. Then, we propose a real-
time adaptive authorization (RAA) scheme, which uses the decisions from CABA to
provide an extremely flexible access control model. The RAA concept is not limited
to CABA. It provides an adjustable access control model for any authorization system
that authorizes the user based on decisions of a continuous authentication system.
Authorization is defined as the process of establishing if the user, who has been
already authenticated, should be allowed access to a resource, system, or area [470].
Traditional authorization schemes grant a specific access level to the authenticated
user based on his user ID. However, the fact that continuous authentication systems
have a non-zero FRR implies that such a simple scheme may unintentionally block a
legitimate access when the authentication system fails to recognize a valid user for a
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short period of time. Consider a scenario in which a continuous authentication system
is used to protect a personal laptop from unauthorized users. The authentication
system first authenticates the user. Then, the authorization scheme specifies the
user’s access level based on the user ID. However, the laptop may log out the user
when the authentication scheme falsely rejects him. RAA schemes can be used to
alleviate user inconvenience caused by false reject decisions. They continuously adjust
the user’s access level based on the last decision of the authentication system. Next,
we propose an RAA scheme that can be used with a continuous authentication system.
A trust level-based RAA adaptively changes the user’s access level based on a
parameter called trust level (TRL). TRL is a recently-suggested parameter that rep-
resents how much we trust a user based on previous decisions of the continuous
authentication system [471]. TRL has a value between 0 and 100, where a higher
number indicates a higher level of trust. The initial value of TRL is 100 when the
user is authenticated and authorized for the first time. The value of TRL is continu-
ously updated using a trust update procedure after each user authentication. A simple
trust update procedure may be to just increase (decrease) the TRL by a constant step
after each accept (reject) decision. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code for such an
approach. We need to set two parameters: WAccept and WReject. The values of WAccept
and WReject should be chosen such that the TRL value becomes 0 as soon as we detect
the presence of an impostor and becomes 100 when we confidently verify that the user
is legitimate. Consider AdaBoost classification with a tree size of 15 nodes that yields
FRW = 3. This indicates that the authentication system may falsely reject three con-
secutive requests of a legitimate user in the worst case. Therefore, if the RAA scheme
gets at least four consecutive reject decisions from the authentication system, it be-
comes confident that the user is an impostor (TRL = 0). Hence, we can set WReject
for this classifier as follows: WReject = −100FRW+1 = −1004 = −25. FAW = 4 for the above-
mentioned classification method, which indicates that in the worst case, an impostor
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may be falsely accepted as a legitimate user in four successive trials. Therefore, if the
authentication system outputs five consecutive accept decisions, TRL should become
100. Thus, we can set WAccept as follows: WAccept = +100FAW+1 = +1005 = +20.
We can set different threshold values for different applications. We set the thresh-
old value to 100 for accessing email and financial accounts to ensure that the user
can access such accounts only when the system is confident that the user is legiti-
mate. However, for less sensitive applications, e.g., simple web surfing, a lower level
of trust might be sufficient. Using CABA in conjunction with RAA can enhance user
convenience, while ensuring high security for critical applications.
Algorithm 1: trustUpdate procedure
Given: The latest decision of the authentication system and current TRL value
1. TRL← TRL + FUpdate, where
FUpdate(decision) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
WAccept, if decision = Accept,
WReject, otherwise.
2. If (TRL > 100)
3. TRL← 100
4. end
5. If (TRL < 0)
6. TRL← 0
8. end
9. Return TRL
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7.9 Potential threats and countermeasures
Next, we describe possible attacks/threats against CABA that can be exploited by
attackers to bypass CABA. For each attack, we also suggest possible countermeasures.
1. Eavesdropping: This is defined as the act of covertly listening to confidential
conversations of others [1], which, in our context, can be done by intercepting the com-
munication between two devices using an appropriate equipment, e.g., HackRF [430].
Eavesdropping can occur when unencrypted information is transmitted over an un-
trusted channel.
Countermeasures: The most effective and well-known defense against eavesdrop-
ping is encryption. For example, the transmitted message can be encrypted using
Advanced Encryption Standard [221]. However, implementing a strong encryption
in WMSs may not be possible in the current state of the technology since they have
limited energy and memory capacity. Fortunately, eavesdropping does not pose a
direct threat to the authentication system. In other words, it is possible to design the
authentication system assuming that eavesdropping does occur on the communica-
tion between the WMSs and the smartphone. In this case, CABA would require that
the data be sent from a smartphone that is previously registered in the system to
ensure that the attacker is not able to capture the biomedical information and send
the captured information to CABA using another smartphone. The smartphone can
send its unique ID over a secure communication link to CABA before transmitting
the biomedical information.
2. Phishing: This is an attack that attempts to fool the user into submitting his con-
fidential or private information, e.g., username, password, email address, and phone
number, to an untrusted server or device [472]. For example, the attacker might at-
tempt to fool the user’s smartphone by sending a counterfeit request that asks the
smartphone to send its authentication-related information to the attacker’s server.
Countermeasures: The most effective way to address phishing attacks is to use a
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digital certificate, i.e., an electronic document that allows a device to exchange in-
formation securely using the public key infrastructure [473]. The certificate carries
information about the key and its owner. In CABA, the server’s digital certificate
can be examined by the smartphone to ensure that the server is trusted.
3. Replay attack: In a replay attack, an attacker records the data, packets, and
user’s credentials, which are transmitted between two devices, e.g., a WMS and the
smartphone, and exploits them for a malicious purpose. In a replay attack against
the authentication system, the attacker attempts to impersonate a legitimate user in
order to bypass the authentication procedure and gain full access to the protected
device, application, or area. Unlike the attacks based on eavesdropping, in a replay
attack, the attacker does not need to interpret the packets. In fact, he can even record
encrypted packets and retransmit them in order to bypass the system.
Countermeasures: An encrypted timestamp, i.e., a sequence of encrypted infor-
mation identifying when the transmission occurred, can be utilized to enable the
authentication system to check that the packets were not previously recorded. More-
over, the packet should include a field that contains the encrypted information, e.g., a
hashed device ID, which can be used in the authentication system to uniquely specify
the sender of the packets and check if the sender is known and trusted.
4. Poisoning attack: In a poisoning attack, the attacker changes the final learning
model by adding precisely-selected invalid data points to the training dataset [161].
In CABA, the attacker might threaten the integrity of the machine learning algorithm
by using an untrusted WMS that aims to add malicious data points to the training
set.
Countermeasures: We describe two types of countermeasures against poisoning
attacks.
1. Outlier detection: One of the common goals of defenses against poisoning
attacks is to reduce the effect of invalid data points on the final result. In a ma-
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chine learning method, such invalid data points are considered outliers in the train-
ing dataset. Several countermeasures against poisoning attacks have been discussed
in [234].
2. Digitally-signed biomedical information: A digital signature can be used to
check the authenticity of the information. It is a mathematical method for demon-
strating the authenticity of a transmitted message. Thus, it provides the means to
the recipient to check if the message is created by a legitimate sender. The WMSs
and the smartphone can digitally sign the biomedical information before transmitting
it.
7.10 Comparison between CABA and previously-
proposed systems
In this section, we first describe why previously-proposed authentication sys-
tems based on biomedical signals (EEG and ECG) may not be well-suited to
continuous authentication. Then, we compare CABA to three promising biometrics-
/behaviometrics-based continuous authentication systems.
The use of EEG [474] and ECG [86, 475] signals, as biomedical traits with high
discriminatory power for user authentication, has received widespread attention in
recent years. Although such authentication systems show promising results, they do
not provide a convenient method for long-term continuous user authentication for
two reasons. First, they commonly need long measurement times and impose a heavy
computational load on the system [88]. Second, due to the size/position requirements
of the electrodes that enable EEG/ECG acquisition [86,87], these systems can mainly
be used for one-time user authentication (or short-term continuous authentication)
systems. For example, the user needs to wear a large cap to collect the data for
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EEG-based authentication [474], which is not convenient for long-term continuous
authentication.
As mentioned in Section 7.1, several biometrics-/behaviometrics-based continuous
authentication systems have been proposed. Among them, facial recognition systems
[447, 454, 476, 477], which use facial features (as biometrics), and keyboard-/mouse-
based authentication systems [449,457,478–481], which rely on keystroke/mouse dy-
namics (as behaviometrics), are the most promising.
Facial recognition systems make use of low-cost cameras that are commonly built
into most laptops. They are accurate when the user looks straight at the webcam.
However, their performance is significantly affected by illumination, pose, expression
or changes in the image acquisition method [454]. Moreover, the user’s facial images
is unavailable when the user turns his head or does not look at the camera. Such
systems are also not useful for tablets and smartphones since the user typically does
not face a built-in camera in these cases.
Previous keyboard-/mouse-based authentication systems report promising results
and provide user authentication in a convenient manner. However, they have four
drawbacks that limit their applicability: (i) their performance is easily impacted by
environmental variables, such as changes in software environments, input devices,
task, or interaction modes [82, 449], (ii) they can only be employed when system
has a keyboard/mouse, (iii) the data often become unavailable, e.g., when the user
is watching a movie on his computer, and (iv) keyboard-based systems need active
involvement of the user for long sessions, e.g., several minutes [457], to guarantee
acceptable accuracy, and mouse dynamics based systems have still not reached an
acceptable accuracy levels [449].
Unlike most continuous authentication systems that support personal computers
and laptops, CABA can be used to protect personal computers, servers, software
applications, and restricted physical spaces. Moreover, WMSs ensure a continuous
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data stream. This enables the user to freely move and change his posture while being
authenticated. In addition, unlike previous systems, CABA can be implemented on
any general-purpose computing unit with sufficient memory capacity and computation
power.
7.11 Discussion
Here, we address three items not yet explained in detail. First, we discuss an impor-
tant privacy concern surrounding the use of biomedical signals. Second, we describe
how CABA can also be used as a stand-alone one-time authentication system. Third,
we discuss the impact of temporal conditions on authentication results.
7.11.1 Health information leakage
An important privacy concern associated with the use of biomedical signals is the
possibility of health information leakage. For example, an adversary might extract
disease-specific information from such signals, e.g., certain heart rate ranges may be
correlated with cardiovascular disease [482]. Exposure of a serious illness or a con-
dition that carries social stigma would naturally raise serious privacy concerns [112].
However, since CABA does not rely on high-precision measurements (it only processes
the average values of Biostreams over specific time frames), the amount of health-
related information potentially leaked by CABA is less than leaked by EEG/ECG-
based approaches that rely on high-quality EEG/ECG signals. Similar concerns have
been discussed in previous research efforts for both biometrics and behaviometrics,
and usually addressed by suggesting legislation [483].
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7.11.2 One-time authentication based on BioAura
CABA can also be used as a stand-alone one-time authentication system. We discuss
several such scenarios next.
• Battery-powered devices: Incurring overheads of continuous authentication on
a battery-powered device may drain its battery quickly, and lead to user incon-
venience.
• Low-security environment: Continuous authentication may not be required in
a low-security environment, e.g., a common room in an apartment.
• Intentionally-shared resources: A user might want to intentionally authorize
a group of users to access some specific locations or resources. For example,
consider a user who uses a smart lock, which grants access to him when he
approaches the door of his house. He may want to open the door for his guests
and leave the house.
Generally, a continuous authentication system that has high accuracy and a short
response time may be able to provide stand-alone one-time authentication or com-
plement a traditional authentication system (whose decision is only considered at the
time of initial login). As discussed in Section 7.6, CABA provides an accurate decision
within a few milliseconds and, hence, is also useful for one-time authentication.
7.11.3 The impact of temporal conditions
The negative impact of temporal conditions, e.g., emotional/physical conditions
and changes in posture, gesture or facial expressions, on widely-used biometrics-
/behaviometrics-based systems have been discussed earlier [80]. Similarly, some
biomedical signals may change significantly due to a change in physical activity.
This may negatively impact authentication accuracy. For example, when the user
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suddenly starts running, his blood pressure, heart rate, and respiration rate increase.
Therefore, if the authentication system has only been trained using data collected
when the user was at rest, it might fail to authenticate the user after he finishes
running. A solution would be to design a state-aware system that takes different
emotional states and physical activities into account. Algorithms exist for recognizing
emotional states [484] and the type [485] and intensity [12] of physical activities using
WMSs. Such algorithms can be used in conjunction with CABA.
7.12 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we proposed CABA, a novel user-transparent system for continuous
authentication based on information that is already gathered by WMSs for diagnos-
tic and therapeutic purposes. We described a prototype implementation of CABA
and comprehensively investigated its accuracy and scalability. We also described
how CABA can be used to support user identification. We then presented an RAA
scheme that uses the decisions from CABA to enable flexible access control. We com-
pared CABA to previously-proposed continuous authentication systems (biometrics-
and behaviometrics-based), and highlighted its advantages. We discussed several at-
tacks against the proposed authentication system along with their countermeasures.
Finally, we briefly described an privacy concerns surrounding the use of biomedi-
cal signals, how CABA can also be used for one-time authentication, and impact of
temporal conditions on authentication.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm provides an opportunity
to transform isolated devices into communicating things. As a side effect of rapid
advances in the development of IoT-enabled systems, the number of potential se-
curity/privacy attacks against such systems, in particular wearable medical sensor
(WMS)-based systems, has grown exponentially. Therefore, common security threats
and privacy concerns need to be studied and addressed in depth. This thesis at-
tempted to explore and address different security/privacy-related issues associated
with IoT-enabled systems with a special focus on WMS-based systems.
8.1 Thesis summary
In Chapter 1, we discussed different IoT reference models and the scope of IoT appli-
cations. We described what security means in the scope of IoT and who the attackers
that target the IoT might be, and what motivations they might have. Furthermore,
we discussed different WMS-based systems along with their applications, components,
and design requirements.
In Chapter 2, we described related work and provided background for several key
concepts used in this thesis. We summarized different attacks and threats on the
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edge-side layer of IoT and described possible countermeasures against them. We dis-
cussed several research directions that are closely related to the domain of WMSs and
described how previous research studies have facilitated the design and development
of WMS-based systems.
In Chapter 3, we described a secure energy-efficient system for long-term continu-
ous health monitoring. We constructed a wireless body area network (WBAN) using
eight biomedical sensors. Furthermore, we presented different processing and trans-
mission schemes and evaluated our schemes using the WBAN. We also examined the
storage requirements for long-term analysis and storage. Among the four schemes we
evaluated (including the baseline scheme), we showed that the compressive sensing
(CS)-based scheme provides the most computational energy savings because it needs
to process much fewer signal samples. For low-sample-rate sensors, we can achieve
significant energy savings by simply accumulating the raw data before transmitting
them to the base station. In addition, the CS-based scheme also allows us to reduce
the storage requirements significantly. The results indicate that long-term continuous
health monitoring is indeed feasible from both energy and storage points of view.
In Chapter 4, we presented OpSecure, an optical secure communication channel
between an implantable medical device (IMD) and an external device, e.g., smart-
phone, that enables an intrinsically short-range, user-perceptible one-way data trans-
mission (from the external device to the IMD). Based on OpSecure, we proposed a
wakeup and a key exchange protocol. In order to evaluate the proposed protocols,
we implemented an IMD prototype, that supports both protocols, and developed an
Android application, which can be used to wake up the IMD and transmit the shared
key from the smartphone to the IMD. We evaluated our prototype implementation
using a human body model. Our experimental results indicate that OpSecure can be
used to implement both wakeup and key exchange protocols for IMDs with minimal
size and energy overheads.
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In Chapter 5, we discussed two sources of information leakage, namely the human
body and implantable and wearable medical devices (IWMDs), which continuously
leak health information. We described two types of signals for each source: acous-
tic and electromagnetic. We presented a variety of attacks on the privacy of health
data by capturing and processing unintentionally-generated leaked signals and also
discussed the feasibility of using intentionally-generated acoustic/electromagnetic sig-
nals to compromise the patient’s health privacy.
In Chapter 6, we discussed Dedicated Intelligent Security Attacks on Sensor-
triggered Emergency Responses (DISASTER). It exploits design flaws and security
weaknesses of safety mechanisms utilized in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) to trig-
ger the system’s emergency responses even when a real emergency situation is not
present. We demonstrated that DISASTER can lead to serious consequences, ranging
from economic collateral damage to life-threatening conditions. We examined several
already-in-use sensors and summarized common design flaws and security weaknesses
of safety mechanisms. We demonstrated the possibility of launching DISASTER in
realistic scenarios and suggested several countermeasures against the proposed at-
tacks.
In Chapter 7, we proposed a continuous authentication system based on biologi-
cal aura (CABA). We described a prototype implementation of CABA and examined
its accuracy and scalability. We discussed how CABA can be used to support user
identification. We presented a real-time adaptive authorization scheme, which uses
decisions provided by CABA to enable flexible access control. We compared CABA
to previously-proposed continuous authentication systems and highlighted its advan-
tages. We discussed several attacks against the proposed authentication system along
with their countermeasures. We also described privacy concerns surrounding the use
of biomedical signals, how CABA can also be used for one-time authentication, and
impact of temporal conditions on authentication.
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8.2 Future directions
Next, we describe several avenues along which the proposed schemes and techniques
we presented can be further explored.
Targeting weak links of IoT-enabeled systems
The majority of IoT-based services rely on compact battery-powered devices with
limited storage and computation resources. Due to the special characteristics of these
devices and cost factors considered important by manufacturers, several already-in-
market devices do not support highly-secure cryptographic protocols. This has led to
the emergence of an enormous number of weak links in the network/system that can be
exploited by an attacker to target other presumably-secure entities in the network. A
few research efforts [486,487] have recently demonstrated the possibility of targeting
weak edge nodes to extract the home user’s WiFi password. Chapman [486] has
demonstrated how Internet-connected light bulbs can reveal the user’s WiFi password
to the attacker. In [487], a similar attack is discussed, which extracts the WiFi
password by targeting the user’s smart lock. The endless variety of IoT applications
magnifies the impact of these weak edge nodes. DISASTER, which we described in
Chapter 6, also targets insecure sensors in home automation and industrial CPSs.
Similar attacks can be proposed and investigated in other application domains.
Unexpected uses of collected data
The widespread use of ubiquitous computing enabled by IoT technologies has led to
the pervasive deployment of Internet-connected sensors in modern day living. In re-
cent years, a few research efforts have attempted to shed light on unexpected uses of
different types of environment-/user-related data collected by Internet-connected sen-
sors [488–491]. For example, McKenna et al. have provided a list of privacy-sensitive
information, e.g., number of residents, personal habits, and daily routines, that can
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be inferred from smart homes’ electricity load data collected by smart meters [488].
Despite the existence of previous research efforts, the extent of private information
that can be inferred from presumably non-critical data is neither well-known nor
well-understood.
Promising authentication solutions
As we described in Chapter 7, password-based authentication has several issues span-
ning user inconvenience to security flaws. For example, a serious security flaw of
one-time password-based authentication is its inability to detect unauthorized users
after initial authentication. Such issues have boosted the design and development of
continuous authentication mechanisms, e.g., face recognition and keystroke-based au-
thentication systems. In Chapter 7, we presented a novel continuous authentication
system based on biomedical signals collected by WMSs and described why the pro-
posed system has an advantage over previously-proposed systems. Similar systems
can be designed using another set of biomedical signals, which can potentially ad-
dress a variety of issues associated with the use of one-time password-based systems.
Moreover, researchers may want to investigate the effect of temporal changes in the
user’s biomedical signals on authentication results.
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